PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES ANTHONY CARREKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290501
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-010942-FH
JAMES ANTHONY CARREKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: METER, P.J., and MURRAY and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction for first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 12 to
20 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree home invasion conviction. We affirm defendant’s
conviction and sentence, but remand for entry of a corrected sentencing information report (SIR)
and an amended Judgment of Sentence.
The first argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to find defendant
guilty of first-degree home invasion. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this
Court reviews the record de novo in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 83; 777 NW2d 483 (2009). In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not interfere with the fact finder’s role
of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of first-degree home invasion are (1) the defendant broke and entered a
dwelling or entered the dwelling without permission, (2) when the defendant did so, he intended
to commit a felony, larceny, or assault, or he actually committed a felony, larceny, or assault
while entering, being present in, or exiting the dwelling, and (3) another person was lawfully
present in the dwelling or the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. MCL
750.110a(2); People v Sands, 261 Mich App 158, 162; 680 NW2d 500 (2004). Identity is an
essential element of every crime. People v Oliphant, 399 Mich 472, 489; 250 NW2d 443 (1976).
Furthermore, MCL 767.39 provides:
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[e]very person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly
commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its
commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall
be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.
The elements of aiding and abetting are: (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant
or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the
commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and
encouragement. People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 6; 715 NW2d 44 (2006). However, a person’s
mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being
committed, is not enough to make a person an aider and abettor. People v Norris, 236 Mich App
411, 419-420; 600 NW2d 658 (1999).
In applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence was sufficient
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant either broke into the victim’s house, or aided
another who broke into the victim’s house. The evidence supported the finding that the victim’s
home was broken into and entered, as the screen to a window was cut and pulled forward, and
the couch just inside that window had been moved away from the window. It was also
undisputed that the victim and his wife were in the house when it was broken into. With respect
to identity, defendant was found leaving the area of the victim’s house, dropped a claw hammer
when approached by police, wore clothing similar to that described by a neighbor, and eventually
admitted to being at the victim’s house standing guard for an unidentified person who broke into
the victim’s house. Defendant’s intent to commit a larceny or felony after breaking in was
established by the time the break-in occurred, as well as by his flight from the scene, see People
v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 226; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), quoting People v Goodin, 257 Mich
App 425, 432; 668 NW2d 392 (2003). These facts were sufficient to convict defendant under
either a direct theory, or an aiding and abetting theory, particularly when we keep in mind that
“[i]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly
drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v
Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing in front of a different judge, not
because his sentence was unlawful, but because the trial court seemed a bit confused about a
sentencing rule. Defendant failed to preserve this issue at sentencing, in a motion for
resentencing, or in a motion to remand. MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). Unpreserved sentencing errors are reviewed for plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211, 227-228; 646 NW2d 875
(2002).
This Court applies the following test in determining whether resentencing should occur
before a different judge:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have
substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views
or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected,
(2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and
(3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to
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any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. [People v Hill, 221 Mich App
391, 398; 561 NW2d 862 (1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Although defendant asserts that the trial court appeared a bit confused regarding the twothirds rule of Tanner1, his minimum sentencing range, as a fourth habitual offender, was 51 to
170 months. MCL 777.63; MCL 777.21(3)(c). Two-thirds of the 20-year (240 month)
maximum sentence would be 160 months. MCL 769.34; People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690;
199 NW2d 202 (1972). Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced defendant because his
12-year (144 month) minimum sentence is within the minimum sentencing guidelines range, and
is less than two-thirds of the 20-year maximum sentence. Accordingly, because no sentencing
error occurred, defendant is not entitled to a remand for resentencing.
Defendant next argues that remand is needed to correct errors in his SIR, an issue
defendant failed to properly preserve because he did not raise it at sentencing, in a motion for
resentencing, or in a motion to remand. MCL 769.34(10); Kimble, 470 Mich at 310-311. This
Court reviews unpreserved sentencing issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. Sexton,
250 Mich App at 227-228.
The only plain error in the SIR is that the trial court never corrected defendant’s
minimum sentencing range in the SIR. At sentencing, the trial court agreed with the prosecution
and defendant to correct the scores on OV-13, OV-15, and OV-19, adjusting defendant from
OV-level III to OV-level II. This resulted in defendant’s minimum sentencing range being
adjusted to 51 to 170 months. However, this was never corrected and defendant’s SIR
incorrectly states his minimum sentencing range to be 57 to 190 months. The prosecution agrees
that this case should be remanded to correct errors in the SIR, and we remand for the ministerial
task of correcting this error.2 MCR 6.435(A).
Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that under MCL 769.11b he is entitled to jail
credit for time served before he was convicted, which is a question of law. People v Givans, 227
Mich App 113, 124; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). This Court reviews de novo questions of law
regarding statutory interpretation. People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 554; 773 NW2d 616 (2009).
MCL 769.11b does not apply to parolees who commit new felonies while on parole. Id.
at 562. Defendant admits he was on parole on the date he was arrested for this offense, and
therefore he is not entitled to credit for time served on the current conviction. The time
defendant served in jail before his conviction in this case must be applied to the unexpired
maximum portion of defendant’s earlier sentence.
1
People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972).
2
On remand, the Judgment of Sentence should be amended to accurately reflect that defendant
was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender. MCR 6.435(A).
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Affirmed, but remanded for correction of the SIR, and for amendment of the Judgment of
Sentence as outlined in this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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