PEOPLE OF MI V FADIA MOHAMAD KLAIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289522
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000399-FH
FADIA MOHAMAD KLAIT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and K.F. KELLY and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72. She was sentenced
to 15 months to 20 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that her statement1 to the police should not have
been admitted because she was in custody and not read her Miranda2 rights. Defendant’s claim
is precluded as a result of the law of the case doctrine. Under the law of the case doctrine, this
Court’s determination of a legal issue will not be decided differently on a subsequent appeal in
the same case if the facts remain materially the same. People v Kozyra, 219 Mich App 422, 433;
556 NW2d 512 (1996). “If a litigant claims error in the first pronouncement, the right of redress
rests in a higher tribunal.” Id.
Back in March 2006, the trial court ruled that defendant’s confession was inadmissible
because she was subject to a custodial interrogation but not informed of her rights. The
prosecution appealed to this Court. This Court reversed, finding that defendant was not in
custody and, therefore, need not have been advised of her rights before being questioned. People
v Klait, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 13, 2007
1
The written statement provided in part, “I sprayed the couch w/lighter fluid and lit it with a
lighter. I sprayed the small pillow and lit it. I made sure the kids weren’t nearby. I thought the
fire would keep Nada away from me. I only wanted to burn it a little bit.” (Original in all caps.)
The statement indicated that it had been read to defendant in Arabic. Defendant printed her
name next to an “x” at the end of the incriminating language in the statement.
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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(Docket No. 271887), slip op at 2. Because the facts have not materially changed, we need not
again reach the question presented by defendant regarding whether she was in custody and
entitled to being informed of her Miranda rights.
Defendant next argues that her statement should not have been admitted because it was
not made voluntarily. This Court performs its own independent review of an issue concerning
the voluntariness of a confession. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609
NW2d 822 (2000). However, we give deference to the trial court’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. People v Jobson, 205 Mich App 708, 710; 518 NW2d 526 (1994).
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination and the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and absent contemplation of Miranda
rights, confessions must be voluntary. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 630-632; 614 NW2d 152
(2000). The test for admissibility under these constitutional provisions requires confessions to be
made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort. Id. at 631. The
Daoud Court also indicated that the rule set forth in Miranda developed because of the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, which called into question whether a defendant’s
statements could truly be deemed the product of free choice. Id. at 632. Given the prior
unpublished opinion in this case and the law of the case doctrine, we shall not address
defendant’s claim that her statements were rendered involuntary because she was not read her
Miranda rights.
At this juncture, it is necessary for us to first address a procedural matter as to the issue of
voluntariness. Defendant argues that the trial court ruled, after holding an evidentiary hearing in
March 2006 on defendant’s motion to suppress her statement, that the statement was not
admissible because defendant was not read her Miranda rights and because the statement was
not voluntary; two separate grounds for suppression. Defendant maintains that this Court’s
previous ruling, alluded to above, only addressed the Miranda aspect of the trial court’s ruling,
not the independent ground that the statement was involuntary. Therefore, part of defendant’s
argument here is that the trial court’s findings and ruling on the issue of whether the statement
was voluntarily made, untouched by this Court’s earlier ruling, did not constitute error. In
essence, defendant is asserting that the trial court did not err in suppressing the statement based
on lack of voluntariness; however, error ultimately occurred because the statement was indeed
admitted into evidence.3 Thus, defendant is asking us to affirm the court’s alleged ruling that the
statement was involuntary, yet reverse the verdict because the statement was admitted.
On review of the record, defendant’s motion to suppress alleged that her statement to
police was not given voluntarily and that she was not read her Miranda rights. An evidentiary
hearing was conducted. At the end of the hearing, defense counsel focused his argument on the
3
The record reflects that, at trial, defense counsel expressly indicated that he had no objection to
the admission of the statement into evidence. However, counsel did aggressively cross-examine
police witnesses concerning the circumstances of the confession in an effort to convince the jury
that little or no weight should be given to the statement because it was coerced. The trial court
instructed the jury that it could give the statement whatever weight it deemed proper under the
facts presented at trial.
