IN RE HISLER MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of M.A.H. and S.D.H, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 292783
Eaton Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-016645-NA
JENNIFER KAY ANTES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MATTHEW HISLER,
Respondent.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Cavanagh and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Jennifer Kay Antes appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating
her parental rights to the two minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that at least one statutory ground for
termination of respondent’s parental rights was established by clear and convincing evidence.
See MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
The primary condition of adjudication was respondent’s substance abuse, including abuse
of prescription drugs. Respondent was directed to comply with the terms of her probation, which
required intensive outpatient therapy, abstinence from any alcohol or controlled substance, and
no use of potentially addictive medications without court permission. While on probation,
respondent was further ordered to participate in the Eaton County Family Drug Court’s
Substance Abuse Family Empowerment and Treatment (Safe-T) program. Respondent
completed inpatient drug treatment in April 2008, but she was subsequently unsuccessfully
discharged from outpatient substance abuse counseling at the end of 2008 after testing positive
for opiates. Her probation was revoked on January 16, 2009, after several positive drug screens
-1-
and respondent’s unsuccessful discharge from substance abuse counseling. She was briefly
incarcerated. After her release from jail, respondent was given another chance to engage with
the Safe-T program, but she failed to return a call and was unsuccessfully discharged on March
10, 2009.
Respondent had six positive drug or alcohol screens from April 14, 2008, through
January 6, 2009. According to documentation introduced at trial, respondent obtained ten
prescriptions for narcotics from April 12, 2008, through March 6, 2009, six of those for Vicodin.
Respondent’s substance abuse counselor, Sheila Smith, testified that respondent should never
take Vicodin because it is an addictive narcotic, and that respondent knows this. Smith further
testified that respondent was not honest in treatment. She considered respondent to be high risk
because she used substances off and on, did not disclose, and never really disconnected herself
from people who were using. Smith testified that an addict must always advise a doctor of their
addiction and that they cannot take narcotics. Respondent’s testimony and that of her mother
indicating that she did advise medical personnel of her addiction lacks credibility in light of
medical records that indicate no history of drug abuse, even while indicating in the same “social
history” box a positive history for smoking. Respondent’s credibility is also severely undercut
by a note on her emergency room records indicating that she was on probation and could not take
“benzos” but that narcotics were “OK.” Also, respondent testified that her use of prescription
narcotics was not abuse because her mother controlled the supply; yet her mother testified that
she had taken possession of only one of the pill bottles. It is the job of the trial court to judge the
credibility of witnesses, and its judgment should be granted deference. In re Miller, supra. The
evidence amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that respondent is not a recovering addict
but is still actively using drugs.
The trial court also did not clearly err by finding that there was no reasonable likelihood
that respondent would successfully address her addiction within a reasonable time.
Respondent’s motivation and desire to stay sober is severely drawn into question by her failure
to advise her probation agent of the majority of her narcotics prescriptions, by her apparent
repeated failure to advise medical personnel that she was an addict, by her lack of honesty in
substance abuse treatment and in the Safe-T program, and by her failure to re-engage in the SafeT program when given the opportunity to do so. Smith commented that she would not have
continued with respondent because of her lack of honesty, noting that much time and energy was
spent, and respondent had “burnt out” her group. William Kennedy of the Safe-T program
testified somewhat similarly that respondent could potentially reenter the program, but the
program team would have to consider whether it was the wisest investment of resources or if
there might be other parents with substance abuse issues more in need of assistance or more
willing to engage and work on sobriety. Respondent received intensive services for over one
year, but she did not attain sustained sobriety and was discharged unsuccessfully from two
treatment programs. This record is certainly adequate to support the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent will not successfully address her drug addiction within a reasonable time considering
the ages of the children. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
The trial court also did not clearly err by finding that respondent failed to provide proper
care and custody for the children and would not be able to do so within a reasonable time
considering the ages of the children. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Respondent admitted that she
did not put the children’s interests first when she was using marijuana, benzodiazepines, and
-2-
crack. On October 15, 2007, respondent left the children in the care of a neighbor and consumed
alcohol at the home of a friend, got into an accident while driving home, and woke up the next
morning in a ditch. She went home in the morning and called the police, and she learned at that
time that the children had been found home alone. Respondent and the children’s father also
engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the children. This record clearly establishes a
failure to provide proper care and custody. The same evidence that established that there was no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions of adjudication would be rectified within a reasonable
time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), equally indicates that there was no reasonable expectation that
respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable
time considering the ages of the children, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and that there was a reasonable
likelihood, based on respondent’s conduct or capacity, that the children would be harmed if
returned to her care, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by
relying on statutory subsections (g) and (j) for the termination of respondent’s parental rights.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5). While there was
evidence that the children love respondent and have a bond with her, they have now been out of
her care for two years, during which time she has failed to successfully address her substance
addiction or to maintain sobriety. Despite intensive assistance, respondent has not demonstrated
an ability to place the needs of her children before her addiction. Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was in the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.