PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID NICHOLAS SNOW
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290300
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 07-055241-FC
DAVID NICHOLAS SNOW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and FITZGERALD and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of safe breaking, MCL 750.531, breaking
and entering with intent to commit a larceny, MCL 750.110, and fleeing and eluding, MCL
750.479a. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to prison terms
of ten to 27 years for the safe breaking conviction, five to 20 years for the breaking and entering
conviction, and three to ten years for the fleeing and eluding conviction. Defendant now appeals
his convictions and sentence as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions and remand for
reconsideration of the scoring of offense variable (OV) 13, MCL 777.43.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In January 2007, a police task force began investigating a series of burglaries near
Muskegon, Michigan. On July 20, 2007, after receiving new information related to the
investigation, police officers searched the duplex where defendant and his codefendant, Ryan
Armstrong, resided. After the search, the officers put the duplex under surveillance. In the late
evening hours of July 26 or early morning hours of July 27, Detective Anthony Nanna observed
a red truck with two occupants drive away from the duplex. Detective Julie Sanderson, along
with several other officers, followed the truck as it made numerous stops in the Muskegon area.
She believed that the occupants of the truck were males and that defendant was the driver. When
the truck momentarily disappeared near the Lincoln Golf Club, Officer Brian Cribbs exited his
vehicle, walked down the road, and observed the truck on a railroad bed, unoccupied. He then
retreated to the forest and waited. Officers set up a perimeter around the area and waited for
someone to approach the truck.
Thereafter, police officers observed two men riding in a golf cart on the roads near the
railroad bed. Lieutenant Cam Henke observed the golf cart traveling north on Whitehall Road
and then east on Michillinda Road. Officer Cribbs could hear the men talking, and observed the
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golf cart traveling east on Michillinda Road, whereafter it drove into the woods on the north side
of the road. The men left the golf cart, walked to the truck, backed the truck up to the golf cart,
where they had a discussion about bolt cutters, and then left the area in the truck. When the
truck turned into a driveway, officers approached the truck and said, “police . . . hands up.” The
truck then sped away, and the officers followed. The men in the truck looked back at the officers
and threw items out of the truck windows. The truck eventually crashed and the passenger fled.
The driver, later identified as defendant, was arrested. He was not wearing any shoes. Officers
found cash, packs of cigarettes, liquor, and shoes in the truck and along the side of the road
where the chase occurred. Shortly after defendant’s arrest, Detective Nanna observed a man
dressed in dark clothes and gloves and not wearing any shoes limp to the side of the duplex and
crawl in through a window. The man, later identified as Armstrong, was arrested.
During the chase and defendant’s arrest, police officers discovered a break-in at the
Lincoln Golf Club. Maintenance sheds were open and various tools, including bolt cutters, had
been taken. A pair of gloves and cash were taken from the pro shop, and a large plasma
television was taken from the clubhouse wall. Doors were damaged, the contents of drawers
dumped out, and a safe in a clubhouse storage room broken into. Officers also discovered an
abandoned golf cart on Whitehall Road. They found a large plasma television on the cart and
pop, liquor, candy, and crackers on and around the cart.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced as described. He now
appeals as of right.
II. STATEMENTS ADMITTED UNDER MRE 801(d)(2)(A) AND (d)(2)(E)
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Officer Cribbs’
testimony regarding two statements he overheard while hiding in the forest. We disagree.
Officer Cribbs testified that when he was hiding in the forest near the truck, he heard two
men talking. They drove up in a golf cart, stopped, and got out of the cart. Both men entered the
truck, the truck backed up, and then one man got back out. The officer heard the man that exited
the truck ask: “Dave, do you want these bolt cutters[?]” He then heard the other man respond:
“[N]o, get rid of them.” Before the truck drove away, the officer heard something hit the ground.
Later in the investigation, he found bolt cutters on the ground, near the abandoned golf cart and
the area where the truck had been parked. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the two
statements, arguing that they constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted the first
statement as the statement of a co-conspirator under MRE 801(d)(2)(E), and admitted the second
statement as the statement of a party opponent under MRE 801(d)(2)(A).
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted both statements. We review the
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 99; 712
NW2d 703 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs “when the trial court chooses an outcome
falling outside [the] principled range of outcomes.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666
NW2d 231 (2003).
Under MRE 801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is
“a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy
on independent proof of the conspiracy.” A party claiming that a statement is admissible under
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this hearsay exclusion must establish three things. First, the proponent of the statement “must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed through independent
evidence.” People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 316-317; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). Second, the
proponent of the statement must establish that it “was made during the course of the conspiracy.”
