PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES TAYLOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286768
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-014233-FH
JAMES TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Wilder, JJ.
GLEICHER, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence
that defendant constructively possessed the marijuana and firearms, as charged.
Based on information gathered during a controlled narcotics purchase, the police obtained
a search warrant for the upper flat of a two-family dwelling at 5259 Chatsworth Street in Detroit.
The search warrant identified Sayyid Watkins as a resident of the upper flat. The first officer
who entered the upstairs flat found defendant walking from a rear bedroom and detained him.
That officer searched the area and “didn’t make any confiscations.” A second officer discovered
in a front closet a shoebox containing marijuana and two handguns. Further investigation at the
scene revealed that Watkins resided in the lower flat.
At trial, the prosecutor questioned Detroit Police Lieutenant Darryl Brown regarding
“proof of residence” of the upstairs flat:
Prosecutor: Were you able to get proof of residence from the upstairs
location?
Brown: Yes, sir; we were.
***
Prosecutor: I want to show you what’s marked as People Exhibit-3—
proposed Exhibit-3. And if you could look at it and tell me what it is.
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Brown: Yes, sir. It’s Total Health cards in the name of James R. Taylor at
5259 Chadsworth [sic]; Detroit, Michigan 48224. It is someone’s HMO medical
cards.
Prosecutor: All right. And it has the defendant’s name on it, and it has
the address of Chadsworth [sic] Street?
Brown: That’s correct.
Prosecutor: Now, looking at the cards there, the card actually has a
birthday; is that correct? On the cards; the actual medical cards.
Brown: That’s correct.
Prosecutor: And what’s the birthday on there?
Brown: That would be 11/4 of 2000.
Prosecutor: Okay. Which would make the person about eight, seven
years old? About seven years old.
Brown: Seven years old; that’s correct.
Prosecutor: And where did you find that at?
Brown: This was recovered from the premises upstairs living room.
On cross-examination, Lieutenant Brown admitted that because defendant’s date of birth is
September 30, 1974, the health card did not belong to him.
The prosecutor introduced no additional evidence that connected defendant to 5259
Chatsworth. For example, no evidence tended to support that defendant resided in the upper flat
or had ever touched the drugs and guns found in the closet. And no evidence established
defendant’s address or that the police found defendant’s clothes or other personal items in the
upstairs flat.
The majority opines that “it is reasonable to infer that the medical cards found in an
envelope addressed to James Art Taylor at the 5259 Chatsworth address were for defendant’s
minor son.” Ante at 3. I agree that this is a reasonable inference. However, I respectfully
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the inference supporting that the cards belonged to
defendant’s son equates to sufficient evidence that defendant lived in the upstairs flat or
possessed any knowledge about the contents of its closets. In my view, the circumstantial
evidence supporting defendant’s constructive possession of the contraband in the shoebox
qualifies as entirely speculative and conjectural, and thus insufficient to support defendant’s
convictions.
When determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a
conviction, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
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crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). This standard, articulated in Jackson v Virginia, 443 US
307; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979), reflects “an attempt to give ‘concrete substance’” to a
criminal defendant’s due process rights. Wolfe, 440 Mich at 514. The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard requires that the fact finder “reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt
of the accused . . . .” Jackson, 443 US at 315.
Defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to deliver marijuana and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knowingly possessed the contraband, either actually or constructively. Wolfe, 440 Mich at 517;
People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470-471; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). Because no evidence showed
that defendant actually possessed the marijuana or guns found in the closet, the prosecutor bore
the burden to establish that defendant constructively possessed them. A person constructively
possesses an item “if he ‘knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise
dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons . . . .’”
Hill, 433 Mich at 470, quoting United States v Burch, 313 F2d 628, 629 (CA 6, 1963).
“Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of possession.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 623; 709
NW2d 595 (2005). However, a defendant’s mere presence near contraband does not prove
knowing possession or an ability to control it. In Wolfe, 440 Mich at 520, the Supreme Court
reiterated the “well established” principle “that a person’s presence, by itself, at a location where
drugs are found is insufficient to prove constructive possession.” To support a conviction
premised on constructive possession, the prosecution must demonstrate “some additional
connection between the defendant and the contraband . . . . Id.
In People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 422-423; 646 NW2d 158 (2002), the “additional
connection[s]” between the female defendant and narcotics discovered in an apartment included
the presence of narcotics in the pocket of a dress hanging in a bedroom closet, other clothes in
the bedroom belonging to a woman, and letters addressed to the defendant discovered in the
bedroom’s nightstand and the apartment’s mailbox. In McGhee, 268 Mich App at 623, this
Court identified several evidentiary links between defendant and the property where narcotics
were found, including a utility bill, vehicle and other insurance documents bearing the
defendant’s name and the raid address, and the defendant’s driver’s license and a property deed
both reflecting the raid address. This evidence sufficed to “indicate defendant’s ownership and
control of the location at which drugs were found at the time when they were found.” Id.
In contrast, the prosecutor here introduced only mere presence evidence linking
defendant and the marijuana and firearms in the closet. The contraband was not in plain view.
The medical insurance card did not belong to defendant. The prosecutor presented no evidence
of utility bills, lease agreements, or even a driver’s license connecting defendant to the premises.
In my view, no plausible inference permits a fact finder to conclude that the presence of an
insurance card, presumably belonging to defendant’s son, established beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant’s dominion and control over the upper flat. “While the trier of fact may draw
reasonable inferences from facts of record, it may not indulge in inferences wholly unsupported
by any evidence, based only upon assumption.” People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 275; 380
NW2d 11 (1985). Stated differently, when the evidence does not rise above the threshold of
speculation and conjecture, the prosecutor has not established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The evidence introduced here does not even come close to giving rise to a reasonable inference
that defendant knew that a shoebox in the front closet contained marijuana and weapons. To
convict defendant, the trial court had to assume that the insurance card belonged to defendant’s
son, and that the insurance card’s presence in the flat meant that defendant had the right to
control the entire premises. The first inference qualifies as reasonable, but the second does not.
Because no evidence reasonably tends to prove that defendant lived in the flat, frequently
visited, or had reason to know of the marijuana and firearms in the closet, I would reverse.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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