PEOPLE OF MI V ROSALIND LAURICE BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 6, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288551
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-021145-FC
MONTEL JOSEPH PETTIFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288552
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-021158-FC
ROSALIND LAURICE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and K. F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
At a joint jury trial, before separate juries, defendants Montel Pettiford and Rosalind
Brown were each convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a). They
were both sentenced to life in prison without parole. Defendant Pettiford appeals by right in
Docket No. 288551, and defendant Brown appeals by right in Docket No. 288552. We affirm in
both cases.
Defendants’ convictions arise from the drowning death of defendant Brown’s 11-year-old
stepson in April 1985. Defendant Pettiford is defendant Brown’s brother. The victim
disappeared on April 12, 1985. His body was discovered in the Flint River on April 30, 1985.
The victim’s death was initially ruled an accidental drowning. Although a criminal investigation
was opened, no charges were brought.
The investigation was re-opened in 2004 after additional information was received. At
trial, defendant Pettiford’s ex-wife, Cathy Pettiford, testified pursuant to a grant of immunity.
Cathy testified that before the victim’s disappearance, she observed defendants Pettiford and
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Brown help the victim into her house. The victim was not able to walk on his own. Cathy saw
defendant Pettiford give the victim a clear liquid from a brown bottle, and also saw him mix
some of the same liquid into some eggs that defendant Pettiford instructed Cathy to feed to the
victim. The victim complained that his stomach hurt. An hour or two later, Cathy observed
defendants Pettiford and Brown leave the house while carrying the victim, who was unconscious.
Defendants Pettiford and Brown later returned without the victim, and their shoes and pants were
muddy and wet. According to Cathy, defendant Pettiford said that he had drowned the victim,
and defendant Brown was crying.
Other witnesses testified that defendant Brown made statements to them admitting her
involvement in the victim’s death. Defendant Brown’s husband, Jestine, testified that at some
point after 2004, defendant Brown told him that she and defendant Pettiford took the victim to
the river and defendant Pettiford threw him in the water while she stayed in the car. Another
witness, Twila Miller Cochran, testified that defendant Brown told her in 1994 that she gave the
victim some medication and could not wake him up.
A sample of the victim’s blood obtained in 1985 revealed the presence of ethanol (grain
alcohol), isopropanol (rubbing alcohol), and a trace amount of acetone. After the investigation
was reopened, the victim’s body was exhumed and a second autopsy was performed in 2005 by
Dr. Ljubisa Dragovic. Tissue samples were not tested due to the level of decomposition and the
use of embalming fluid. However, Dr. Dragovic testified that the presence of mud in the
victim’s lungs, but not his stomach, indicated that the victim was unconscious when he went into
the water, which would have been consistent with the high ethanol level in his blood. Dr.
Dragovic also testified that the alcohol levels in the victim’s blood indicated that it was ingested
before death, as opposed to produced by the body naturally after death due to decomposition.
Dr. Joyce DeJong, a defense witness, agreed that drowning was the cause of death, but
concluded that the manner was indeterminate. In her opinion, however, the alcohol levels were
consistent with natural postmortem production, and she believed that no conclusions regarding
consciousness could be drawn from the lack of fluid or mud in the victim’s stomach. Dr. DeJong
also believed that it would have been prudent to test the 2005 tissue samples for whatever
additional information they could have yielded.
I. Docket No. 288551
Defendant Pettiford argues, through both appellate counsel and in a supplemental brief
filed in propria persona, that reversal is required because the trial court’s jury instructions
misinformed the jury regarding the scope of Cathy Pettiford’s immunity.
The record indicates that the parties and the trial court discussed the jury instructions at
issue, after which defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the instructions. In addition, after
the court instructed the jury, defense counsel indicated that he had no objection to the
instructions as given. Therefore, any alleged instructional error was waived. People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Defendant Pettiford additionally argues,
however, that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court’s immunity
instructions. Because defendant Pettiford did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
in the trial court, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007).
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Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and a defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The
determination whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 124;
748 NW2d 859, amended 481 Mich 1201 (2008). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance denied him the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d
713 (2007).
