PEOPLE OF MI V SHONTE LAMARTRE HARBIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288381
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-003490-FH
SHONTE LAMARTRE HARBIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Stephens and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench convictions for possession with intent to deliver
less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and possession with intent to deliver
marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender,
MCL 769.10, to concurrent terms of 9 months to 20 years in prison for possession with intent to
deliver cocaine and to nine months to five years in prison for each of his remaining convictions
except his felony-firearm conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve five years in
prison for his felony-firearm conviction, which was to be served prior to the other sentences.
Because we conclude that there were no errors warranting relief, we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest. We review a trial court’s factual findings in
connection with a motion to suppress for clear error and review de novo the ultimate legal
conclusion. People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001). The government
performs a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it intrudes on an
individual’s reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy. People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 204205; 341 NW2d 439 (1983). Our Supreme Court has explained that whether a person has a
legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment depends on the totality of the
circumstances:
“An expectation of privacy is legitimate if the individual has an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy and that actual expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable. Whether an expectation of privacy exists in both the subjective and
the objective sense is determined by scrutinizing the totality of circumstances
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surrounding the alleged intrusion.” [People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 27; 360 NW2d
841 (1984) (citations omitted), quoting Nash, 418 Mich at 205.]
An owner has no expectation of privacy in abandoned property, and the search and
seizure of abandoned property is “presumptively reasonable.” People v Rasmussen, 191 Mich
App 721, 725; 478 NW2d 752 (1991). Moreover, “[p]olice officers do not need a warrant before
entering structures that, by all objective manifestations, appear abandoned.” People v Taylor,
253 Mich App 399, 409; 655 NW2d 291 (2002). Courts examine the totality of the
circumstances when evaluating whether police officers must secure a warrant before entering
what appears to be an abandoned or vacant structure. Id. at 407. The factors to be considered
include:
(1) the outward appearance, (2) the overall condition, (3) the state of the
vegetation on the premises, (4) barriers erected and securely fastened in all
openings, (5) indications that the home is not being independently serviced with
gas or electricity, (6) the lack of appliances, furniture, or other furnishings
typically found in a dwelling house, (7) the length of time that it takes for
temporary barriers to be replaced with functional doors and windows, (8) the
history surrounding the premises and prior use, and (9) complaints of illicit
activity occurring in the structure. [Id].
Here, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that police officers reasonably
determined that the house was abandoned. The house did not have boarded up windows or
extensive exterior damage, but officers Steven Kopp and Barron Townsend testified that two
days before the arrest they went to the house and found that the front door was wide open. The
house appeared to be vacant, and there was nobody inside. Moreover, the front door did not
have a handle or a locking mechanism. The police officers did not enter the upper unit because it
was secured, but in the lower unit, there was garbage and feces scattered throughout the house,
and the officers noticed that there was no food or clothing inside. Further, there were sparse
furnishings, the basement was flooded with several feet of sewage, and the electricity was
illegally hooked up to the house. The officers did not believe that a person could safely live in
the house.
When the officers returned two days later, the house appeared to be in the same
condition, although this time there was someone working on the front door and there were people
inside. As the officers approached, the man working on the door walked right into the house
leaving the door wide open. The overall condition of the house coupled with the relatively short
period of time between the officers’ first and second visits weigh heavily in favor of the
reasonableness of the inference that the house was still abandoned. Defendant failed to establish
that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Attebury, 463 Mich at 668. The officers
did not need a search warrant before entering the house because, by all objective manifestations,
the house was abandoned. Taylor, 253 Mich at 409. Although defendant may have had the right
to occupy the house, the officers did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy protected
under the Fourth Amendment when they entered the house without a warrant. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the
house.
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Defendant next argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine. We review de
novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial. People v Wilkens, 267 Mich
App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). This Court views the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution to determine whether the trial court could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “To convict a defendant of
possession with intent to deliver, the prosecution must prove (1) that the recovered substance is a
narcotic, (2) the weight of the substance, (3) that the defendant was not authorized to possess the
substance, and (4) that the defendant knowingly possessed the substance intending to deliver it.”
People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 622; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). The intent to deliver may be
inferred from “the quantity of narcotics in a defendant’s possession, from the way in which those
narcotics are packaged, and from other circumstances surrounding the arrest.” People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 524; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Defendant argues only that the evidence of knowing possession with intent to deliver was
insufficient. At trial, the prosecution admitted the preliminary examination testimony by officer
Anthony O’Rourke’s under MRE 804. Officer O’Rourke testified that he recovered what
appeared to be crack cocaine and marijuana from defendant’s pocket. The parties stipulated to
police tests that determined that two of the seven bags recovered contained 16 grams of cocaine.1
In addition, there was evidence that defendant intended to deliver the cocaine. Officer O’Rourke
testified that the narcotics were packaged for individual sale. Moreover, inside the dining room,
the police found drug scales and paraphernalia used to package narcotics on a table. And,
defendant admitted that he possessed the marijuana found in his pocket, which was also
packaged for individual sale, and that he was intending to sell it on the street. From this
evidence, the trial court could properly infer that defendant also intended to deliver the cocaine
that was individually packaged for sale. See Wolfe, 440 Mich at 524-526.
Defendant finally argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to admit
O’Rourke’s preliminary examination testimony without a showing that the prosecutor exercised
due diligence to ensure his presence. We review a trial court’s determination whether to admit
the preliminary examination testimony for an abuse of discretion. People v Bean, 457 Mich 677,
684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). The testimony of a witness from a prior proceeding is admissible in
a later proceeding if the witness is unavailable to testify and the party against whom the
testimony is being admitted had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination at the earlier time. MRE 804(b)(1). A witness is
unavailable when he is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has used due
diligence to procure his attendance. MRE 804(a)(5). The party proffering the former testimony
must demonstrate that he made a reasonable, good-faith effort to secure the declarant’s presence
for trial; however, the party need not have done everything possible to locate the witness. Bean,
457 Mich at 684.
1
The record does not state whether the amount recovered represents each individual bag or the
total amount.
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Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the testimony. The prosecutor established that officer O’Rourke was on active military
service and had been deployed to Afghanistan; this evidence was sufficient to establish
O’Rourke’s unavailability. See People v Boyles, 11 Mich App 417, 421-423; 161 NW2d 448
(1968). Here, the record established that the prosecutor was aware of O’Rourke’s location in
Afghanistan and his military status. He had successfully procured O’Rourke’s testimony for the
previous trial date, but defendant did not appear on that date. Before the next scheduled trial
date, O’Rourke was called to active duty and deployed to Afghanistan. At trial, the prosecutor
produced official documentation detailing O’Rourke’s situation. Due diligence is an attempt to
do everything reasonable, not everything possible, to obtain the presence of a witness. People v
Cummings, 171 Mich App 577, 585; 430 NW2d 790 (1988). Although the prosecutor did not
attempt to secure O’Rourke’s presence from Afghanistan, he was not required to exhaust all
avenues to secure the witness’s presence. The prosecutor understood that he would be unable to
procure O’Rourke’s attendance because of his military status. Indeed, nothing in the record
supports that O’Rourke could have been returned for trial. Thus, the prosecutor exercised the
required due diligence under MRE 804(a)(5). Additionally, given that it is undisputed on appeal
that defendant had an opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine O’Rourke at the
preliminary examination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the
prosecution’s motion to admit O’Rourke’s prior testimony into evidence. MRE 804(a)(5); MRE
804(b)(1).
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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