Id. at 317. “The conspiracy continues until the common enterprise has been fully completed,
abandoned, or terminated.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Third, the
proponent of the statement must establish that it furthered the conspiracy. Id.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the first statement as the
statement of a co-conspirator. “Conspiracy is defined by common law as a partnership in
criminal purposes . . . . Under such a partnership, two or more individuals must have voluntarily
agreed to effectuate the commission of a criminal offense.” People v Justice, 454 Mich 334,
345-346; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). Although there is no direct evidence that defendant and
Armstrong agreed to commit an offense, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and inference may be used to
establish the existence of [a] conspiracy.” Martin, 271 Mich App at 317. Testimony at trial
established that the duplex where defendant and Armstrong resided was under surveillance as
part of an investigation into a series of breaking and enterings. During the surveillance, officers
observed two men, believed to be defendant and Armstrong, drive away from the duplex in a
truck. The men then parked the truck in a railroad bed. When the men returned, they were
riding in a golf cart together, and then left the scene together in the truck. They fled from police
in a high speed chase, throwing shoes and stolen items out the truck windows. It was later
discovered that during the time the men were away from the truck, there was a break-in at the
golf club. After his arrest, defendant admitted to the officers guarding him that during the police
chase, it was “pretty exciting,” Armstrong told him to “go, go, go, go,” and he told Armstrong,
“thanks for getting me into all this kind of stuff.” Based on this circumstantial evidence, the trial
court properly found that defendant and Armstrong conspired to break into the golf club, steal
goods, and then escape the scene.
Additionally, we agree with the trial court that the statement, “Dave, do you want these
bolt cutters[?]” was made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. See id. Defendant argues that at the time the statement was made, any conspiracy
was already complete. But in People v Woodfork, 47 Mich App 631, 633-634; 209 NW2d 829
(1973), this Court suggested that codefendants may conspire to commit a crime and successfully
escape capture. See also United States v Carter, 760 F2d 1568, 1581 (CA 11, 1985) (holding
that statements made during the defendants’ escape from drug agents were made during the
course of and in furtherance of their conspiracy to import marijuana because arriving undetected,
or in the alternative escaping, is a primary objective in every drug smuggling operation). Here,
there was evidence that defendant and Armstrong conspired to flee the scene with their stolen
goods and escape arrest. Thus, the statement about the bolt cutters was made during the course
of the conspiracy. Further, considering the evidence that the bolt cutters referred to were stolen
from the golf club, it is reasonable to conclude that Armstrong asked defendant about the bolt
cutters to determine which stolen goods they would keep and which they would dispose of, or
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whether to dispose of incriminating evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly
admitted the first statement under MRE 801(d)(2)(E).1
Under MRE 801(d)(2)(A), a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is
the party’s own statement. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted the second
statement, “no, get rid of them,” under MRE 801(d)(2)(A) because there was insufficient
evidence that defendant made the statement. We disagree. As indicated, officers followed the
red truck from the duplex where defendant and Armstrong resided. Detective Sanderson testified
that she believed there were two men in the truck and that defendant was the driver. After
finding the truck unoccupied in the railroad bed and hiding in the forest, Officer Cribbs heard
two men talking. He saw them drive up in the golf cart, stop, get out of the cart, and then enter
the truck. After one man got back out the truck, the officer heard the exchange regarding the bolt
cutters. The man who made the first statement, allegedly Armstrong, referred to “Dave.”
[Defendant is David Snow.] Thus, it is reasonable to assume that defendant was the person
responding to the first statement. Further, after the truck drove away and crashed during the high
speed chase, police confirmed that defendant was the driver. There was sufficient evidence
establishing that defendant made the second statement and it was properly admitted.
Finally, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting either or both of the
statements, any error was harmless. Reversal is not required for a preserved, nonconstitutional
error unless it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. See People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). In light of the substantial amount of
evidence establishing defendant’s guilt, he cannot prove that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different, but for the admission of these two isolated and very brief statements.
See id.
III. OVs 12 AND 13
Defendant challenges the scoring of OVs 12 and 13. The sentencing court has discretion
in determining the number of points to be scored for the sentencing variables provided that there
is evidence on the record that adequately supports the scoring. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App
462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). We review the scoring to determine whether the sentencing
court properly exercised its discretion and whether the evidence adequately supported a
particular score. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 671; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). We
review de novo the proper interpretation and application of sentencing guidelines. People v
Gullett, 277 Mich App 214, 217; 744 NW2d 200 (2007).
A. OV 12
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 12 at ten points. We
disagree.
1
The trial court noted that the first statement might also be admissible to give meaning to the
second statement. Although we agree that that may have been a legitimate reason to admit the
first statement, the jury was not instructed to consider the statement for that limited purpose.
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OV 12 considers contemporaneous felonious criminal acts. MCL 777.42. Ten points
may be scored if a defendant committed “[t]hree or more contemporaneous felonious criminal
acts involving other crimes.” MCL 777.42(1)(c). Contemporaneous, for purposes of this OV,
means that the “act occurred within 24 hours of the sentencing offense,” MCL 777.42(2)(a)(i),
and “has not and will not result in a separate conviction,” MCL 777.42(2)(a)(ii).
