IN RE MINOUS MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of FRANCESCA MINOUS and
COREY MINOUS, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293026
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2008-000030-NA
2008-000031-NA
COREY L. MINOUS, SR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and K.F. KELLY and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to the
minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(iii), and (k)(v). We affirm.
Respondent admitted being the person who was bathing the four-month-old child when
the child sustained burns that caused severe pain and required six days of treatment in the
hospital. Respondent maintained that the burns were inflicted accidentally when hot water
flowed from a spigot located near the child as he lay in the bathtub. There was evidence,
however, reflecting that the child’s burns were the result of being immersed in hot water.
Respondent’s explanation about the circumstances of the burns did not comport with the
testimony of a recognized expert in the field of child abuse, which rendered suspect respondent’s
claim that the burns were the result of an accident. Indeed, petitioner’s child abuse expert
opined, on the basis of an examination of the child and review of burn photographs, that it was
impossible for the burns to have occurred in the manner described by respondent. Two days
after the child’s release from the hospital, the child reportedly stopped breathing due to a
possible choking and/or seizure incident and was taken to the hospital, where other tests
conducted on the child revealed healing rib and femur fractures as well as evidence of an old
hemorrhage in the brain. Expert testimony indicated abuse and again cast suspicion on
respondent.1
1
Although portions of the lower court record were not provided to us, respondent acknowledges
in his brief that “several doctors testified that it was their ‘opinion’ that the alleged injuries
suffered by [the minor child] were deliberate acts.” (Emphasis added.)
-1-
On the basis of these facts and the record presented to us, we hold that the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that there existed clear and convincing evidence supporting termination
of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(iii), and (k)(v). MCR
3.977(J); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich
341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). While respondent argues that the trial court should have
given more weight to the testimony of his expert witness, regard must be given to the special
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.
MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). There is no basis not to
give deference to the trial court’s decision to attribute greater weight to the testimony of
petitioner’s experts. In cursory fashion, respondent argues that the trial court failed to qualify his
expert as being an expert in child abuse. However, respondent provides no analytical framework
under the rules of evidence, statutory provisions, and caselaw governing the admission of expert
testimony. The issue is insufficiently briefed and thus waived, Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich
87, 105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998), and, regardless, we find that any assumed error was not
prejudicial, MCR 2.613(A), considering that a bench trial was involved.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in its best interests determination.2 In re JK, 468
Mich at 209. There was evidence that respondent inflicted severe physical abuse on the child,
that he failed to appreciate the seriousness of the situation,3 and that respondent failed to provide
a truthful recounting of the incident in which the child was burned.4 Although a psychologist
opined that respondent was a good candidate for counseling, he also believed that respondent
should address his problems before seeing the children and said that it was possible that it would
take years of therapy before respondent was ready to parent. This protective proceeding had
already lasted 18 months, and it was in the children’s best interests not to prolong it further.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
2
MCL 712A.19b(5) provides, “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of
parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall
order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child
with the parent not be made.”
3
Respondent’s characterization of the protective proceeding as “madness” orchestrated by the
Department of Human Services and the legal system demonstrated his ongoing failure to
recognize the need to protect the children.
4
Respondent disclosed at the best interests hearing that he had been under the influence of
marijuana the night that the child was burned.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
