IN RE HALEY BRYAN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of H.B., Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 18, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293578
Presque Isle Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-000022-NA
MICHAEL BRYAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MARISA A. GARCIA,
Respondent.
In the Matter of H.B., Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293579
Presque Isle Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-000022-NA
MARISA A. GARCIA,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MICHAEL BRYAN,
Respondent.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Zahra, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right the order terminating their
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
The child first came under the court’s jurisdiction in June 2007. She had been found
outside in a parking lot unattended and respondent mother was suspected of drug or alcohol use
at the time. Subsequently, both parents admitted to using alcohol and marijuana. In January
2008, the court’s jurisdiction was terminated after respondents successfully completed substance
abuse counseling. However, petitioner filed a new petition the same day because the child was
found unattended in an intersection, while respondent father was at a bar and respondent mother
was asleep at home. The goal of the renewed petition was reunification and both parents were
ordered to comply with a parent agency treatment plan, requiring them to successfully address
their substance abuse issues. Respondent mother was also expected to address her mental health
issues. However, both respondents continued to use alcohol throughout much of 2008. In
addition, respondent father continued to test positive for marijuana and was convicted of
manufacturing and delivery of marijuana in early 2009. Respondent mother also failed to
complete inpatient treatment twice and failed to successfully address her mental health problems.
The trial court terminated respondents’ parental rights in July 2009.
II. Statutory Grounds for Termination
Respondents first argue that the trial court erred by finding clear and convincing evidence
in support of the statutory grounds for termination. We disagree. We review for clear error the
trial court’s determination that the petitioner established a statutory ground for termination. In re
Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). In a termination proceeding, a
petitioner must establish at least one statutory ground for termination of parental rights by clear
and convincing evidence. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Here, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). This provision provides that a court may terminate a parent’s
parental rights to a child if “the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there
is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child’s age.” The trial court’s finding was not erroneous. Our review of the
record shows that respondent father continued to use alcohol and marijuana, committed a drugrelated crime, and was increasingly inconsistent in visiting his daughter. Respondent mother
appeared to be making a greater effort; however, she failed to complete two different inpatient
treatment programs and failed to address her mental health issues. This evidence sufficiently
supports the trial court’s finding with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).1 Accordingly,
respondents’ argument fails.
1
Because there was sufficient evidence of one statutory ground, it is unnecessary for us to
(continued…)
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III. Best Interests
Respondents next argue that the trial court erred in finding that termination was in the
child’s best interests. We do not agree. We also review for clear error the trial court’s best
interests finding. In re Trejo Minors, supra at 356-357.
If a trial court finds that grounds for termination have been established, as it did here,
then it must consider whether termination is in the child’s best interests; if termination is in the
child’s best interests, then it must order termination of the parent’s parental rights. MCL
712A.19b(5). In considering the child’s best interests, the bond between each respondent and the
child is relevant, see In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 301; 690 NW2d 505 (2004), as is the child’s
need for permanence, In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
Here, the child’s counselor testified that the child was in need of permanence, had failed
to sufficiently bond with respondents, and had effectively said good-bye to her parents. In the
counselor’s opinion, the child would regress to her aggressive behaviors if returned to
respondents. Moreover, the child’s foster mother testified that the child did not even want to
attend visitations with respondents. Clearly, respondents cannot provide the child with the
permanency she deserves given the fact that the child has remained under the court’s jurisdiction
for over two years while respondents have failed to rectify the circumstances that led to
termination. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it held that termination of
respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
IV. Reunification Efforts
Finally, respondents argue that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify
them with their child. We disagree. It is true that petitioner must make reasonable efforts to
rectify the problems in the home through a service plan. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542;
702 NW2d 192 (2005). Failure to do so can affect whether there was sufficient evidence to
terminate parental rights, if the respondents would have fared better with additional services. Id.
at 542-543.
However, the services provided in this matter were sufficient. Respondents argue that
they should have received certain documents but do not explain what unknown facts those
documents contained or how respondents would have fared better as a result. Respondent
mother also contends that she should have received more assistance after she moved; however,
our review of the record reveals that she was able to secure the services she contends should
have been provided. The only service respondents requested and did not receive was family
counseling. Nonetheless, petitioner reasonably withheld this service. Family counseling would
have been provided had respondents gained control of their substance abuse and mental health
issues. Respondents, however, never gained control of these issues. Petitioner made reasonable
efforts to reunify respondents with the child.
(…continued)
analyze whether the evidence was sufficient as to other statutory grounds. See In re JK, supra at
210.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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