At sentencing, the prosecution argued that ten points should be scored for OV 12 based
on defendant’s breaking into one of the golf club’s maintenance sheds and driving away of two
golf carts, specifically the carts found on Whitehall Road and Michillinda Road near the truck.
Defense counsel objected, arguing that those three acts were “part and parcel of the entire
operation” for which defendant was convicted, and therefore, should not be counted in scoring
OV 12. The trial court agreed with the prosecution, stating that the “testimony this Court heard
was that at least two buildings were broken into and at least two carts were moved so regardless
of how the jury verdict equates with the jury instruction, factually, I think those things are true . .
. .” Defendant did not argue at sentencing, nor does he argue on appeal, that he did not commit
the three acts. Rather, defendant argues that there is only one “unit of prosecution” arising from
his actions, for which he has already been convicted.2
In regard to breaking into the maintenance shed, defendant concedes that a shed may be
considered a building or structure within the meaning of the breaking and entering statute, MCL
750.110. See People v Adams, 75 Mich App 736, 738; 255 NW2d 752 (1977). Furthermore, as
noted by the prosecution, “breaking and entering is not a continuing offense. It is completed
once the actor has entered the building.” People v Patterson, 212 Mich App 393, 395; 538
NW2d 29 (1995). Thus, the breaking and entering of separate buildings, albeit on the same
grounds, could give rise to separate convictions under MCL 750.110. In this case, defendant was
initially charged with breaking and entering “the golf pro-shop and/or dining facility.” There
was no mention of a maintenance shed in the charging documents. At trial, the prosecution
presented evidence that defendant and Armstrong broke into more than one of the golf club’s
buildings, including at least one maintenance shed. The jury verdict form asked whether
defendant was guilty of “Breaking and Entering a Building,” as did the jury instructions. Thus,
although the jury heard evidence relating to more than one building, it was instructed to consider
whether defendant broke into a building. Because defendant was convicted of breaking and
entering only one of the golf club’s buildings, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that
his breaking and entering of a second building constituted a contemporaneous felonious criminal
act for purposes of OV 12.
In regard to driving away the two golf carts, the prosecution argued at sentencing that
defendant may not have intended to steal the carts, but his actions constituted “unlawful use of a
2
All of the cases cited by defendant on appeal discuss the “unit of prosecution” rule in the
context of double jeopardy challenges and are not directly applicable here. Even if we applied
the analysis in those cases here, the dispositive question in determining the proper “unit of
prosecution” is whether the Legislature intended that more than one conviction result under the
circumstances presented in the case. See, e.g., People v Barber, 255 Mich App 288, 292-293;
659 NW2d 674 (2003) (considering whether the Legislature intended multiple convictions of
arson stemming from a single building fire that spread to two more buildings).
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motor vehicle.” The trial court accepted the prosecution’s argument. Presumably, the
prosecution intended to argue that defendant’s actions constituted two distinct violations of either
MCL 750.413 or MCL 750.414. MCL 750.413 provides that “[a]ny person who shall, wilfully
and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away, and any person who shall assist
in or be a party to such taking possession, driving or taking away of any motor vehicle,
belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony.” The offense requires an intent to take the
vehicle unlawfully, but does not require an intent to steal the vehicle or permanently deprive the
owner of his or her vehicle. People v Hendricks, 200 Mich App 68, 71; 503 NW2d 689 (1993).
MCL 750.414 governs the taking or use of a motor vehicle without authority but without intent
to steal, or being party to such unauthorized taking or use. Defendant was not charged with
either offense, but the evidence presented at trial established that at least two golf carts were
driven off the golf club grounds onto public roads, used to transport stolen goods and to transport
defendant and Armstrong to the truck, and then abandoned. Again, defendant does not dispute
on appeal that he committed the offenses. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that defendant’s taking of the carts constituted two contemporaneous felonies under
OV 12.3
The trial court properly scored OV 12 at ten points.
B. OV 13
Defendant further argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 13 at 25 points. OV
13 considers a continuing pattern of criminal behavior. MCL 777.43. Twenty-five points may
be scored if the “offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more
crimes against a person.” MCL 777.43(1)(c) (formerly MCL 777.43(1)(b)).4 “[A]ll crimes
within a 5-year period, including the sentencing offense, shall be counted regardless of whether
the offense resulted in a conviction.” MCL 777.43(2)(a).
In scoring 25 points for OV 13, the trial court considered defendant’s prior conviction for
resisting and opposing, his conviction for safe breaking in this case, and a charge for first-degree
home invasion. Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) indicates that he was
arrested for first-degree home invasion on July 9, 2004, and lists a disposition of: “Nolle Pros.
