PEOPLE OF MI V JASON ROQUE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286212
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-003360-FC
JASON ROQUE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions for assault with intent to rob
while armed, MCL 750.89; felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Because defendant has not shown
that he was prejudiced during the photographic or corporeal lineups, and because he has not
shown that trial counsel was ineffective, we affirm, but remand for resentencing in accordance
with this opinion.
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
because he failed to move to suppress the identification evidence of the second photographic
lineup and the corporeal lineup showed to the victim. Our review is limited to the existing
record. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).1 To prevail, defendant
must show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient according to an objective standard
of reasonableness considering the prevailing professional norms. Strickland v Washington, 466
US 668, 687-688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 312313; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must also establish that the deficient performance
prejudiced him by depriving him of a fair trial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for
the deficiency, the factfinder would not have convicted him. Pickens, supra at 314. Defense
counsel’s performance is presumed to be effective, and a defendant bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
1
Although defendant moved this Court to remand his case for an evidentiary hearing based on
his ineffective assistance claim, this Court denied his motion. People v Roque, unpublished
order of the Michigan Court of Appeals, entered March 19, 2009 (Docket No. 286212).
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To effectively challenge a pretrial identification lineup, defendant must show that the
lineup
was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. If the trial court finds that the pretrial
procedure was impermissibly suggestive, testimony concerning that identification
is inadmissible at trial. However, in-court identification by the same witness still
may be allowed if an independent basis for in-court identification can be
established that is untainted by the suggestive pretrial procedure. [People v
Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302-303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993) (internal citations
omitted).]
Mere physical differences between the lineup participants do not render the procedure defective;
they relate to the weight of the identification and they are “significant only to the extent that they
are apparent to the witness and substantially distinguish the defendant from the other lineup
participants.” People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650 NW2d 700 (2002) (citations
omitted).
The record does not support defendant’s assertion that the photographic lineup was so
impermissibly suggestive that it led to a substantial probability of misidentification. Kurylczyk,
supra at 302-303. Defendant’s assertion that the other individuals in the photographic array
were white police officers is erroneous and not supported by the record. The record reflects that
the other participants were not police officers, but were generated by the police’s “mugging
machine,” and the individuals “were once criminal suspects or arrested for a criminal violation”
in the past. In fact, our review of the photographic lineup reveals that the complexions of the
participants do not appear to differ drastically from defendant’s complexion. Hornsby, supra at
466. Participants number two and five bear striking resemblance to defendant: they are bald,
have similar facial features, and their complexions appear to be similar to defendant’s
complexion. And all the individuals in the photographic array appear to be of similar ages and
physical stature to defendant. Thus, defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
present a futile argument, because this evidence was properly admissible. Snider, supra at 425.
With respect to the corporeal lineup, it did not contain the “same police officers” wearing
the “same clothing” as in the photographic lineup, because the second photographic lineup
contained no officers, but four of the six individuals in the corporeal lineup were actually police
officers. The officer who arranged the lineup indicated that the participants were selected
because they matched defendant’s physical description. They were dressed in plain clothes and
the victim viewing the lineup was not informed that they were officers. The record reflects that
two of the participants were of the same or similar height as defendant, and the others were only
a few inches taller and slightly heavier than defendant. Although the officers were white and
defendant emphasizes that he has a substantially darker skin tone than white, his claim of darker
skin is not supported by the photographic lineup, and no record evidence supports his claim.
There is no evidence of any procedural irregularities. Further, the record reflects that defendant
had an attorney present during the corporeal lineup. The attorney never objected, and never
otherwise indicated that there was a problem with the lineup or the procedure. On the record,
defendant has failed to establish that defense counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to
move to suppress the corporeal lineup because he has not established that the lineup evidence
was inadmissible. Defendant bore the burden of establishing the factual predicate of his claim.
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People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Again, defense counsel cannot be deemed
to have rendered defective assistance in failing to make a futile motion. Snider, supra at 425.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that defense counsel should have moved to suppress
the lineup evidence, defendant has not established that he suffered prejudice, given the
substantial evidence against him. Pickens, supra at 314. The victim’s description of defendant
was accurate. The victim also identified defendant by the Windstar van defendant was driving
during the assault. The victim substantially recalled the van’s license plate number, and he
observed this van a second time shortly after the incident, recognized it, and called police again.
The victim observed defendant wearing a red coat at the time of the crime. Defendant was
arrested in the van, wearing a red coat, and he admitted to driving that van on the night of the
incident and being involved in the incident. The victim’s version of the events to the police was
consistent with police observations, including the bullet hole through the windshield and the
scratches on his face from flying glass. Moreover, although defendant claimed at trial that he
was not involved in the incident with the victim, but he was involved in a different incident that
occurred earlier that evening on different streets in that area, this contradicted the statement he
signed and gave to police, and his trial testimony.
