PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN DANIEL SMOOT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 1, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289540
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 08-010647-FH
STEVEN DANIEL SMOOT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and SAWYER and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC III), MCL 750.520d(1)(b), for which he was sentenced to 84 to 180 months’
imprisonment with credit for 191 days served. Defendant appeals as of right, and for the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we affirm the conviction and sentence of defendant.
This case began with an alleged arranged meeting between defendant and the
complainant in June 2008. Defendant and others went to the complainant’s home and smoked
cigarettes and marijuana in her driveway. According to the complainant’s testimony, she and
defendant went for a walk out of the view of the others and they engaged in three sexual acts.
The complainant testified that she did not consent to any of the sexual acts and that defendant
had forced himself on her. Defendant testified that the complainant consented to all three sexual
acts. Defendant was charged with three counts of CSC III; the jury acquitted him of the first two
counts and convicted him of the third count.
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant first argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of CSC
III. We review de novo insufficiency of the evidence claims. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). This is a deferential standard requiring the reviewing court to
draw all reasonable inferences and resolve credibility issues in favor of the jury verdict. People
v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
In the present case, to properly convict defendant of CSC III, plaintiff had to show that
defendant used force or coercion when he sexually penetrated the complainant. MCL
750.520d(1)(b).
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Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, any of the following
circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of
physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use
force or violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the
present ability to execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate
in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that
the actor has the ability to execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, “to
retaliate” includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the
victim in a manner or for purposes that are medically recognized as unethical or
unacceptable.
(v) When the actor, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is
able to overcome the victim. [MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i)-(v).]
Defendant does not dispute that the three sexual acts alleged actually happened. Nor
does he dispute that the prosecutor presented evidence that could support his guilt. Rather,
defendant argues that because the complainant’s testimony about what happened was
inconsistent and her conduct was inconsistent with nonconsensual sex, there was insufficient
evidence of his guilt. Defendant also claims the prosecution’s other witnesses were not credible.
Given that both the complainant and defendant agree that they engaged in sexual acts, the
only issue before the jury was whether it believed the complainant’s testimony that the sexual
acts were committed without consent and through force or defendant’s assertion that all sexual
acts were consensual. As the trier of fact, the jury was free to accept a portion or all of either
defendant or the complainant’s testimony. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 228; 749 NW2d
272 (2008). Regardless of any inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony or any perceived
questionable conduct on her part on the date in question, the fact remains that the complainant
maintained that despite her telling defendant that she did not want to have sex with him, he
forced himself on her anyway. This Court has repeatedly held that it is the function of the jury,
not the courts, to weigh the competing evidence presented at trial. See Unger, 278 Mich App at
228-229, quoting People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 431; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). For that
reason, it is immaterial whether the complainant voluntarily walked with defendant down the
road, was not wearing any underwear, or had previously had conversations of a sexual nature
with defendant on the phone. It was also immaterial whether the other prosecution witnesses
were credible. Despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, the complainant’s testimony alone
was adequate. MCL 750.520(h); People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 632 n 6; 576 NW2d 129
(1998).
Defendant argues that because there was a lack of testimony that he actually used force to
overpower the complainant, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We find
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that defendant is mistaken, based on our reading of our Supreme Court’s decision in People v
Carlson, 466 Mich 130; 644 NW2d 704 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court explained that
the force used:
must be force to allow the accomplishment of sexual penetration when absent that
force the penetration would not have occurred. In other words, the requisite
“force” for a violation of MCL 750.520d(1)(b) does not encompass nonviolent
physical interaction in a mechanical sense that is merely incidental to an act of
sexual penetration. Rather, the prohibited “force” encompasses the use of force
against a victim to either induce the victim to submit to sexual penetration or to
seize control of the victim in a manner to facilitate the accomplishment of sexual
penetration without regard to the victim’s wishes. [Carlson, 466 Mich at 140.]