Per plea agreement in instant case.”5, 6 At sentencing, defense counsel argued that the home
invasion charge should not be counted in scoring OV 13 because although the PSIR “says per
plea agreement,” defendant asserts the case “was dismissed due to an evidentiary issue long
3
Because neither party has raised the issue, we decline to address whether a golf cart may be
considered a “motor vehicle” as the term is defined in MCL 750.412.
4
MCL 777.43 was amended effective April 1, 2009. [Defendant was sentenced in March 2008.]
The changes to the statute do not affect our analysis in this case.
5
Nolle prosequi, often shortened to nolle pros, is a “legal notice that a lawsuit or prosecution has
been abandoned,” or a “docket entry showing that the plaintiff or the prosecution has abandoned
the action.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), p 1074.
6
The “instant case” referenced in the PSIR was a prior case involving defendant, not the case at
hand.
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before he agreed to make any plea agreements . . . because it couldn’t be proven because it didn’t
happen. Or he wasn’t responsible for it . . . .” The trial court stated that while there was an
“information gap” in regard to the home invasion charge, it would count the charge for purposes
of OV 13, pursuant to the statement in the PSIR that the charge was dismissed “per plea
agreement, per instant case.” The court made no findings regarding whether defendant
committed the charged home invasion. On appeal, defendant reiterates that the charge should
not be counted in scoring OV 13 because there is no record evidence that the crime actually
occurred.
MCL 777.43 provides that all offenses “shall be counted regardless of whether the
offense resulted in a conviction.” MCL 777.43(2)(a). Thus, under the plain language of the
statute, charges that have been dismissed can be counted for purposes of OV 13. However,
factors used in sentencing must have support in the record, Hornsby, 251 Mich App at 468, and
where effectively challenged, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, People v
Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 142-143; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). In People v Ratkov (After Remand),
201 Mich App 123, 125-126; 505 NW2d 886 (1993), remanded 447 Mich 984 (1994), this Court
explained:
A sentencing court may consider all record evidence before it when calculating
the guidelines, including, but not limited to, the contents of a presentence
investigation report, admissions made by a defendant during a plea proceeding, or
testimony taken at a preliminary examination or trial. The contents of the
presentence report are presumptively accurate if unchallenged by the defendant.
However, once a defendant has effectively challenged an adverse factual assertion
contained in the presentence report or any other controverted issues of fact
relevant to the sentencing decision, the prosecution must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the facts are as asserted. If the record
provides insufficient evidence upon which to base the decision supporting or
opposing the scoring, the court in its discretion may order the presentment of
further proofs. [Citations omitted.]
In People v Walker, 428 Mich 261, 268; 407 NW2d 367 (1987), abrogated in part on other
grounds by People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145; 560 NW2d 600 (1997), our Supreme Court
described an “effective” challenge to an adverse factual assertion:
Thus, a defendant who seeks to challenge a proposed scoring decision
bears the burden of going forward with an “effective challenge.” Whether that
requirement is satisfied with a flat denial of an adverse factual assertion, or
whether an affirmative factual showing is required, will depend upon the nature of
the disputed matter. Some negatives are obviously difficult or impossible to
demonstrate by affirmative proof.
In this case, defendant challenged the assertion in his PSIR that the July 9, 2004, home
invasion charge was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement, arguing that the offense never
occurred and the charge was dismissed because of evidentiary issues long before any plea
agreement. Defendant offered nothing in support of his argument (nor has he on appeal), other
than his own assertion that the PSIR is incorrect. Arguably, defendant’s challenge was
ineffective, because he failed to put forth any evidence regarding the timing of the dismissal in
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relation to any plea proceedings or the true reason for the dismissal of the charge. We conclude,
however, that even if the PSIR is presumed true, there is insufficient record evidence establishing
that defendant actually committed the charged home invasion. The only evidence the
prosecution presented indicating that defendant committed the offense was the statement in the
PSIR that he was arrested and that the charge was subsequently dismissed per the alleged plea
agreement. Factors used in sentencing must have adequate support in the record, Hornsby, 251
Mich App at 468, and a dismissed charge, without something more, cannot be said to constitute
actual evidence of the commission of a crime.
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of the scoring of OV 13.7 If the trial court
determines that the home invasion has not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence, the
court shall consider whether to resentence defendant. If the court determines that the offense has
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then OV 13 was properly scored and the trial
court may deny resentencing. See People v Chesebro, 206 Mich App 468, 474; 522 NW2d 677
(1994).
We affirm defendant’s convictions and remand for reconsideration of the scoring of OV
13. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
7
On the sentencing grid for Class C offenses, MCL 777.64, without the scoring of 25 points for
OV 13, defendant’s OV level is reduced from level IV to level II.
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