TRUDY BAIN V COMMUNITY SALES INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRUDY BAIN, f/k/a TRUDY SIMS, f/k/a
TRUDY COLMER,
UNPUBLISHED
February 4, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
COMMUNITY SALES, INC and CHAMPION
HOME BUILDERS,
No. 288370
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 08-040402-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Markey and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
In 1999, plaintiff bought a manufactured home from defendant Community Sales, to be
placed on a rented lot owned by Community Sales. Defendant Champion manufactured the
home. Community Sales assembled the home. Soon after plaintiff took possession, several
serious defects were discovered, including conditions that resulted in the growth of toxic mold.
In 2001, plaintiff filed suit against both defendants, alleging breach of contract, breach of the
Uniform Mobile Home Warranty Act, breach of implied warranty of fitness, and negligence.
The parties reached a settlement agreement in July 2002, under which defendants agreed to
repair various defects in a workmanlike manner and to pay plaintiff and her attorney $8,500.
Plaintiff stayed in a hotel while the repairs, which included the plumbing, were being completed.
Two weeks later, she did a walk-through, visually inspecting the repairs, many of which were
hidden within the walls of the home. Plaintiff and her attorney signed off on the repairs:
I, Trudy Sims, have visually conducted a walk through of my home on 7/24/02
and have confirmed the repairs listed on the two (2) pages of Addendum A have
been completed to my satisfaction.
-1-
On August 2, 2002, the trial court entered a Stipulated Order for Dismissal with Prejudice
and Without Costs, based on the settlement agreement, settling all pending claims.1 However,
the problems resumed soon after plaintiff retook possession, and in January 2003, plaintiff’s
attorney sent a letter to defendants, identifying the problems and asking that they be repaired.
Defendants replied that it had no further responsibility, plaintiff having agreed in July that the
repairs were completed to her satisfaction.
In November 2004, plaintiff had a mold test done and it showed high levels of toxic
mold, most likely resulting from improper cleanup or from water leaks that were not properly
repaired. In November 2005, plaintiff moved out of the home after suffering a number of
respiratory problems that continue. On July 10, 2008, plaintiff filed suit, alleging that defendants
breached the settlement agreement by not completing the repairs in a workmanlike manner, as
they had promised, and alleging negligence in both the original construction and the later repair
of the home. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim was barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction because of her agreement
that the repairs were satisfactory and acceptance of the settlement money. Defendants also
argued that plaintiff’s negligence count was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
In response, plaintiff argued that she could not have discovered the improperly completed
repairs because defendants would not let her inspect the work until the repairs were enclosed in
the walls. She instead had to rely on their false representations that the repairs were done
properly. She also argued that under Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, 456 Mich 511;
573 NW2d 611 (1998), her home and the repairs to it constituted “improvements to real
property.” Under MCL 600.5839, six years is the applicable time period to apply for actions
against a contractor for damages arising out of a defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property. Thus, plaintiff asserted, her claim was not time-barred because
she brought it within six years of the time the repairs were done.
The trial court disagreed with both of plaintiff’s arguments. It found the language of the
release was unambiguous, that plaintiff knowingly signed it, that nothing prevented her from
having someone inspect the work as it was being done, and that her statement accepting the
repairs as satisfactory was valid. Because the court ruled that the settlement agreement barred
plaintiff’s suit, the court did not need to address the period of limitations.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Although substantively admissible evidence submitted at the time of the motion must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the non-moving party must come
forward with at least some evidentiary proof, some statement of specific fact upon which to base
his case. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Skinner v Square
D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
1
The same trial judge entered that order as heard the present case.
-2-
Plaintiff argues that she does not need to tender back the $8,500 because she is not trying
to repudiate the release and pursue the underlying suit. The present complaint is not about the
underlying suit but about breach of the settlement agreement. Plaintiff’s July 24, 2002, recitation
of satisfaction had no legal effect on the July 10, 2002, agreement, especially where plaintiff
noted that she only “visually” inspected the repairs.
Simply put, plaintiff is attempting to repudiate her release. To do so, she must first
tender back the consideration given. Stefanac v Cranbrook Educational Community, 435 Mich
155, 163, 165; 458 NW2d 56 (1990). Plaintiff has not done this. If there had been no statement
of satisfaction, she could have compelled defendants to complete the repairs as required. As
defendants note, once plaintiff agreed that they performed as required, and once they tendered
the cash to satisfy her claims, the contract was completed. There is no evidence that plaintiff
was prevented from checking on the work while it was being done, or that she could not have
demanded photographs of the work before it was sealed up. She simply accepted that it was
done as stated. Defendants are entitled to rely on plaintiff’s agreement that the settlement was
satisfied in full and her acceptance of the consideration. 435 Mich at 163.
Plaintiff also argues that the six-year period of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5839
applies to this case because the home and repairs to it are both “improvements to real property.”
Plaintiff asserts that contrary to defendants’ argument in the trial court that plaintiff’s home is a
“mobile home,” the home in question is a “manufactured home,” placed on a permanent
foundation, and unlikely to be moved. In Frankenmuth, our Supreme Court held without
reservation that a manufactured home is an improvement to real property. Alternatively, plaintiff
argues that even if the three-year period of limitations applies, the harm to plaintiff’s respiratory
system was ongoing until the time she moved out of her home in November 2005.
The question of which period of limitations applies is a matter of statutory interpretation,
a question of law that we consider de novo on appeal. Ostroth v Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474
Mich 36, 40; 709 NW2d 589 (2006). The period of limitations plaintiff seeks to apply provides
in relevant part:
No person may maintain any action to recover damages for any injury to property,
real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the
defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action
for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained as a result of such injury,
against any state licensed architect or professional engineer performing or
furnishing the design or supervision of construction of the improvement, or
against any contractor making the improvement, more than 6 years after the time
of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the
improvement, or 1 year after the defect is discovered or should have been
discovered, provided that the defect constitutes the proximate cause of the injury
or damage for which the action is brought and is the result of gross negligence on
the part of the contractor or licensed architect or professional engineer. However,
no such action shall be maintained more than 10 years after the time of occupancy
of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement. [MCL
600.5839(1).]
-3-
Plaintiff’s argument that her home is an improvement to real property fails because
mobile and manufactured homes are treated like vehicles in this state unless the owner follows
the procedures outlined in MCL 125.2330i. Under that statute, the owner of the home must also
have an ownership interest in the real property, and the home must have its wheels, towing
hitches, and running gear removed. MCL 125.2330i(1), (11). Unless the towing gear is
removed, the home is not “affixed” to the land. MCL 125.2330i(11). There is no evidence this
has been done to plaintiff’s home; it is still titled as a vehicle. Thus, the repairs made to
plaintiff’s home are the equivalent of repairs made to an automobile parked on someone else’s
real property: no “improvement to real property” is made by an improvement to personal
property. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument on this issue fails.
Plaintiff’s alternative argument that she filed timely because her injuries were ongoing
until she moved out also fails. In general, a claim “accrues at the time the wrong upon which the
claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827. The
alleged “wrong,” in this case, was the faulty repair work. The continuing growth of mold is
damage resulting from that wrong. Thus, plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred three years
after the repair work was completed.
Affirmed. Defendants, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.