RAINBOW USA INC V SEVEN GRAND ASSOC LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RAINBOW USA, INC,
UNPUBLISHED
January 5, 2010
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 288640
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-706968-CZ
SEVEN GRAND ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to plaintiff in
this declaratory action, in which the trial court construed the disputed provision of a commercial
lease in plaintiff’s favor. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant is the landlord of a shopping center in which plaintiff leases space for a retail
store. Article II of the lease governed “rent.” Section 2.01 provided that “minimum rent” was
$84,501 per year. Section 2.02 provided that, in addition to the minimum rent, plaintiff would
pay percentage rent of four percent of all gross sales. Section 2.04 provided that plaintiff would
pay a proportionate share of taxes and assessments. Section 2.05, entitled “additional
payments,” provided that rent was defined in the lease “as minimum rent, percentage rent, cost of
living, and all other sums of money or charges required to be paid by Tenant under this Lease or
in the Exhibits attached hereto. . . .”1 A separate section of the lease, Article VIII, entitled
“operation, use and maintenance of common areas,” provided that plaintiff was to pay a pro rata
share for such expenses, including “the cost of insuring all property provided by Landlord which
may at any time comprise the Shopping Center.”
1
Throughout this opinion, the language we quote from the lease reflects additions and deletions
made by the parties during negotiations. For example, in § 2.05, the definition of rent originally
included the term “cost of living,” but this term was crossed out before the parties signed the
lease.
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In an addendum, the lease included an anchor tenancy clause at § 27.19. It provided:
In the event that Big Lots, [Oak Foods,] or more than 15% of the present cotenants [remaining gross leasable area of the Shopping Center] ever go dark for
more than 90 days, Tenant shall have the option to convert [its] total rental
obligation to [4%] of gross sales in lieu of minimum [all] rent. If Tenant was
to exercise this option, then Landlord shall have the right to terminate the lease
with 30 days written notice. Further, Tenant shall have the [additional] right to
terminate the lease [at any time] if any of the above conditions persist for more
than three [two (2)] months by providing 30 days notice. [Emphasis added.]
In December 2005, Big Lots went out of business. Plaintiff exercised its option under the
anchor tenancy clause in § 27.19 to convert its rental obligation to four percent of gross sales. In
November 2006, Nationwide Furniture moved into the Big Lots space. Nationwide Furniture
subsequently went out of business. Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s rent reverted back to the
original amount paid during the period that Nationwide Furniture occupied the Big Lots space.
Defendant also asserted that the term “all rent,” as used in § 27.19, includes taxes, insurance and
common areas costs. Plaintiff asserted that it could convert its payments upon the triggering of
the anchor tenancy clause and that the rent did not convert back to the original amount when
Nationwide Furniture occupied the Big Lots space. The trial court agreed with plaintiff, finding
that the rent did not convert back to the original terms and that “all rent” included common area
expenses (implicitly including insurance), taxes, and rent. Accordingly, the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, and this appeal ensued.
Review of a trial court’s grant of summary disposition is de novo. Klapp v United Ins
Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 463; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). “The interpretation of a contract
is also a question of law this Court reviews de novo on appeal, including whether the language of
a contract is ambiguous and requires resolution by the trier of fact.” DaimlerChrysler Corp v G
Tech Professional Staffing, Inc, 260 Mich App 183, 184-185; 678 NW2d 647 (2003).
A contract must be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Holmes v
Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 593; 760 NW2d 300 (2008).
Under ordinary contract principles if contractual language is clear, construction of
the contract is a question of law for the court. If the contract is subject to two
reasonable interpretations [or the provisions irreconcilably conflict with each
other], factual development is necessary to determine the intent of the parties and
summary disposition is therefore inappropriate. If the contract, although
inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly admits of but one interpretation, it is
not ambiguous. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 721-722; 565
NW2d 401 (1997); see also Shaw v City of Ecorse, 283 Mich App 1, 22; 770
NW2d 31 (2009).
A court may not rewrite clear and unambiguous language under the guise of interpretation.
Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 354; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). Rather,
courts must give “effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a contract and avoid an
interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory.” Klapp v United
Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 463; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).
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Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in construing the term “convert” in
§ 27.19 to allow the tenant to permanently convert its total rental obligation. Defendant
maintains that the term “convert” is ambiguous because it could either mean that by electing the
option, the total rental obligation: 1) would permanently change to four percent of gross sales, or
2) would vary between four percent of gross sales and the original rental obligation depending on
occupancy. Thus, defendant argues that further factual development is necessary to determine
the intent of the parties. We disagree.
