IN RE WICKS/SCHOONMAKER/BURK MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KANE WICKS, JOSEPH
SCHOONMAKER, SHALYN SCHOONMAKER,
and ZOEY BURK, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
June 3, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 294894
Clinton Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 08-020705-NA
KRISTY BURK,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and FORT HOOD and DAVIS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order that terminated her parental rights to the
minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that at least one of the statutory grounds for
termination of respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The three older children, Kane, Joseph,
and Shalyn, came to the court’s attention after Shalyn tested positive for marijuana at birth, and
respondent tested positive for marijuana, Ultram and Vicodin that same day. Respondent’s use
of marijuana and prescription drugs during her pregnancy with Shalyn resulted in her premature
birth and numerous ongoing and persistent health problems.
An emergency preliminary hearing was held on August 21, 2008; respondent tested
positive for marijuana at that hearing. The hearing was continued to August 28, 2008; at the
conclusion of that hearing, the children were made temporary wards based on respondent’s
admission that both she and Shalyn tested positive for marijuana after Shalyn’s birth.
Respondent also admitted that she tested positive for the prescription drugs Ultram and Valium,
but she claimed to have a valid prescription for those medications. Respondent admitted that
there were warrants out for her arrest for not paying court fines and costs. At the time,
respondent did not have a job, and she was living with her father and his girlfriend.
A dispositional hearing was held in September 2008, at which time respondent was
ordered to attending parenting classes and individual counseling. She had already completed a
-1-
psychological evaluation, which revealed that she was emotionally unstable. Respondent
consistently tested positive for benzodiazepines; she reported that she took prescription
medication for pain related to a 2004 car accident.
At the next review hearing, on December 18, 2008, respondent was pregnant, had tested
positive for benzodiazepines and cocaine, had missed numerous drug screens and had recently
been sentenced to jail for retail fraud. Before her incarceration, respondent missed numerous
appointments, failed to follow-up on referrals and frequently tested positive for benzodiazepines
and opiates, and on one occasion, cocaine. She also missed nine drug screens.
Respondent remained incarcerated until February 2009. Upon release, respondent failed
to keep numerous appointments or to attend two different sessions with Outreach Parenting. She
had one session of individual counseling in March 2009, but failed to meet with her parenting
class instructor. She tested positive for benzodiazepines twice, and failed to appear for five other
drug screens after her release. She tested positive for cocaine and prescription medications at a
March 2009 review hearing. In April 2009, the counselor recommended that respondent receive
inpatient treatment. The worker arranged for respondent to attend an intake evaluation and even
arranged transportation, but respondent was nowhere to be found.
Zoey was born on April 15, 2009. She was premature and possibly suffered from
cerebral palsy due to some unknown in utero trauma. A dispositional hearing regarding Zoey
was held in May 2009. Respondent was re-arrested and jailed in May 2009, where she remained
until the termination hearing in October 2009. She was awaiting sentencing for retail fraud and
was facing a possible five-year sentence, in light of her extensive history of shoplifting dating
back to 2005.
The evidence presented at the termination trial clearly established that respondent had a
serious and chronic substance abuse problem that was not properly addressed. Although she
completed a drug program in jail during her stay from December 2008 to February 2009, it was
obvious that the treatment did not help, as respondent continued to test positive for cocaine and
other substances through March 2009. The fact that respondent had been in jail for the five
months before the termination hearing did not mean that her substance abuse issues were being
properly addressed. It was clear that respondent needed intensive, inpatient treatment. However,
she failed to avail herself of those services when they were made available to her in April 2009.
In addition to respondent’s substance abuse issues, she also had unaddressed emotional
problems, and she had no housing and no income. Indeed, it was obvious from the evidence
presented at the termination trial that respondent’s position had actually worsened since the
original dispositional hearing in September 2008. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by
concluding that the conditions leading to adjudication continued to exist without a reasonable
likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time, considering the
children’s ages.
Additionally, respondent could not provide the children with proper care or custody. She
had been in jail during most of the case and could not work toward her service agreement. She
failed to avail herself of services that were offered to her when she was briefly out of jail.
Respondent had no housing or income and continued to struggle with substance abuse and
emotional problems. Finally, there was a substantial likelihood that the children would have
been harmed if returned to respondent’s care. She had an extensive unaddressed substance abuse
-2-
problem. She also had an extensive criminal history and re-offended during the pendency of this
case. Her drug use and criminality placed the children in jeopardy.
Having found statutory grounds for termination established by clear and convincing
evidence, the trial court then had to decide whether termination of respondent’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Respondent never independently cared
for Shalyn or Zoey, who were immediately made temporary wards after their births. The girls
did not share a bond with respondent. Shalyn had extensive medical needs, including numerous
appointments with specialists and numerous medications. While respondent shared a bond with
Joseph and Kane, she had not seen any of the children in five months because she was
incarcerated. Respondent could not take care of herself, let alone four children. She had no
housing and no income, and she continued to struggle with unaddressed substance abuse and
emotional issues. Three of the children had been in care for over a year and respondent was no
closer to being reunified with them. They were entitled to permanence and stability.
Respondent next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to appoint
separate counsel for Kane after his guardian ad litem indicated that her position differed from
that of Kane’s, who did not want his mother’s parental rights terminated. Respondent does not
have standing to raise the issue because the guardian ad litem’s statutory obligation is to the
child, not the parent. See MCL 712A.17d(1); In re Foster, 226 Mich app 348, 358; 573 NW2d
324 (1997). Even assuming that respondent has standing to raise the issue, however, it cannot be
argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint separate counsel for Kane
when it was never asked to exercise that discretion. Additionally, use of the term “may” in both
the statute and court rule signifies that such a decision is discretionary, not mandatory. Warda v
Flushing City Council, 472 Mich 326, 332; 696 NW2d 671 (2005). The evidence clearly
demonstrated that respondent was not in a position to provide for her children. Kane, being over
ten years old at the time of the termination, undoubtedly wanted to maintain contact with his
mother, but the evidence supported a finding that continued contact with her was not in his best
interests. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint separate counsel for
Kane.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.