In the present case, the complainant testified that defendant pushed her to the ground and
put his penis inside her vagina. The complainant testified that she did not want to have sex with
defendant and that she pushed him away and told him to stop when he first pulled her into the
woods and began kissing her. Also, when defendant performed cunnilingus on her, she told him
to stop at least three times and tried to scoot away from him. Although the complainant did not
say no to defendant when he pushed her to the ground to have sexual intercourse, she testified
that she did not say anything to him or fight him because she was scared. Based on this
testimony and our reading of Carlson, there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant used
force to facilitate the accomplishment of sexual penetration without regard to the complainant’s
wishes.
Next, defendant argues that because the complainant did not receive any injuries, save a
small scratch on her back, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant
is in error because defendant’s argument relies on his mistaken belief that to be found guilty of
CSC III there must be some manifestation of the force used to accomplish the sexual penetration.
Our Supreme Court’s holding in Carlson belies any such argument. Moreover, to be found
guilty of CSC III, it is not necessary that the victim suffer an actual injury. MCL 750.520(d).
Lastly, defendant argues that because the complainant did not resist his efforts to have
sex with her, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant’s argument is
without merit. Pursuant to MCL 750.520i,1 a victim of a sexual assault is not required to resist
the defendant in any way. People v Jansson, 116 Mich App 674, 683; 323 NW2d 508 (1982).
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a
rational trier of fact could reasonably find defendant guilty of CSC III. That the jury was
presented with conflicting evidence does not change this conclusion. “It is for the trier of fact,
not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may fairly be drawn from the evidence and
to determine the weight to be accorded to those inferences.” Hardiman, 466 Mich at 428.
B. INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICTS
1
This statute provides: “A victim need not resist the actor in prosecution under sections 520b to
520g.”
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Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction because the jury’s
verdicts were inconsistent. Specifically, defendant argues that because it was undisputed that he
and the complainant engaged in three sexual acts, the jury was required to convict or acquit
defendant on all three counts. According to defendant, the jury’s inconsistent verdict can only be
attributed to its confusion about the law. For that reason, defendant argues he is entitled to a
reversal of his conviction.
We review de novo whether a jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. See People v Tombs,
472 Mich 446, 462-463; 697 NW2d 494 (2005), overruled on other grounds by People v Nix,
479 Mich 112; 734 NW2d 548 (2007).
In Michigan, a jury is permitted to reach inconsistent verdicts. People v Vaughn, 409
Mich 463, 465-466; 295 NW2d 354 (1980). In Vaughn, our Supreme Court stated:
“Because the jury is the sole judge of all the facts, it can choose, without any
apparent logical basis, what to believe and what to disbelieve. What may appeal
to the judge as ‘undisputed’ need not be believed by a jury.” People v Chamblis,
395 Mich 408, 420; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).
Juries are not held to any rules of logic nor are they required to explain
their decisions. The ability to convict or acquit another individual of a crime is a
grave responsibility and an awesome power. An element of this power is the
jury’s capacity for leniency. Since we are unable to know just how the jury
reached their conclusion, whether the result of compassion or compromise, it is
unrealistic to believe that a jury would intend that an acquittal on one count and
conviction on another would serve as the reason for defendant’s release. These
considerations change when a case is tried by a judge sitting without a jury. But
we feel that the mercy-dispensing power of the jury may serve to release a
defendant from some of the consequences of his act without absolving him of all
responsibility. [Vaughn, 409 Mich at 466 (footnote omitted; emphasis in
original).]
Even though the jury was permitted to reach inconsistent verdicts, we conclude that the
verdicts in this case were not inconsistent. The complainant testified that all three sexual
penetrations were not consensual and that she told defendant no when he tried to perform
cunnilingus on her and right before he vaginally penetrated her. In contrast, defendant asserted
that the complainant consented to all three sexual acts. If there is an interpretation of the
evidence that logically explains the jury’s findings, the verdict is not inconsistent. Tombs, 472
Mich at 462-463. The jury apparently believed that the complainant consented to the
cunnilingus and fellatio, but not the vaginal penetration. The jury’s acceptance of and rejection
of certain components of defendant’s testimony and the complainant’s testimony in this case
logically explains the jury’s verdict. Thus, the verdict is not inconsistent.
C. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Defendant argues that the trial court made several procedural and evidentiary rulings that
deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, defendant contends on appeal that the trial court abused
its discretion when: (1) it denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial, (2) allowed the
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complainant’s brother to testify as a rebuttal witness, (3) allowed the complainant’s mother to
testify about the changes in the complainant’s behavior following the alleged rape, and (4) ruled
that the complainant’s sister’s testimony regarding the complainant’s hearsay statements were
admissible under the excited utterance exception.
Defendant’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for
mistrial is based on the assistant prosecutor eliciting testimony from the complainant that she had
been sexually assaulted by her brother. At the time the testimony was elicited, the trial court had
yet to rule on the admissibility of such testimony. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on the assistant prosecutor’s conduct in
eliciting this testimony.
A trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 390; 605 NW2d 374 (1999). Absent a
showing of prejudice, an error does not warrant reversal. Id.
In the present case, before the start of trial and opening arguments, the trial court
informed the assistant prosecutor, that prior to eliciting any testimony, that the complainant’s
brother had previously sexually assaulted her, the assistant prosecutor had to raise the issue
outside the presence of the jury. The assistant prosecutor informed the trial court that the issue
would not be raised in opening argument, but that the complainant would testify about the matter
during direct examination. The assistant prosecutor argued that the incident was relevant to
rebut defendant’s theory that the complainant did not behave as a person who had been sexually
assaulted because such testimony would help the jury to understand why the complainant did not
fight defendant. Defendant argued that the testimony was irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and
inadmissible pursuant to the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j. The trial court expressed
reluctance to rule on the issue at that time because the prosecutor had not filed a trial brief and,
accordingly, it was not prepared to make a ruling. However, on redirect examination, the
assistant prosecutor asked the complainant why she did not fight, scratch, or bite defendant when
he tried to have sex with her, to which the complainant replied, “Because this has happened
before.” Defendant objected and the jury was excused. The trial court then appropriately
admonished the assistant prosecutor for disobeying its previous order by not giving the trial court
an opportunity to make a ruling on the admissibility of the testimony. Before denying
defendant’s motion, the trial court stated that it did not believe the testimony had prejudiced
defendant’s case because it did not believe the jury would convict defendant for something that
the complainant’s brother had done to her. Nonetheless, the court believed that a cautionary
instruction was appropriate and would cure any prejudice arising from the assistant prosecutor’s
error; hence, the jury was recalled and the trial court gave the following curative instruction:
Okay, members of the jury, when we broke, there was some single answer
about something about it happened once before. I’m striking that answer, because
it’s completely irrelevant.
It turns out that what was being referred to had nothing to do with this
Defendant, nothing to do with this incident. Indeed, it is separated from this
incident by a period of years. So it is completely irrelevant to what did or did not
happen here.
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A trial court should grant a mistrial only where the prejudicial effect of an error cannot be
cured any other way. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 195; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). The
purpose in objecting to a prosecutor’s improper conduct at trial is to seek a curative instruction.
People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138, 143; 508 NW2d 144 (1993). Curative instructions are
deemed to cure most errors. People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 370; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).
Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279;
662 NW2d 836 (2003), citing People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Defendant does not demonstrate that the instruction given by the trial court failed to cure
any defect arising as a result of the assistant prosecutor’s improper questioning or that the jury
failed to follow the trial court’s curative instruction. Moreover, in its final instructions, the trial
court told the jury that it could only base its decision regarding defendant’s guilt on evidence that
was properly admitted. The trial court instructed the jury that any evidence that it had excluded
or stricken was not evidence and could not be considered when deciding defendant’s guilt. The
trial court also instructed the jury that lawyers’ questions were not evidence. Because jurors are
presumed to follow their instructions, Abraham, 256 Mich App at 279, citing Graves, 458 Mich
at 482, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.2
Second, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the
assistant prosecutor to call the complainant’s brother as a rebuttal witness. The basis for
defendant’s argument in this regard is the assistant prosecutor’s representations to defendant and
the trial court regarding who the assistant prosecutor intended to call as rebuttal witnesses.