We conclude that the term “convert” in the anchor tenancy clause is capable of only one
interpretation and is unambiguous. Meagher, 222 Mich App at 721. ‘“When considering a word
or phrase that has not been given prior legal meaning, resort to a lay dictionary such as Webster’s
is appropriate.’” Citizens Ins Co v Pro-Seal Service Group, Inc, 477 Mich 75, 84; 730 NW2d
682 (2007), quoting Greene v AP Products, Ltd, 475 Mich 502, 510; 717 NW2d 855 (2006).
The Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001) defines “convert” as “to change into
something of different form or properties; transmute; transform.” Applying this definition to
§ 27.19, upon the occurrence of the condition, such as Big Lots’ closure, plaintiff had the option
to convert or change its original rental obligation to something of a different form, namely four
percent of gross sales. Contrary to defendant’s interpretation, the plain language of the lease
does not provide for a subsequent conversion of the rental obligation, from four percent of gross
sales back to the original rental obligation, upon the occurrence of another condition, such as
occupancy in Big Lots’ leasable space. Defendant’s interpretation would amount to a
modification of clear and unambiguous language. Such a modification is not permitted by
contract law. Henderson, 460 Mich at 354.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in construing § 27.19 to relieve plaintiff of
its obligation to pay overhead costs. Defendant asserts that the election to convert the “total
rental obligation to [4%] . . . of gross sales in lieu of all rent” should be interpreted to mean that
plaintiff is obligated to pay four percent of gross sales plus pro rata common area expenses,
insurance and taxes. Plaintiff counters that “all rent” should be interpreted to mean “minimum
rent, percentage rent, . . . and all other sums of money or charges required to be paid by tenant
under this Lease” according to the definition of “rent” in § 2.05.
We conclude that the phrase “all rent” in § 27.19 is also capable of only one
interpretation and is unambiguous. Meagher, 222 Mich App at 721. Section 2.05 clearly states
that “rent” is defined throughout the lease as “minimum rent, percentage rent, . . . and all other
sums of money or charges required to be paid by tenant under this Lease.” As we stated, supra,
under the lease plaintiff was obligated to pay pro rata charges for the common area expenses,
insurance and taxes. Thus, these charges clearly fell within plaintiff’s rental obligation until
plaintiff elected to convert that “total rental obligation” to four percent of gross sales and was
relieved of the charges.
We reject defendant’s argument that the definition of rent in § 2.05 is only applicable to
tenant default because, in § 2.05, the parties stated, “Rent shall be defined in this Lease” and did
not limit the definition to that section only.
Defendant also argues that the application of this definition of rent to other sections of the
lease would result in surplusage. For example, in § 2.04:
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If the total amount [of pro rata taxes] paid by Tenant hereunder for any such
calendar year shall exceed such actual amount due from Tenant for such calendar
year, such excess shall be credited against the next installment of rent and
additional rent due from Tenant to Landlord hereunder. [Emphasis added.]2
The parties may not have intended the definition of “rent” to apply in these sections where other,
more specific charges are referenced. The parties’ references to “rent” may have been added
clumsily or redundantly. Meagher, 222 Mich App at 721-722; see Mich Twp Participating Plan
v Pavolich, 232 Mich App 378, 389; 591 NW2d 325 (1998) (“a finding of surplusage does not
equate to a finding of ambiguity”). Nevertheless, in § 27.19, the parties clearly intended the full
definition of rent to apply because they modified the term “rent” with the term “all.”3 Had the
parties intended a different definition of rent to apply, they would have modified the term “rent”
with a qualifying term like “minimum,” “percentage,” or “additional.” Again, this Court will not
rewrite clear and unambiguous language to modify “rent” with such a qualifying term.
Henderson, 460 Mich at 354. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to
MCR 7.219.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
2
Section 1.03 of the lease and § 2 of the Rider speak to “rent and additional rent”; § 5.01 of the
lease speaks to “rent, additional rent, taxes, assessments, impositions and all other charges,
including utilities”; § 10.01 speaks to “rent and other charges”; § 19.01 speaks to “any rental or
other charges”; and § 19.02 speaks to “rent and other charges”; § 26.04 speaks to “rent,
percentage rent or any other payments required by the terms of this Lease.”
3
The Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) defines “all” as “the whole or full
amount of.”
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