STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KEVIN E. KOSINSKI and
RICHARD KOSINSKI, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 14, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291879
Gogebic Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-000083-NA
CHRISTOPHER KOSINSKI,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
WENDY KOSINSKI,
Respondent.
In the Matter of KEVIN E. KOSINSKI and
RICHARD KOSINSKI, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291880
Gogebic Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-000083-NA
WENDY KOSINSKI,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHRISTOPHER KOSINSKI,
Respondent.
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Before: Markey, P.J., and Bandstra and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Christopher and Wendy Kosinski appeal as of
right the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
This family’s history with preventive and protective services dates back to the day that
the oldest child, Kevin, was born. Both parents have disabilities that prompted the initial
referrals. Wendy is developmentally disabled. She has difficulty reading, writing, and telling
time. Because she is unable to handle her own finances, she requires the services of a third-party
payee to manage her SSI benefits. Christopher, while not cognitively impaired, lost his hearing
at the age of seven following a childhood illness; he communicates through sign language, lip
reading, and note writing.
The children were both born in Lansing, Michigan. At the time of Kevin’s birth, in 2001,
a referral was made because of concerns regarding Wendy’s ability to care for the infant. Wendy
did not understand a newborn’s most basic needs, including feeding and diaper changing.
Prevention services were initiated with the placement of Families First in the home. Between
2004 and August 2006, after their move to the Upper Peninsula, the family received preventive
services through Gogebic County. The family was assisted by Community Mental Health
(CMH), Early Head Start, Even Start, MSU Extension Services, Early On, speech and physical
therapists, and the Department of Human Services (DHS).
The case transitioned to protective services in August 2006, after Christopher attempted
to run the children and Wendy over with his truck. Christopher testified that demons in his head
compelled his actions. As a result of this incident, which Wendy consistently referred to as an
“accident,” Christopher was arrested and incarcerated for nine months. During this time, Wendy
continued receiving services and, with this assistance, she attempted as a single parent to care for
the children.
In June 2007, Christopher was released from jail. Because he and Wendy decided that it
would be appropriate for Christopher to return to the family home, the children were removed
from their care. For the next 18 months, the family would be provided a multitude of services,
many of them a continuation of the preventive services, in an effort to foster reunification. When
it became apparent that respondents had made no progress with their parenting skills, and that
they had not benefited from the services offered, a petition seeking termination of their parental
rights was filed.
On appeal, respondents contend that the trial court clearly erred in finding sufficient
evidence to terminate their parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We
disagree and find that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re
Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Despite respondents being offered intensive
services over a five-year period, there was little to no improvement in their parenting skills.
Indeed, even at the time of the termination hearing, respondents had not reached a level of
proficiency that would warrant unsupervised parenting time for even a few hours. None of the
foster care workers were comfortable with leaving the children in respondents’ care
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unmonitored, and a parent aide still coached respondents during their parenting time. Wendy’s
CMH case manager testified that Wendy could care for her children if she had the case
manager’s assistance and prevention services through DHS. However, agency employees made
it clear that DHS services, such as a parent aide, could not be provided indefinitely. At the time
of the termination hearing, respondents could not care for their children and would be unable to
do so within a reasonable time. Consequently, termination of their parental rights was
appropriate pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
Respondents contend that, because they complied with the treatment plan, the trial court
erred when it found statutory grounds for termination of their parental rights. While it is true that
respondents were cooperative and did comply with the elements of their service plan, compliance
alone is insufficient. A parent must benefit from the services offered. In re Gazella, 264 Mich
App 668, 676-677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Several service providers testified that respondents
simply did not retain the information and skills they had been taught and re-taught. The record
does not suggest that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to adjust the service plan to
better accommodate respondents’ limitations.
We also find no clear error in the trial court’s ruling regarding the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. Before terminating parental rights,
the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL
712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich at 632-633.
Additionally, the trial court must make an affirmative finding that termination of parental rights
is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). If a statutory ground for termination is
established and termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court must
terminate parental rights. Id.
In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the trial court’s conclusion that
termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Although
respondents loved their children, they simply did not possess the skills necessary to care for them
and address their basic needs. With respondents’ severe parenting deficits, a product of both
developmental disabilities and lack of motivation, the children would be put at risk of harm in
their care.
Further, the trial court did not unfairly compare the foster parents’ parenting skills to
respondents’ parenting skills as prohibited by In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214-215 n 21; 661 NW2d
216 (2003). Instead, the court was simply illustrating that the children needed appropriate
structure and stability in order to thrive and overcome the delays they had experienced in their
earliest years. The children are still very young. They need the stability and security of a stable
environment in order to foster continued growth and development. Consequently, the trial court
did not err when it concluded that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the
children’s best interests.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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