Defendant further argues that his due process rights were violated because police took no
photographs of the individuals in the corporeal lineup. Because he did not raise this argument in
the trial court, we review it for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). There is a distinction between failing to disclose evidence and failing to
develop evidence. The police are not required to develop evidence absent a showing of
suppression, intentional misconduct, or bad faith. People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 21-22; 669
NW2d 831 (2003). There is no evidence of intentional suppression, misconduct, or bad faith in
this case. Id. No photographs were taken because a camera was not available at the time.
Further, the descriptions of the individuals in the lineup were recorded and the attorney present at
the live lineup voiced no objection to the composition. Defendant even concedes that the
photographs would have been merely “speculatively useful evidence.” Defendant has failed to
establish the existence of a plain error that affected his substantial rights, or that defense
counsel’s performance was defective in failing to raise his due process concerns in the trial court.
Carines, supra at 763-764; Snider, supra at 425.
Defendant also argues that trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable
because he did not: have the owner of the cab company that employed the victim testify, present
the receipt for the repair of the windshield, and subpoena company records. Defendant
represents company records would have shown that the victim was not working on the night in
question and that the victim did not file an incident report. Defendant’s exhibits attached to his
brief on appeal, such as the receipt, trial counsel’s notes, and appellate counsel’s affidavit, were
not contained in the lower court file, and “will not be considered by this panel to resolve this
issue because it was not part of the lower court record. MCR 7.210(A)(1); Long v Chelsea
Community Hosp, 219 Mich App 578, 588; 557 NW2d 157 (1996).” People v Shively, 230 Mich
App 626, 629 n 1; 584 NW2d 740 (1998).
Nonetheless, were we to consider the evidence, defendant’s claim has no merit. The
record reflects that trial counsel investigated defendant’s case, hired a private investigator, and
subpoenaed the cab company owner, who brought the receipt for the repairs to the cab to trial.
Trial counsel ultimately made a strategic decision that the owner should not testify or present the
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repair receipt as evidence because he felt that the evidence would do more damage to
defendant’s case than good. Indeed, it would have corroborated the victim’s version of events.
The fact that the passenger window was not also listed on the windshield receipt does not mean
that it was not fixed or broken. We decline to second-guess trial counsel’s strategic decision
regarding whether to call a witness or present certain evidence in hindsight. People v Dixon, 263
Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). A mere difference of opinion with respect to trial
strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Stubli, 163 Mich App
376, 381; 413 NW2d 804 (1987).
Additionally, regardless of whether the victim made an official incident report or was
recorded as working at that time, he obviously submitted the damage claim to the owner of the
cab company because the owner had the windshield fixed the day after the crimes at issue
occurred. The owner even produced the receipt for the repairs to trial counsel. The victim also
called the police after the incident and reported it to them, and the police observed the damage to
both the windshield and the passenger window. Further, the victim testified that any time he was
in his cab, he was on duty. Whether the victim was actually on duty with the cab company
would not negate the fact that he was robbed at the time and place he indicated. The record does
not support that trial counsel did not conduct an adequate and reasonable investigation regarding
an incident report and work records. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595
(2005). The lack of an incident report or work records would not have provided defendant with a
substantial defense under the circumstances. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-78; 601
NW2d 887 (1999) (Failure to call a witness or present evidence constitutes ineffective assistance
when it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.) In sum, defendant has ultimately not
established that absent any errors by trial counsel, the outcome would have been different, given
the substantial amount of evidence indicating his guilt, including his statement in which he
confessed to being involved in the incident. Pickens, supra at 312-314.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly scored prior record variable (PRV)
6, MCL 777.56, and as a result he is entitled to resentencing. The prosecutor agrees. Defendant
preserved this claim because he raised the scoring issue in his motion to remand this case.
People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309-311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004); MCL 769.34(10).
A defendant is scored ten points where he is on probation for committing a felony at the
time he committed the instant offense, and five points where he is on probation for committing a
misdemeanor. MCL 777.56(1)(c) and (d). The trial court erroneously scored defendant ten
points for PRV 6. Defendant’s presentence investigation report reflects that he was on probation
for a misdemeanor domestic violence offense. Under the corrected scoring, defendant’s total
PRV score would be 45. The applicable sentencing guideline’s range would be 81 to 168
months’ imprisonment with the habitual offender enhancement rather than the guideline’s range
used of 108 to 225 months’ imprisonment. MCL 777.62; MCL 777.21(3)(a). Because
defendant’s sentence was based on inaccurate information and scoring that led to sentencing
under an improper guidelines range, he is entitled to be resentenced. MCL 769.34(10); Kimble,
supra at 309-311; People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this scoring
objection at trial. However, “since defendant is getting his desired remedy, remand for
resentencing, we do not find it necessary to reach this claim.” People v Lowe, 172 Mich App
347, 353; 431 NW2d 257 (1988).
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Finally, defendant requests a remand for an evidentiary hearing to further develop his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Defendant’s request for a remand in his brief on appeal
presents the same factual predicate and arguments as previously raised in his motion to remand
in this Court, which we denied. People v Roque, unpublished order of the Michigan Court of
Appeals, entered March 19, 2009 (Docket No. 286212). We again decline to remand defendant’s
case.
We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand for resentencing. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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