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claim that defendant had been subject to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda
warnings. A week after the hearing, the trial court, in open court, rendered its decision to
suppress the statement. Ruling from the bench, the trial court first reviewed and summarized the
testimony of the witnesses. The court then ruled that defendant had been in custody and subject
to a custodial interrogation; therefore, she should have been advised of her Miranda rights, but
they were never given. The trial court then immediately concluded her ruling by stating, “This
was not voluntary. The defendant’s statement is suppressed and not admissible in any court
proceedings.”4 Woven into the ruling were the court’s findings that defendant was not provided
with an adequate translator and that “she also could not read the contents of the paper she signed
and it was not properly translated so that she could make an informed decision as to its contents.”
Our review of the transcript indicates that the court’s discussion was predominantly couched in
the context of determining whether defendant was in custody and denied her Miranda rights,
although defendant’s motion did go beyond the Miranda issue.
The discussion in this Court’s earlier opinion focused solely on the Miranda issue and
whether defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation; however, because the Court
ultimately reversed the order of suppression, the ruling effectively encompassed all grounds
given by the trial court in support of suppression. Following remand, defendant made no claim
to the trial court that the statement should still be suppressed on the basis that this Court failed to
address the separate issue of whether the statement was given voluntarily. Assuming that the
trial court’s ruling included a finding that the confession was involuntary, the law of the case
doctrine would preclude us from considering the issue of voluntariness, where this Court’s
previous opinion reversing the suppression order necessarily rejected the trial court’s ruling in its
entirety. On the other hand, assuming that the trial court’s ruling did not encompass a
determination that the statement needed to be suppressed because, aside from any Miranda
analysis, it was involuntary, and that, therefore, this Court’s opinion did not speak to the issue,
the whole matter of whether the statement was admissible was waived when defense counsel
expressly voiced that he had no objection to the statement’s admission at trial. See People v
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215, 219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
The quirky nature of this issue leads us to the conclusion that it would be best to
additionally rule substantively on the issue of voluntariness. On careful scrutiny of the testimony
given at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, we find that, under the factors set
forth in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988),5 defendant’s
4
The court later ruled that its decision also precluded any testimony by the police regarding
verbal statements made by defendant during the interview. This led to the prosecutor’s decision
to dismiss the case at that point in time.
5
The test of voluntariness should be whether, considering the totality of all
the surrounding circumstances, the confession is “the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker,” or whether the accused's “will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired . . . .”
The line of demarcation “is that at which governing self-direction is lost and
compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the
confession.”
(continued…)
-3-
confession or statement was voluntary. Defendant herself testified that she was not physically
threatened, nor told that she could not leave. Although she testified that she felt nervous,
stressed, and pressured under the circumstances and that she did not believe that she was free to
leave, defendant never expressly stated that she signed the statement only because the police
pressured her into doing so. On being asked why she confessed to starting the fire, defendant
testified:
Okay. The fire marshal when he first started the interview, he was telling
me about the kids. First of all, he told me that he had spoke with my daughter . . .
and he tried to ask her some question to figure out how the fire started. Then
when he told me I spoke with your daughter and if your kids did start the fire just
go ahead, tell me and we can send them to a special school. And then we can
send them to a special school that they can, you know, teach them about fires and
other things.
And then I told him I don’t know if my daughter start the fire because I
don’t know. Maybe they were playing with fireworks because we did have
fireworks in the garage.
We fail to see how this explanation provides a valid basis to find that defendant’s
confession was not the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by defendant or
that her will had been overborne and her capacity for self-determination critically impaired.
Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. Reversal is unwarranted.
Defendant next argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence for the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed arson. We disagree. We review claims of
insufficient evidence de novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002).
(…continued)
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the trial court should
consider, among other things, the following factors: the age of the accused; his
lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience
with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length
of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack
of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an
unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the
confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill
health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food,
sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and
whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.
The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not necessarily
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is
whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made. [Citations omitted;
omission in original.]
-4-
When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a conviction, this
Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether
a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended
441 Mich 1201 (1992). This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining
the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514-515. Circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory
proof of the elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v
Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
Arson is statutorily defined as the willful or malicious burning of “any dwelling house,
either occupied or unoccupied, or the contents thereof, whether owned by himself or another, or
any building within the curtilage of such dwelling house, or the contents thereof[.]” MCL
750.72. Following CJI2d 31.2(4) nearly word for word, the trial court instructed the jury that the
prosecution was required to prove, in part,
that when the defendant burned the building or any of its contents, she intended to
burn the building or contents or intentionally committed an act that created a very
high risk of burning the building or its contents, and that while committing the act
the defendant knew of that risk and disregarded it.