Before defendant’s case-in-chief, the trial court and the parties discussed whether the
assistant prosecutor anticipated calling any rebuttal witnesses. Because the trial court did not
issue a formal sequestration order, defendant wanted to clarify whether the assistant prosecutor
anticipated calling any of the witnesses that had remained in the courtroom during the
proceedings. The assistant prosecutor informed the trial court that if it did call a rebuttal witness,
it would be the complainant. After defendant rested, the assistant prosecutor asked to call the
complainant’s brother as a rebuttal witness to rebut defendant’s testimony that he did not tell the
brother that defendant had had sex with the complainant and that it was consensual. Defendant’s
objection to this testimony was twofold: first, the brother had been in the courtroom during the
presentation of defendant’s case and second, the assistant prosecutor had made representations
that his only rebuttal witness would be the complainant.
Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court ruled that the assistant prosecutor could
call the brother for the limited purpose requested. The trial court explained that while it was
concerned about the assistant prosecutor’s representation that it did not intend to call any rebuttal
witnesses other than the complainant, it did not find that a sufficient basis to deny the assistant
prosecutor’s request to question the complainant’s brother.
2
We recognize that evidence that the complainant might have been raped before could raise a
question of the admissibility of that type of evidence under the rape shield statute, MCL
750.520j. Because the trial court did not rule on this issue, we make no decision regarding the
admissibility of such evidence under that statute.
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Defendant does not deny that the complainant’s brother’s testimony was proper rebuttal
evidence. Rather, his argument rests on the mistaken assumption that because of the
prosecutor’s representations, the trial court could not properly allow the rebuttal testimony
without violating defendant’s due process rights. First, defendant cites no authority compelling
this Court to conclude that the trial court’s ruling was improper. Second, because a criminal trial
is not scripted play, a trial court must have broad power to address situations that might arise in
the adversary process. MCL 768.29; People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398; 547 NW2d 673
(1996), relying on Geders v United States, 425 US 80, 86; 96 S Ct 1330; 47 L Ed 2d 592 (1976).
Because the brother’s testimony was proper rebuttal evidence, People v Natella, 215 Mich App
77, 85; 544 NW2d 667 (1996),3 it cannot be said that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of
discretion.
Even if we were to concur with defendant that the actions of the assistant prosecutor
constituted error, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue because he has not established
the requisite prejudice. Wells, 238 Mich App at 390. It is undisputed that defendant and the
complainant engaged in three sexual acts that were the subject of defendant’s trial. We conclude
the brother’s rebuttal testimony that defendant told him that defendant and the complainant had
consensual sex bolsters rather than rebuts defendant’s defense. Thus, even if improperly
admitted, defendant was not prejudiced by the brother’s testimony because the rebuttal testimony
merely bolstered defendant’s defense. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Third, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the
complainant’s mother to testify that the complainant’s demeanor and behavior changed after this
incident. MRE 402 states that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible. . . . Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.” Evidence is relevant if has a tendency to make a fact in issue more
or less probable than without the evidence. MRE 401.
In the present case, defendant maintained that the complainant consented to the sexual
acts that occurred between them. Another theory proffered by defendant was that the
complainant fabricated her story that he had raped her because she thought accusing defendant of
rape was a game or because she felt guilty for cheating on her boyfriend. Thus, based on
defendant’s fabrication theory, whether the complainant’s behavior changed after the alleged
rape was relevant to a determination whether she was sexually assaulted. MRE 402. The
argument that changes in the complainant’s behavior could have been attributed to something
other than a sexual assault goes more to the credibility to be afforded the testimony rather than
its admissibility.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the complainant’s mother’s testimony in this regard
was not inadmissible junk science. Her testimony was based on her perceptions and
observations of the complainant’s behavior, not hypothetical facts, and thus was proper lay
opinion. MRE 701. Moreover, she did not testify that the changes in the complainant’s behavior
3
See also Figgures, 451 Mich at 399 (stating that whether rebuttal evidence is admissible is not
dependent upon whether it could have been introduced during the prosecution’s case in chief, but
rather whether the evidence is responsive to material presented by the defense).