In this case, the trial court issued an order authorizing the prosecution to “enter into an
agreement with CATHY MARIE PETTIFORD stating that she would not be prosecuted for the
crime committed against [the victim] in exchange for truthful testimony.” Consistent with this
order, the trial court instructed the jury that “Cathy Pettiford has been promised that she will not
be prosecuted for the crime the defendants are charged with committing.” The court also gave a
cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony in which it advised the jury that it could
consider whether an accomplice’s testimony was influenced by any promises when evaluating
that witness’s credibility, and that “the testimony showed that [Cathy] Pettiford was granted
immunity from prosecution on a charge of murder.” On appeal, defendant Pettiford argues that
defense counsel should have objected to the trial court’s instructions regarding the scope of
Cathy Pettiford’s immunity because they misinformed the jury that she received transactional
immunity, rather than use immunity.
As explained in People v Schmidt, 183 Mich App 817, 826; 455 NW2d 430 (1990):
Transactional immunity is a complete bar to prosecution for the offense to
which the grant of immunity relates, while use immunity allows a witness to be
prosecuted for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, but only if
the prosecution shows that the evidence used against that witness was derived
from a legitimate source, wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
In this case, although Cathy Pettiford testified on cross-examination that she understood that she
could not be prosecuted based on anything she said, there is no indication in the record that the
actual scope of her immunity was ever formally raised as an issue before or during trial.
However, the language of the trial court’s immunity order is consistent with an authorization of
transactional immunity—truthful testimony in exchange for not being prosecuted for a crime
against the victim—and the trial court’s jury instructions were consistent with the scope of
immunity authorized by the trial court’s order.
The basis for defendant Pettiford’s argument on appeal—that the scope of Cathy
Pettiford’s immunity cannot be characterized as transactional immunity—is that Michigan
statutes only recognize use immunity. See MCL 767.6; MCL 767.19b; MCL 780.701 et seq.
Plaintiff agrees that Michigan statutes currently provide for only use immunity, but argues that
this does not preclude a promise or agreement for transactional immunity, enforceable as a
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contract.1 As plaintiff recognizes, federal courts have long recognized that prosecutors have the
authority to grant immunity under terms that differ from federal immunity statutes. See, e.g.,
United States v Fitch, 964 F2d 571 (CA 6, 1992); United States v Turner, 936 F2d 221 (CA 6,
1991). “Statutory immunity” pursuant to federal law, 18 USC 6002, equates to use immunity.
Turner, 936 F2d at 223-224. However, a prosecutor can also informally grant “pocket
immunity,” bypassing statutory formalities. Id. at 223. Pocket immunity is enforceable
according to contract principles, and the parties have those rights and remedies outlined in the
immunity contract. Fitch, 964 F2d at 576.
The basis for recognizing transactional immunity agreements stems from the prosecutor’s
broad authority and discretion in deciding whether to plea bargain, whether to prosecute, and
what charges to file. See People v Jackson, 192 Mich App 10, 15; 480 NW 283 (1991). In
People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 154 n 7; 599 NW2d 102 (1999), our Supreme Court expressly
recognized that a prosecutor has the authority “to add additional terms [to an immunity
agreement] beyond that imposed by the statute.” Therefore, we reject defendant Pettiford’s
argument that an agreement for transactional immunity is not enforceable as a matter of law.
Further, because the trial court’s jury instructions were consistent with its order authorizing the
prosecution to enter into an agreement with Cathy Pettiford whereby “she would not be
prosecuted for the crime committed against [the victim] in exchange for truthful testimony,” they
were not improper or misleading. Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object to the court’s instructions. People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 257-258; 732 NW2d 605
(2007).
Although defendant Pettiford lists an additional issue in the Statement of Questions
Presented of his supplemental brief, he fails to address the merits of the issue in the body of his
brief. Therefore, the issue has been abandoned. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774
NW2d 714 (2009).
II. Docket No. 288552
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant Brown argues through both appellate counsel and in a supplemental brief filed
in propria persona that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in his closing
rebuttal argument. Because defendant Brown did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks at trial,
this issue is not preserved and our review is limited to ascertaining whether a plain error affected
her substantial rights. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). Error
requiring reversal will not be found where a curative instruction could have alleviated any
prejudicial effect, given that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v Unger,
278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
1
The current immunity statutes provided for transactional immunity before they were amended
in 1999 by 249 PA 1999 and 250 PA 1999. See People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 154; 599
NW2d 102 (1999).
