PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN CHARLES SCHERER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 25, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290554
Delta Circuit Court
LC No. 08-008030-FH
BRIAN CHARLES SCHERER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Cavanagh and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial conviction of possession of an analogue
controlled substance (Alprazolam, i.e., Xanax), MCL 333.7403(2)(b), for which he was
sentenced to six months in jail. We affirm.
A vehicle owned by Dennis Herp, driven by Jared Barthart, and carrying defendant as a
passenger, was stopped by Escanaba Public Safety Sergeant Robert LaMarche, who had
determined that defendant had outstanding arrest warrants. LaMarche informed defendant that
defendant would be taken into custody. According to LaMarche, defendant then stated, “I have
to get some things out of my pocket.” Defendant leaned back and started digging both hands
into his pockets. As defendant pulled his hands out of his pockets, LaMarche noticed a plastic
wrapper sticking out of defendant’s left hand. While LaMarche ordered defendant to place his
hands on the dash, defendant moved his hand towards the console of the car and appeared to
drop the wrapper. LaMarche removed defendant from the vehicle and searched the area between
the passenger seat and the console where he thought defendant had dropped the plastic. He
located and seized a sealed plastic wrapper that contained little blue pills. LaMarche also found
defendant’s keys in that location. Tests revealed that the pills contained Alprazolam.
Defendant’s defense was that he did not possess the pills and that they belonged to Herp,
who had a prescription for them. Herp testified that he had left the pills in the car after a trip to
Escanaba with defendant and Barthart, and that he had let defendant and Barthart borrow the
vehicle while he slept. Herp maintained that the pills were packaged in the cellophane because
he did not want to take his whole bottle on the trip. Defendant testified and denied that the pills
were his and that they were in his pockets when the officers stopped the car. He said the pills
were on the center console, and may have fallen to the floor when his keys hit them after he
dropped them in response to LaMarche’s order to do so.
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Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of LaMarche
during rebuttal, and that this unfairly prejudiced defendant and denied him a fair trial. He further
argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to this prosecutorial misconduct was objectively
unreasonable and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant failed to object to the
alleged prosecutorial misconduct; thus, this issue is not preserved. An unpreserved claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for plain error. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586;
629 NW2d 411 (2001).
Defendant did not move for a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel or
request a Ginther1 hearing before the trial court; therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is also not preserved. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
Our review of an unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes
apparent on the record. Id. A defendant has waived the issue if the record on appeal does not
support the defendant's assignments of error. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich
App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). A trial
court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear error, and the ultimate constitutional issue
arising from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed de novo. Id.
Defendant argues that the following statement made by the prosecution during the
prosecution’s rebuttal closing argument was improper:
The judge will tell you that cases are not won and lost by
the number of witnesses, and it makes sense. If you have one
credible person versus three who are not credible, the number of
witnesses never carries the day. It’s the truth of the witness, it’s
their credibility, it’s their honesty testifying under oath. And I
suggest to you that the witness here is Sergeant LaMarche and his
testimony above all is to believed (sic), and on that basis I ask you
to find the defendant guilty.”
“The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether, after examining the prosecutor’s
statements and actions in context, the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v
Hill, 257 Mich App 126, 135; 667 NW2d 78 (2003). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
considered on a case-by-case basis, and the actions of the prosecutor are to be considered as a
whole and evaluated in light of the defense arguments and the evidence admitted at trial. People
v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
The prosecution’s comment was not improper. Prosecutors are generally afforded great
latitude regarding their arguments and conduct at trial, and are free to argue the evidence and all
reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to their theory of the case. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). “Included in the list of improper
prosecutorial commentary or questioning is the maxim that the prosecutor cannot vouch for the
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some special knowledge concerning a
witness’ truthfulness.” Id. at 276. Nor may the prosecutor use the prestige of his office, or that
of the police, to suggest that the defendant is guilty. People v Swartz, 171 Mich App 364, 370371; 429 NW2d 905 (1988); People v Cowell, 44 Mich App 623, 628; 205 NW2d 600 (1973).
However, a prosecutor is free to argue that a trial witness is not credible, or that a prosecution
witness should be believed. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 630; 709 NW2d 595 (2005);
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
Here, the prosecutor did not suggest that the jury should accept LaMarche’s testimony
because the prosecutor had some special knowledge that it was truthful. Nor did the prosecutor
use the prestige of his office or of the police to suggest that defendant was guilty or that
LaMarche was testifying truthfully. The fact that the prosecutor “suggested” to the jury that
LaMarche should be believed does not render this a case of improper vouching. “Where the
prosecutor’s argument is based upon the evidence and does not suggest that the jury decide the
case on the authority of the prosecutor’s office, the words ‘I believe’ or ‘I want you to convict’
are not improper.” Swartz, 171 Mich App at 370-371 (citations omitted); see also Cowell, 44
Mich App at 628. The prosecution was responding to defendant’s assertion during closing
argument that defendant and Herp were telling the truth about who owned the Xanax and that
LaMarche was mistaken in what he saw when he stopped defendant. The prosecutor’s response
was an argument that the jury should believe LaMarche’s testimony and reject the testimony
given by defendant and Herp. Because the prosecutor's statement was made in reference to the
specific evidence at trial, we find that defendant has not shown plain error.
We thus also find that defendant has failed to support his claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel. ‘“Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and [a] defendant bears a heavy
burden of proving otherwise.”’ McGhee, 268 Mich App at 625, quoting People v Solmonson,
261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). “In order to overcome this presumption,
defendant must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured against an
objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances and according to prevailing
professional norms.” Id. “Second, defendant must show that the deficiency was so prejudicial
that he was deprived of a fair trial such that there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors the trial outcome would have been different.” Id., quoting
Solmonson, 261 Mich App at 663-664.
Here, counsel did not act unreasonably when he did not object to the prosecutor’s
comment. See People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). (“[C]ounsel
does not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise futile objections.”).
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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