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were consistent with how a sexual assault victim might behave after a sexual assault, nor did she
offer any scientific opinions or evidence. She simply testified that the complainant’s behavior
changed after the alleged sexual assault. For that reason, we reject defendant’s argument. See
Unger, 278 Mich App at 216-220.
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that several
hearsay statements made by the complainant to her sister were admissible under the excited
utterance exception.
Pursuant to MRE 803(2), a statement is not inadmissible hearsay if it is related to “a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition.” There are two primary requirements for a statement to be admissible
under the excited utterance exception: “1) that there be a startling event, and 2) that the resulting
statement be made while under the excitement caused by the event.” People v Smith, 456 Mich
543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), citing People v Straight, 430 Mich 418, 424; 424 NW2d 257
(1998).
The startling event in this case was the sexual assault of the complainant by defendant.
Straight, 430 Mich at 424. Thus, the only question is whether the complainant was still under
the stress of the event when she made the statements to her sister. Id. Several witnesses testified
that when the complainant returned to the house with defendant, she did not seem like herself
and they thought something was wrong with her. In addition, the complainant’s sister testified
that immediately before the complainant made the statements, she was crying and could barely
utter any words. Based on this testimony, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the
complainant was still under the stress of the sexual assault when she made the statements, thus
qualifying them as excited utterances. The Court gives wide discretion to a trial court’s decision
that a declarant was still under the stress of the startling event. Smith, 456 Mich at 552.
Defendant argues that because there was a lapse in time between the sexual assault and
when the complainant made the statements to her sister, the trial court should have excluded the
statements. Defendant is mistaken. The proper focus in determining the admissibility of a
statement under the excited utterance exception is whether the declarant had the capacity to
fabricate, not whether there was a lack of time for the declarant to fabricate. Id. at 551. “[A]
person who is still under the ‘sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling event will
not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication so that any utterance will be spontaneous
and trustworthy.’” Smith, 456 Mich at 550, quoting 5 Weinstein, Evidence (2d ed), § 803.04[1],
p 803-19; see also People v Kowalski, 215 Mich App 554, 559; 546 NW2d 681 (1996)
(upholding a 30- to 45-minute lapse in time and stating there is no definite and fixed period of
time to consider when deciding whether a statement is admissible under the excited utterance
exception).
D. IMPROPER JURY INSTRUCTION
Defendant next argues that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial when it improperly
instructed the jury regarding consent. Specifically, he argues that because the trial court refused
to read Michigan Criminal Jury Instruction 20.27 in its entirety, he is entitled to a new trial.
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A trial court has an obligation to instruct the jury of all the applicable law and to present
its instructions in an understandable manner. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 606; 709
NW2d 595 (2005). If supported by the evidence, a court must give a requested instruction.
People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 124; 649 NW2d 30 (2002).
CJI2d 20.27, which is applicable in sex crimes where the defendant alleges consent,
states:
(1) There has been evidence in this case about the defense of consent. A
person consents to a sexual act by agreeing to it freely and willingly, without
being forced or coerced.
(2) It is not necessary to show that [name complainant] resisted the
defendant to prove that this crime was committed. Nor is it necessary to show
that [name complainant] did anything to lessen the danger to [himself/herself].
(3) In deciding whether or not the [name complainant] consented to the
act, you should consider all of the evidence. It may help you to think about the
following questions:
(a) Was [name complainant] free to leave and not take part in the sexual
act?
[(b) Did the defendant threaten (name complainant) with present or future
injury?]
[(c) Did the defendant use force, violence, or coercion?]
[(d) Did the defendant display a weapon?]
[(e) Name any other relevant circumstances.]