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“[T]he test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Prosecutorial
misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must examine the
record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450,
454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). The propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks depends on all the facts of
the case. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). Prosecutorial
comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the
relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. Brown, 279 Mich App at 135.
During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor explained why tissue samples taken from the
victim’s body were not tested. He further stated:
Now, here’s the kicker to this. If there’s someone that disagreed with that,
and Dr. DeJong apparently does, Dr. DeJong could have looked at the samples. I
mean why are we playing this game? If you believe that you could have done
something, then, Doctor, you test it. Don’t turn around and tell me I’m wrong for
not testing them and you don’t even look at them. You test them. You look at
them. You explain your results. Don’t come into this Courtroom, and sit in that
chair, and say I didn’t look at anything, but yet you’re wrong. That right there
should tell you that that’s just not correct. If you really believe that the tests could
have been done and would have caused valid results, then you test them. You
look at them.
A prosecutor may not suggest in closing argument that a defendant must prove something
or present a reasonable explanation for damaging evidence because such an argument tends to
shift the burden of proof. People v Green, 131 Mich App 232, 237; 345 NW2d 676 (1983).
Here, viewed in context, it is apparent that the primary purpose of the prosecutor’s argument was
to respond to Dr. DeJong’s criticism of Dr. Dragovic for not testing tissue samples obtained
during the second autopsy. Because Dr. DeJong had advanced the theory that testing of the
tissue samples could have yielded useful information, the prosecutor was entitled to comment on
her failure to test the samples herself to challenge the credibility of her opinion. Such an
argument does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 112;
538 NW2d 356 (1995) (noting that once a defendant advances an alternate theory, comment on
the weaknesses of that theory does not shift the burden of proof). Thus, there was no plain error.
Furthermore, shortly after the prosecutor’s argument, the trial court gave a cautionary
instruction in which it advised the jury that it was to consider the prosecutor’s argument only as
it related to the witness’s credibility, and not as suggesting that defendant had a burden to prove
or disprove the case, and that the burden always remains with the prosecution. To the extent that
the prosecutor’s remarks could have been taken as improperly suggesting that defendant Brown
had a burden to test the samples, the trial court’s cautionary instruction was sufficient to cure any
prejudice and to protect defendant Brown’s substantial rights. Unger, 278 Mich App at 235.
In her supplemental brief filed in propria persona, defendant Brown asserts that the
prosecutor engaged in additional misconduct that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. For most
of her claims, however, apart from specifying different types of improper conduct generally, she
fails to identify specific remarks or conduct that she believes were improper. Because her
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assertions of error are not adequately briefed, we consider them abandoned. See People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
B. Right to Present a Defense
Defendant Brown next argues, through both appellate counsel and in her supplemental
brief, that the trial court violated her constitutional right to present a defense when it prohibited
her from introducing hearsay evidence from a police report that a group of young boys had
identified the victim and another boy walking down the street on the date the victim disappeared.
At trial, defendant Brown sought to introduce the evidence under the hearsay catchall exception,
MRE 803(24). The trial court determined that the evidence was not admissible under that rule
because it lacked circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Although defendant Brown now
argues that the exclusion of this evidence violated her constitutional right to present a defense,
she did not raise this constitutional claim in the trial court. Therefore, the constitutional claim is
unpreserved, People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 177-178; 712 NW2d 506 (2005), and our
review is limited to plain error affecting defendant Brown’s substantial rights, People v Shafier,
483 Mich 205, 211; 768 NW2d 305 (2009).
A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present evidence in her defense is not
absolute. Unger, 278 Mich App at 250; see also United States v Scheffer, 523 US 303, 308; 118
S Ct 1261; 140 L Ed 2d 413 (1998). States have the power to establish criminal trial rules and
procedures, including broad latitude to establish rules excluding evidence. Unger, 278 Mich
App at 250; see also Scheffer, 523 US at 308, and Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302303; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). Such rules do not abridge a defendant’s right to
present a defense if they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve. Unger, 278 Mich App at 250.
