GARY L CHRISTIE V CHARLES F FICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY L. CHRISTIE and PATRICIA A.
CHRISTIE,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 2010
Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellees,
v
No. 285924
Crawford Circuit Court
LC No. 06-007131-NZ
CHARLES F. FICK and C. F. FICK & SONS,
INC.,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellants.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Meter and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from a judgment for plaintiffs entered after a jury trial. We
affirm.
Plaintiffs had been renting and living in a cabin in Grayling from defendants since 1998,
at a price of $300 a month. They claimed that defendants, in 2005, unlawfully locked them out
of the premises and also moved a large quantity of valuable equipment from the cabin into
storage, where it was subsequently damaged. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs were behind in
rent, that plaintiffs had abandoned the premises, and that plaintiffs had numerous opportunities to
retrieve their personal property after it was moved. The case was submitted to the jury on only
two claims: a violation of the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918, and statutory conversion
under MCL 600.2919a. The jury found for plaintiffs on both claims, granting $141,500 in
damages for the anti-lockout claim and $89,000 in damages for the conversion claim. The
$89,000 was trebled for a total of $267,000. Damages were ultimately allowed, however, for
only one of the two theories, and the jury was informed of this by way of the verdict form. The
final amount of the judgment, including attorney fees and costs but excluding statutory interest,
was $299,256.21.
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Defendants argue that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to exemplary
damages.1 Defendants contend that if a cause of action is statutorily based, exemplary damages
are not allowable unless the statute specifically allows for such damages. Defendants contend
that the statutes at issue here make no such allowances. Defendants further argue that a plaintiff
in Michigan may not recover damages for emotional injuries allegedly suffered as a result of
property damage. Plaintiffs counter that exemplary damages, as opposed to punitive damages,
are awarded as an element of “actual damages” and were therefore allowable in this case because
the statutes in question – the anti-lockout statute and the conversion statute – refer to “actual
damages.”
The trial court first ruled that a separate jury instruction on exemplary damages is not
appropriate unless the statute in question refers to exemplary damages. However, the court
mentioned, during a December 10, 2007, hearing, that exemplary damages might possibly come
in as part of “actual damages” in this case. Defense counsel stated that he was going to research
the issue further and get back to the court later in the week. At a later hearing, defense counsel
argued that damages for “embarrassment or humiliation” were simply not allowable, even as part
of “actual damages.”
Further discussions and rulings regarding jury instructions took place off the record. The
court ultimately gave the following instruction to the jury:
[I]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of one or more
of the Defendants or their agents was malicious or willful . . . and wanton so as to
demonstrate the reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights, then, you may also award
damages for emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation.
The above damages are not to be awarded to punish the Defendant but
rather to compensate the Plaintiff. If you determine that Plaintiffs are entitled to
these damages, they should not be set in an amount beyond which fully
compensates the Plaintiff.
***
Actual damages inflicted by the Defendants or Defendants’ agents may
also include compensation to the Plaintiffs for humiliation, sense of outrage,
indignity where the Defendants or Defendants’ agents have engaged in willful and
malicious conduct, which I’ve already explained that term.
Defendants moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and
raised the issue again. The court stated in response that “the law does not state that you can only
seek exemplary damages which the statute expressly states . . . .”
1
“An award of exemplary damages is proper if it compensates a plaintiff for the humiliation,
sense of outrage, and indignity resulting from injustices maliciously, wilfully, and wantonly
inflicted by the defendant.” McPeak v McPeak, 233 Mich App 483, 490; 593 NW2d 180 (1999).
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We review claims of instructional error de novo. Jury instructions should
include all the elements of the plaintiff's claims and should not omit material
issues, defenses, or theories if the evidence supports them. Instructional error
warrants reversal if the error resulted in such unfair prejudice to the complaining
party that the failure to vacate the jury verdict would be inconsistent with
substantial justice. [Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d
356 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).]
We review de novo a trial court’s decision concerning a motion for JNOV, Craig v
Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 77; 684 NW2d 296 (2004), and we review for an abuse of
discretion a trial court’s decision concerning a motion for a new trial, Denha v Jacob, 179 Mich
App 545, 549; 446 NW2d 303 (1989).
Defendants rely primarily on B&B Investment Grp v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1; 581 NW2d
17 (1998). In B&B Investment Grp, a slander case, the Court stated:
Exemplary damages have not been awarded in any Michigan slander of
title case, either common-law or statutory. However, exemplary damage awards
in intentional tort cases have been considered proper if they compensate a plaintiff
for the humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity resulting from injuries
maliciously, willfully and wantonly inflicted by the defendant. . . . The theory of
these cases is that the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct both intensifies
the injury and justifies the award of exemplary damages as compensation for the
harm done to the plaintiff's feelings. . . .