(4) If you find that the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to whether
[name complainant] consented to the act freely and willingly, then you must find
that defendant not guilty.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court was not required to read CJI2d 20.27 in
its entirety even though it was requested to do so. A review of CJI2d 20.27 reflects that
subsections (a)-(d) are merely examples of situations that might involve force or coercion to help
aid the jury in deciding whether consent existed. Although examples are helpful, trial courts are
not required to provide a jury with examples to clarify the meaning of a legal term. See People v
Edwards, 206 Mich App 694, 696-697; 522 NW2d 727 (1994). Moreover, because the CJIs do
not have the sanction of the Supreme Court, a trial court is not required to use them. See People
v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 277; 380 NW2d 11 (1985). Because the trial court’s instructions to the
jury, as a whole, fairly presented the issues to be tried and the substance of defendant’s consent
defense, and because instructing that force or coercion might exist if defendant displayed a
weapon would only confuse the jury since it was undisputed that no weapon was involved,
defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
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We also find unconvincing, defendant’s argument that because the trial court did not read
CJI2d 20.27 in its entirety, the jury was confused. Although the jury requested clarification of
the definition of consent, the instruction the trial court gave was not inadequate and did not fail
to alleviate any confusion the jury might have had regarding consent.
E. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Next, defendant argues he was denied a fair trial when the assistant prosecutor committed
several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant asserts several instances at trial in
which the prosecutor’s conduct was improper. We find merit to two of his claims only, so we
will limit our discussion to just those two.4
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing
court must examine the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v Thomas,
260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). The propriety of a prosecutor’s statements is
determined from an evaluation of the statements in light of the facts of the case. People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). The test of prosecutorial misconduct is
whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58,
63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
Defendant argues that the assistant prosecutor improperly questioned him during crossexamination about his lack of employment and income. While the questioning on issues of
defendant’s lack of a steady job and his income was limited, it bore no relationship to any issue
presented at trial and clearly constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
Generally, it is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant about his lack of
employment and income. People v Johnson, 393 Mich 488, 496-497; 227 NW2d 523 (1975).
4
Defendant’s complete list of prosecutor error is as follows: (1) that after defendant was read his
rights he asked for an attorney and refused to talk to the police; (2) that defendant did not have a
consistent job or income; (3) that the complainant had been raped by her brother; (4) that the
complainant’s mother would testify that the complainant had changed since the rape (stated by
the prosecutor in his opening statement); (5) that defendant had brought marijuana to the
complainant’s house and everyone there was smoking it; (6) that the complainant told her
boyfriend about the rape; and (7) that defendant did not care about STDs or pregnancy because
he did not use a condom (stated by the prosecutor in his closing argument). In addition, during
closing argument, defendant contends that the assistant prosecutor improperly made several
arguments that were not supported by the evidence, improperly appealed to the sympathy of the
jury, and denigrated defendant and his counsel. Further, the prosecutor’s opening argument
improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant and improperly told the jury that the
complainant’s mother would testify about changes in the complainant’s behavior after the
alleged rape. Absent these errors, defendant argues that he would not have been convicted, and
consequently, he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
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[T]o “assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the
rich”. To do so would “effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and
demolish Pro tanto the presumption of innocence”. Our system of justice and its
constitutional guarantees are simply too fragile to permit this type of unfounded
character assassination. [People v Andrews, 88 Mich App 115, 118; 276 NW2d
867 (1979).]
We find most troubling the assistant prosecutor’s statement that because defendant did
not have a steady job and had little money it gave him a motive to sexually assault the
complainant. Such an argument is the archetype of unfounded character assassination expressly
prohibited by our Supreme Court in Johnson. That argument, along with the assistant
prosecutor’s questioning of defendant regarding those issues, was highly improper and as
previously asserted, constituted prosecutorial misconduct. We are nevertheless bound by prior
precedent to reject defendant’s claim that a miscarriage of justice occurred. The questions and
argument pertaining to defendant’s lack of steady employment and income can best be described
as fleeting, and nothing in the record leads us to conclude that such questions and arguments had
any effect on the outcome of the trial. Also, defendant failed to object to the assistant
prosecutor’s improper questions, perhaps to avoid jury concentration on the matter, and because
any prejudice from the questions could have been cured with a limiting instruction, we are
compelled to find that a miscarriage of justice did not occur. People v Watson, 245 Mich App
572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