MRE 803(24) allows the admissibility of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence that
has adequate circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness if it is offered as evidence of a material
fact, it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence, and its
admission will serve the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice. By
seeking to limit the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence to reliable evidence of a
material fact that will serve the interests of justice, the rule is neither arbitrary nor
disproportionate to the purpose it was designed to serve. Accordingly, in light of the trial court’s
determination that the proffered evidence did not qualify for admission under MRE 803(24), the
trial court’s exclusion of the evidence did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to present a
defense.
Furthermore, the purpose of the proffered hearsay evidence was to show that the victim
was with someone else when defendant Brown left her house on the day the victim disappeared.
At trial, defendant Brown’s 1985 police statement was introduced, in which she stated that when
she left her house, the victim was standing across the street with a boy on a bicycle. The
victim’s mother testified that defendant Brown told her substantially the same thing. Defendant
Brown’s daughter testified that after defendant Brown left the house, she saw the victim walk
toward a park with another boy. In addition, a police officer testified that he located a group of
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young people who allegedly saw the victim and another boy walking down the street.2 Thus, the
proffered hearsay evidence would have been largely cumulative, and defendant Brown’s right to
present a defense was not violated by the trial court’s refusal to admit it.
C. Confrontation Clause
Defendant Brown lastly argues, through both appellate counsel and in her supplemental
brief, that her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated when Cathy Pettiford
testified that defendant Pettiford had told her that “he drowned [the victim].” Because there was
no objection to this testimony at trial, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant
Brown’s substantial rights. Shafier, 483 Mich at 211.
The Confrontation Clause provides that “‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” People v Taylor, 482 Mich
368; 374; 759 NW2d 361 (2008), quoting US Const, Am VI. However, only out-of-court
statements that are testimonial implicate the Confrontation Clause. Crawford v Washington, 541
US 36, 50-52, 61, 68; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004); Taylor, 482 Mich at 374, 377.
Statements are testimonial when they are made under circumstances that would lead an objective
declarant reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use in a later trial or
criminal prosecution. Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822; 126 S Ct 2266; 165 L Ed 2d 224
(2006); Taylor, 482 Mich at 377-378.
In this case, defendant Pettiford made the statement to Cathy, his wife at the time, in their
home after he returned without the victim. There is no indication that he had reason to believe
when he made the statement that it would be available for use at a later trial, particularly after
having earlier threatened Cathy not to say anything about a liquid he poured into the victim’s
drink and making her feed the victim eggs that were mixed with the same liquid. Indeed, Cathy
did not cooperate with the police in 1985, and did not speak to them for nearly 20 years.
Because defendant Pettiford’s statement was made in an informal setting in the presence of only
his wife and defendant Brown, it was not testimonial. See Taylor, 482 Mich at 378, 380 (holding
that statements made informally to an acquaintance were nontestimonial). Therefore, defendant
Brown cannot establish a Confrontation Clause violation in this regard.
Defendant Brown also asserts in her supplemental brief that by allowing Cathy Pettiford
to testify about her immunity agreement, the trial court denied her of the “right to be tried solely
on the evidence against her.” Defendant Brown does not further explain the basis for her
argument. Nevertheless, we note that it is well established that matters affecting a witness’s
credibility, including evidence of any inducements or consideration given for a witness’s
testimony, are a proper subject of examination. See People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 72; 537 NW2d
909, mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995); People v Dowdy, 211 Mich App 562, 570-571; 536 NW2d 794
(1995). Thus, we perceive no error with respect to this issue.3
2
The trial court’s ruling only prevented the officer from testifying whether one of the youths
positively identified the victim as one of the two boys walking down the street.
3
Defendant Brown’s supplemental brief contains several additional pages, beginning with a page
(continued…)
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III. Conclusion
Having found no errors requiring reversal, we affirm in both Docket No. 288551 and
Docket No. 288552.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
(…continued)
entitled, “For future use or can it be used now?” These pages are not part of any issue on appeal
and the matters mentioned therein are not listed in the Statement of Questions Presented.
Further, the pages consist of only general statements, and do not contain any substantive
arguments. Accordingly, they fail to properly present an issue for this Court’s review. MCR
7.212(C)(5); MCR 7.212(C)(7); Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 59.
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