Nonetheless, where a cause of action is statutorily based, there must be a
basis in the statute for awarding exemplary damages, i.e., either an express
provision or a legislative history from which one could infer a legislative intent to
provide such an unusual remedy. We conclude there is no such statutory basis
here; there is neither an express provision nor a legislative history from which one
could infer a legislative intent to provide exemplary damages. In enacting other
statutes, the Legislature has included words expressly providing for exemplary
damages where it has intended that they be recoverable. [Id. at 10 (citations and
quotation marks omitted).]
At first blush, B&B Investment Grp seems to support defendants’ position: for a statutorily
based action, exemplary damages are available only if there is a basis in the statute for such
damages. Indeed, plaintiffs do not dispute that their actions were statutorily based and that the
statutes in question did not provide a specific basis for exemplary damages.
However, the case law makes clear that there is a distinction between “an award of
exemplary damages” and “an award for mental anguish as a component of actual damages.” In
Veselenak v Smith, 414 Mich 567, 574; 327 NW2d 261 (1982), the Supreme Court clearly stated
that “actual damages now include compensation for mental distress and anguish.” As noted by
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plaintiffs, the anti-lockout and conversion statutes refer to “actual damages.”2 In Eide v KelseyHayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 53; 427 NW2d 488 (1988), the Court again noted that “actual damages”
include compensation for mental injury. The Court noted that a separate award of “exemplary
damages” was inappropriate in that case because the “actual damages” encompassed the
plaintiff’s mental distress. Id. at 56-57.
Therefore, the case law indicates that a separate award for exemplary damages is not
appropriate in a statutorily based action unless the statute in question specifically provides for
such damages. However, and significantly, damages for mental distress are allowable as part of
a plaintiff’s actual damages. Here, the trial court did seem to conflate the idea of exemplary
damages with the idea of actual damages awarded for mental distress, because the court used the
“willful and wanton” language applicable to an award of exemplary damages. However, the
court made clear that the award for emotional distress was to be a part of plaintiffs’ “actual
damages,” and, in fact, the court made the burden of proof higher than it would otherwise have
been (if it had left out the “willful and wanton” language). Under the circumstances, there is
simply no basis for reversal.3
Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction
regarding mitigation of damages.
Defense counsel requested that SJI2d 53.05 be given. This instruction reads:
A person has a duty to use ordinary care to minimize his or her damages
after [he or she/his or her property] has been [injured/damaged]. It is for you to
decide whether plaintiff failed to use such ordinary care and, if so, whether any
damage resulted from such failure. You must not compensate the plaintiff for any
portion of [his/her] damages which resulted from [his/her] failure to use such
care.
2
Plaintiffs also contend that Peisner v Detroit Free Press, 421 Mich 125, 135; 364 NW2d 600
(1984), supports their position on appeal. In Peisner, id. at 130-143, the Court undertook a
lengthy analysis of whether exemplary and punitive damages could be awarded in addition to
“actual damages” that encompassed injury to feelings. However, the Court’s analysis was based
on the fact that “actual damages” in the pertinent statute was defined to include damages “to
feelings.” Id. at 130. Therefore, Peisner is simply not pertinent in the present case.
3
Defendants also contend that damages for emotional distress are not available in connection
with injury to property. This argument was not presented to the trial court and we therefore
decline to address it. Camden v Kaufman, 240 Mich App 389, 400 n 2; 613 NW2d 335 (2000).
We have reviewed the citations to the record where defendant claims to have raised this issue
and have found no basis for finding an adequate preservation of the issue. At one point
defendants’ attorney mentioned that the claims involved were “property claims[s],” but he did
not make the same argument below that he makes on appeal – i.e., that emotional-distress
damages are never available in property cases – but instead focused on the idea, discussed in this
opinion, that exemplary damages are not available in statutorily based actions unless specifically
authorized by the statute.
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The trial court indicated that it did not give this instruction because the alleged
conversion was an intentional tort and therefore the instruction did not apply.4 The court added:
“But it really turns on the facts of the case, and it would seem logical to me that once the
property owner has made his reasonable attempt, which the jurors found he did, he made a
reasonable attempt that there be a reasonable refusal.” The court was referring to the instructions
it gave regarding the elements of the conversion claim. The court provided the following
elements to the jury:
First, that one or more of the Defendants wrongfully exerted dominion . . .
over the property of the Plaintiffs.
Second, that Plaintiffs made a reasonable attempt to recover their property.
It is for you to decide what constitutes a reasonable attempt based on all the facts
and circumstances in the case.
And third, that Plaintiffs’ reasonable attempt to recover their property was
refused by one or more of the Defendants or their agents.