We also agree with defendant that the assistant prosecutor improperly elicited testimony
from the complainant that her brother had previously raped her. Nevertheless, for the reasons
already discussed, we find that defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Lastly, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the assistant prosecutor’s errors
deprived him of a fair trial. The cumulative effect of several minor instances of misconduct can
warrant reversal even when the individual errors would not. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich
App 635, 649; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). Our review of the entire record in this matter creates a
close question regarding whether the cumulative effect of the assistant prosecutor’s instances of
misconduct deprived defendant of a fair trial. When expressly told by the trial court not to
engage in eliciting certain testimony, the assistant prosecutor ignored the trial court’s clear and
express ruling and was justly admonished. When asked who would be called to testify as
rebuttal witnesses, the assistant prosecutor provided the trial court and defense counsel with
inaccurate information. Lastly, the assistant prosecutor asked questions of defendant and made
legal arguments which had been expressly forbidden by our Supreme Court since 1975. Thus,
the issue before us is not whether there was prosecutorial misconduct, but whether that
misconduct was so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
When improper testimony was elicited, the trial court gave a curative instruction, thereby
curing the error. Even though the assistant prosecutor failed to inform the trial court and
defendant that the complainant’s brother would be called to the stand as a rebuttal witness, the
only testimony given by the witness bolstered the defendant’s case. Lastly, while we have
already indicated our opinion of the improper questioning and argument regarding defendant’s
lack of steady employment and income, such questions and argument were fleeting and we are
not left with an impression that they had any effect on the outcome of the trial. Further, defense
counsel may have chosen to allow the wayward remarks to pass so as not to draw attention to his
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client’s economic status. Thus, when reviewing the record in its entirety, we cannot conclude
that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of a
fair trial. For that reason, we also hold that defendant was not deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d
674 (1984); People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007).
F. SENTENCING
In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the
trial court made several errors when scoring Offense Variables 3, 4, and 10 and Prior Record
Variable 2.
An appellate court reviews a sentencing court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, and
must determine whether the record evidence adequately supports a particular score. People v
Wilson, 265 Mich App 386, 397; 695 NW2d 351 (2005).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it assessed 5 points for OV 3 because
there was no evidence that the complainant suffered a physical injury. The record reflects that
during the sexual assault, the complainant’s back was scratched as defendant pushed her to the
ground. Albeit slight, the complainant suffered a bodily injury not requiring medical treatment.
For that reason and because bodily injury is not an element of CSC III, we find that the trial court
properly assessed 5 points for OV 3. MCL 777.33(1)(e); MCL 777.33(2)(d).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it assessed 10 points for OV 4
because there was no evidence that the complainant sought treatment for a serious psychological
injury. We disagree. It is not a prerequisite to assessing 10 points under OV 4 that the victim
seek treatment for serious psychological injury prior to sentencing. MCL 777.34(2); People v
Apgar, 264 Mich App 321, 329; 690 NW2d 312 (2004). Nonetheless, in the complainant’s
victim impact statement, she stated that she had sought counseling and that this incident had torn
her life apart. In addition, she testified at trial that she was scared during the incident. Thus, the
trial court properly assessed 10 points for OV 4.
Next, defendant claims the trial court erred when it assessed 5 points for OV 10 because
there was no evidence that he exploited the complainant. The record reflects that defendant, age
29, used his size and strength to force the 16-year-old complainant to have sex against her will
after they had smoked marijuana and after they had walked away from the other people in their
group to an isolated location. The age difference between defendant and the complainant alone
was sufficient to support the trial court’s assessment of 5 points for OV 5. See People v
Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 103; 712 NW2d 703 (2006) (stating that the trial court properly assessed
points under OV 10 when the defendant was 20 years old and the victim was 15 years old).
Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in scoring OV 5.
Defendant also raises a Blakely5 argument in that he asserts the trial court relied upon
facts that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to enhance his sentence. However, as
5
Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).
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previously discussed, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s sentencing
decisions. Additionally, our Supreme Court has explicitly held that Blakely does not apply to
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 146; 715 NW2d
778 (2006).
Lastly, defendant argues that because he had only been previously convicted of two
felonies, the trial court erred when it assessed 30 points for PRV 2. A review of defendant’s
presentence investigation reports reflects that he had been convicted of six felonies prior to his
conviction for the instant offense. Therefore, the trial court properly assessed 30 points for PRV
2.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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