We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the arson conviction. First and
foremost, defendant confessed to setting the fire. As reflected in the instruction, it does not
matter that defendant did not intend to cause the damage resulting from the fire so long as she
intended to start the fire, which she admitted. The confession alone would be sufficient for a
jury to find defendant guilty of statutory arson beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, despite
finding no traces of accelerant in the area, a fire investigator and the fire marshal both testified
on the basis of their experience as fire investigators that the nature of the fire – hot and fast –
indicated that the fire was intentionally set. They testified that the fire likely began on a couch or
near the couch. Moreover, a police officer testified that defendant had the opportunity to set the
fire because she was in the vicinity of the fire when it began. In addition, defendant’s
accusations that another woman set the fire were suspicious given that the woman was confirmed
to have been at work at the time the fire was set. Taken together and viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find defendant guilty of
statutory arson beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We
again disagree. In a post-trial motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, defendant argued that
there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict and that “the great weight of the evidence
would reflect that [defendant] should not have been convicted.” Defendant did not specifically
move for a new trial, and the argument at the motion hearing focused on the sufficiency of the
evidence. A claim that a conviction is against the great weight of the evidence must be preserved
in a motion for new trial, and an unpreserved claim is reviewed for plain error affecting
substantial rights. People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003).
Regardless of whether we review this argument under the plain-error test or treat the argument as
having been properly preserved, reversal is unwarranted.
-5-
A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence only if the evidence preponderates so
heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). “Conflicting testimony and
questions of witness credibility are generally insufficient grounds for granting a new trial.”
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
The evidence in this case does not preponderate so heavily against the verdict as to
amount to a miscarriage of justice if the verdict were permitted to stand. The prosecution
presented evidence that defendant confessed to setting the fire. In addition, there was expert
testimony that the fire was likely intentionally set, and defendant had the opportunity to set the
fire. Moreover, defendant led the police to believe that someone else who could not have set the
fire committed the crime. Therefore, defendant’s conviction was not against the great weight of
the evidence, and she is not entitled to a new trial.
Finally, defendant argues that a statement by the prosecutor during closing argument, that
it was impossible for the fire to have been accidentally set, amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct. We disagree. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed de novo to
determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Wilson, 265 Mich App 386,
393; 695 NW2d 351 (2005). As this issue was not preserved in the trial court, we review the
issue for plain error affecting substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing
court must examine the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v Thomas,
260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Prosecutorial comments must be read as a
whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence
admitted at trial. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 135; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).
As indicated above, defendant argues that the evidence did not support the prosecutor’s
statement that it was impossible for the fire to have been accidentally set. A prosecutor may not
make a statement of fact to the jury which is unsupported by the evidence. People v Fisher, 193
Mich App 284, 291; 483 NW2d 452 (1992). He or she is free to argue the evidence and all
reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to his or her theory of the case. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
While it is true that neither of the fire investigators stated that it was impossible for the
fire to have been accidentally caused, they both testified that they believed, based on the fast and
hot nature of the fire, that it was set intentionally. They both indicated that the fire was likely
caused by an accelerant. The prosecution is allowed to argue all reasonable inferences. Based
on the expert testimony, it could reasonably be inferred that the fire was no accident and that it
was intentionally set. To the extent that the prosecutor’s comment went beyond the testimony
and any reasonable inferences, we cannot conclude, given the strong evidence of guilt, that
defendant’s substantial rights were affected, that defendant was actually innocent, or that the
integrity of the proceedings was compromised. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.ss
Furthermore, the trial court remedied any potential prejudice by indicating to members of
the jury that they and they alone had to decide the facts and determine what occurred. Moreover,
the trial court instructed that “[t]he lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence. They
are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal theories.” These jury
-6-
instructions remedied any potential problems caused by the prosecution’s statement in closing
argument. See People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 56; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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