At the post-judgment hearing, the court stated:
I believe that the duty to mitigate in this scenario, which is a landlord/tenant case,
it was incorporated into the instructions, and the jury was properly instructed on
the plaintiff’s duty. And that was, he must make reasonable attempts and efforts
to recover the property, which he obviously did in this case.
Gum v Fitzgerald, 80 Mich App 234; 262 NW2d 924 (1977), states as follows with
regard to damages available for conversion:
Plaintiffs are required to show that a reasonable attempt has been made to
recover their property in order to establish that their right to possession has been
refused. Once this refusal is established they may recover the value of the lost or
damaged goods determined as of the time of the conversion. [Emphasis added.]
The Gum Court indicated that once there has been a refusal of a right to possession, no further
demand for the property is necessary in order for the plaintiff to recover. Id. Given (1) that
defense counsel had earlier agreed that Gum controlled in this case with regard to the elements of
conversion; (2) the clear language in Gum indicating that a plaintiff may recover the value of the
property as of the time of the conversion once a refusal has taken place, with no further
requirement to demand the property; and (3) the trial court’s instructions, there is no basis for
reversal. To require mitigation of damages would essentially be rejecting the statement in Gum
4
The court was relying on Allen v Morris Building Co, 360 Mich 214; 103 NW2d 491 (1960), in
which the Court stated: “The rule requiring an injured party to mitigate his damages does not
apply, where the invasion of his property rights is due to defendant's intentional or positive and
continuous tort” (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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that a plaintiff, in order to recover for conversion, need not make further demands for the
property after the initial refusal.
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to amend their
pleadings. In general, we review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision regarding a motion
to amend. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 393; 541 NW2d 566 (1995).
Defendants state that plaintiffs’ complaint referred only to “conversion” but that plaintiffs
were allowed to proceed with a “statutory conversion” claim, thus subjecting defendant to treble
damages and an additional theory of recovery not available in a common-law conversion claim.
MCR 2.118(C)(1) states:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings.
In that case, amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence and to raise
those issues may be made on motion of a party at any time, even after judgment.
If a claim is not objected to at trial but could have been subject to an amendment under MCR
2.118(C)(1), then reversal is not required. See, e.g., Belobradich v Samsethsiri, 131 Mich App
241, 248; 346 NW2d 83 (1983). Moreover, MCR 2.118(C)(2) states:
If evidence is objected to at trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues raised by the pleadings, amendment to conform to that proof shall not be
allowed unless the party seeking to amend satisfies the court that the amendment
and the admission of the evidence would not prejudice the objecting party in
maintaining his or her action or defense on the merits. The court may grant an
adjournment to enable the objecting party to meet the evidence.
The transcript of a motion hearing on July 12, 2007 – five months before trial – makes
clear that defendants were aware as of that date that plaintiffs were relying on MCL 600.2919a.
Moreover, at the hearing on December 10, 2007, defense counsel, in arguing against an award of
exemplary damages, referred to the fact that the “statutes that are alleged in this matter” did not
allow for exemplary damages. On the first day of trial, defense counsel stated, “nowhere in the
Complaint does it say common law conversion,” but he made no motion to dismiss or otherwise
raise the issue of an improper attempt to amend the pleadings. The court simply stated, “It just
says conversion” and “I think that’s sufficient notice.”
The record indicates that defendants essentially consented to the statutory conversion
claim. Even if they are deemed to have not consented, there is simply no prejudice apparent,
when defendants were clearly aware, well before trial, that plaintiffs were intending to proceed
under a statutory-conversion theory. Reversal is not warranted.
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Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider claims
under MCL 600.2919a(1)(b). This issue involves statutory interpretation,5 which we review de
novo. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 690; 593 NW2d 215 (1999).
MCL 600.2919a states, in part:
(1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may
recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable
attorney fees:
(a) Another person's stealing or embezzling property or converting
property to the other person's own use.
(b) Another person's buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding
in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person
buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen,
embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled,
or converted.
In Marshall Lasser, PC v George, 252 Mich App 104, 111-112; 651 NW2d 158 (2002),
the Court held that the predecessor to MCL 600.2919a(1)(b) did not apply to the person who
actually committed the conversion but only to other persons. The earlier statue stated:
A person damaged as a result of another person's buying, receiving, or
aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property when
the person buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen,
embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled,
or converted may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. . . .
Defendants claim that the earlier statute and the current statute are materially identical and that
therefore MCL 600.2919a(1)(b) cannot apply in this case under Marshall Lasser, because the
converter and the “receiver” were essentially the same.
However, as pointed out by plaintiffs, the two statutes are materially different. The
current statute refers to “possessing” and “concealing” converted property. Clearly, a converter
himself may “possess” or “conceal” converted property. Unambiguous statutes must be applied
as written. Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471 Mich 540, 549; 685 NW2d 275 (2004). At any
rate, this interpretation is fully supported by the legislative analysis of the proposed amendment.
See House Legislative Analysis, HB 4356, May 31, 2005. Defendants’ argument is without
merit and reversal is unwarranted.
5
The trial court ruled, during the hearing on plaintiff’s post-judgment motions, that the plain
language of the statute provided for its applicability in this case.
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Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary
disposition concerning unpaid rent. At the motion hearing, plaintiffs’ attorney admitted that one
month’s rent was in arrears, but stated that it would have been paid if Charles Fick had come by
to collect it. The court stated:
I do feel more comfortable allowing that counterclaim to go to the jury at
this time. I think there’s a question of fact viewed in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff that there may not even be – they would have even paid the one
month rent had he come back. So I mean, I’m gonna allow that to go to the jury
and not grant summary [disposition] on the counterclaim for unpaid rent.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision concerning a motion for summary disposition.
Ardt, 233 Mich App at 688.
MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition where “[e]xcept as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter or law.”
When reviewing an order of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we
examine all relevant documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on
which reasonable minds could differ. . . . Where the moving party has produced
evidence in support of the motion, the opposing party bears the burden of
producing evidence to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. [Ardt,
233 Mich App at 688.]
The month for which plaintiff’s attorney admitted that rent was unpaid was October
2005. Plaintiff Patricia Christie testified at her deposition that Charles Fick stopped by the cabin
that month to collect rent and she told him, “‘Gary ran up town. He’ll be back in 10, 15 minutes
. . . .’” Patricia stated that Fick “just kind of flew out the door” and she “never seen him again
after that.” Gary Christie stated in an affidavit that “all rental payments made by himself were
made to, and delivered to, Charles F. Fick.” He stated in his deposition that Fick “always" came
to the cabin to obtain the rent and that he and Patricia were instructed not to bring the rent to
Fick’s nearby truck stop. He stated that Fick came “almost religiously, either between the 19th
and the 22nd to pick the money up.”
In light of this evidence, we conclude that plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether the October 2005 rent was unpaid only because defendants had not followed
their usual collection procedure. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion
for summary disposition.
Defendants lastly argue that the trial court erred in its award of attorney fees. We review
a trial court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Windemere Commons I Ass’n v
O’Brien, 269 Mich App 681, 682; 713 NW2d 814 (2006).
Plaintiffs sought attorney fees of $31,296. The court stated, in part:
They’re entitled to attorney fees under the conversion statute against C.F.
Fick & Sons, Inc., and they’re entitled to the full amount requested because it
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would – it would be wholly illogical to reduce the amount because it’s the exact
same amount of proofs and work to present as to C.F. Fick & Sons, Inc. as it is to
. . . Charles Fick personally. . . .
I do find that the hours submitted and the rate billed are both reasonable
and fair and consistent with the high volume of exhibits and evidence involved in
this case. And I also find that – and there’s ample law to back this up. I had this
issue come up before, that where two attorneys are actually working on the file, in
tandem for portions of it like they were here in the trial . . . they are both entitled
to their attorney fees as long as they’re reasonable. They both are reasonable, and
I felt it was reasonable and necessary to have both attorneys here.
I think that the Plaintiffs’ supporting affidavit for Plaintiffs’ bill of costs is
reasonable and fair. And I will . . . authorize an award of attorney fees pursuant
to the – under the authority of the conversion statute. Further, it’s arguable that
portions of them are awardable under the mediation statute. That’s an alternative
ruling. I think the primary ruling is the conversion statute, actual attorney fees.
And the other basis I find not to be very supportive. So under the
mediation rule, you’re certainly entitled to a portion of these.[6] Under the
conversion statute, you’re entitled to all of them. So it’s a single award.
The court did not specifically address defense counsel’s argument that the attorney fees should
be limited to solely those fees related to the conversion claim, but the court did state that it
disagreed with defense counsel “on those, the other points.”
On appeal, defendants take issue with the fact that no evidentiary hearing was conducted
with regard to attorney fees. However, defense counsel failed to request a full evidentiary
hearing during the motion hearing concerning plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees. Moreover,
plaintiffs submitted a detailed bill that the trial court specifically found to be reasonable and fair,
and we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.7 Defendants also argue
that the fee award should be limited to solely those fees relating to the conversion claim.
However, the claims here were so interrelated that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to award fees for the case as a whole.
6
Because Charles F. Fick accepted the case evaluation, attorney fees were not available against
him, individually, under the case-evaluation rules.
7
The bill noted that attorney John Rosczyk expended 126 hours on the case, at a rate of $150 an
hour, and that attorney Michael Edwards expended 82 non-traveling hours on the case, again at a
rate of $150 an hour.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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