PEOPLE OF MI V IVORY JAMAR CRAWFORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286956
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-011654-FC
IVORY JAMAR CRAWFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 50 to 100 years
in prison. We affirm defendant’s conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand for
resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Defendant first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his
counsel failed to challenge the admission of his prior conviction of armed robbery and elicited
testimony from defendant, himself, that he had been convicted of armed robbery. We disagree.
Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and law. “A judge first must find the facts, and then must decide whether those
facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We review the factual
findings for clear error and the constitutional question de novo. Id. However, because there was
no hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), our review is
limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139;
659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Under the United States and Michigan Constitutions, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art
1, § 20, the guaranteed right to counsel encompasses the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). “‘To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different.’” People v Scott, 275 Mich App 521, 526; 739 NW2d 702 (2007), quoting People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995).
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On direct-examination, defendant acknowledged that he had been convicted of armed
robbery in 2000. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited defendant’s admission that
armed robbery is a felony that involves taking property from someone by force.
A witness’s credibility may be impeached with evidence of prior convictions, but only if
the prior convictions satisfy the criteria set forth in MRE 609. People v Cross, 202 Mich App
138, 146; 508 NW2d 144 (1993). MRE 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unless the evidence
has been elicited from the witness or established by public record during crossexamination, and
(1) the crime contained an element of dishonesty or false statement, or
(2) the crime contained an element of theft, and
(A) the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or
death under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
(B) the court determines that the evidence has significant probative value
on the issue of credibility and, if the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial,
the court further determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.
MRE 609(b) provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of the probative value determination required by subrule
(a)(2)(B), the court shall consider only the age of the conviction and the degree to
which a conviction of the crime is indicative of veracity. If a determination of
prejudicial effect is required, the court shall consider only the conviction’s
similarity to the charged offense and the possible effects on the decisional process
if admitting the evidence causes the defendant to elect not to testify.
The crime of armed robbery contains an element of theft and is probative of a defendant’s
veracity. People v Minor, 170 Mich App 731, 736; 429 NW2d 229 (1988). However, “[c]rimes
of theft are minimally probative and are therefore admissible only if the probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect as determined under the balancing test of MRE 609(a)(2)(B).”
People v Bartlett, 197 Mich App 15, 19; 494 NW2d 776 (1992).
Defendant testified at his 2008 trial that he was convicted of armed robbery in 2000, less
than ten years earlier. MRE 609(c). Further, the probative value outweighed the prejudicial
effect because the similarity between defendant’s murder charge and the previous crime of
armed robbery is minimal. With respect to the instant murder charge, although the prosecution
alleged that defendant took the victim’s wallet, the prosecution’s theory was not that defendant
killed the victim in order to take his wallet. We conclude that even if defense counsel had
moved to preclude this evidence, the trial court would have been within its discretion to admit it.
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Further, regardless of whether the trial court would have permitted the evidence
defendant’s prior conviction if defense counsel had moved to exclude it, defendant has failed to
show a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been different if his prior
conviction had been excluded. Although credibility was important in this case, the exclusion of
this piece of evidence would not have discredited the three witnesses who testified that they saw
defendant kick and punch the victim repeatedly. We perceive no error in this regard.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his trial
counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter under a theory of killing
under the heat of passion with adequate provocation. We disagree.
“[T]o show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat
of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time
during which a reasonable person could control his passions.” People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527,
535; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). Although provocation is not an element of voluntary manslaughter,
provocation is the circumstance that negates the presence of malice, which is a requisite element
of murder. Id. at 540.
There was no evidence that defendant acted with the heat of passion or that he was
adequately provoked in the case at bar. Defendant’s testimony suggested that he intervened
when he saw the victim choking codefendant Durrell Moore. But there was no evidence that the
victim was attacking defendant, himself, or that the victim had any other physical contact with
defendant before defendant intervened. We accordingly conclude that this situation would not
have caused a reasonable person to become provoked or to be unable to control his or her
passions. See People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 391; 471 NW2d 346 (1991). Further, “[t]he
role of defense counsel is to choose the best defense for the defendant under the circumstances,”
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 325; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), and the decision to request or
refrain from requesting an instruction is typically a matter of trial strategy, see People v
Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 93; 397 NW2d 229 (1986). In light of the lack of evidence of
provocation and heat of passion, a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter would have been
improper in this case. Pouncey, supra at 392 (observing that because there was insufficient
evidence of adequate provocation, “the trial judge was correct in refusing the requested
instruction on voluntary manslaughter”). It is well settled that counsel is not ineffective for
failing to advocate a meritless position. People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 130; 695 NW2d 342
(2005).
In addition, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his
attorney’s failure to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter under a theory of
imperfect defense of others. We disagree.
The defense of imperfect self-defense can mitigate second-degree murder to
manslaughter when a defendant would have been entitled to claim self-defense had he or she not
been the initial aggressor. People v Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 323; 508 NW2d 184 (1993).
Defendant suggests that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on
imperfect defense of others. However, it does not appear that any Michigan court has ever
extended the imperfect self-defense rule to the imperfect defense of others. Indeed, we have
located no authority to support or sustain defendant’s argument on this issue. As noted earlier,
counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position. Mack, supra at 130.
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Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered
evidence that Dorothea Robinson has admitted to three other inmates that she lied about the
extent of defendant’s involvement in the killing. We disagree. Because this issue is not
preserved, defendant must show a plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A new trial may be warranted where the defendant satisfies a four part test, showing that:
“(1) ‘the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered’; (2) ‘the newly
discovered evidence was not cumulative’; (3) ‘the party could not, using reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced the evidence at trial’; and (4) the new evidence makes a different
result probable on retrial.” People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003), quoting
People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 118 n 6; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). Although a discovery that
trial testimony was perjured may provide a ground for a new trial under certain circumstances,
People v Mechura, 205 Mich App 481, 483; 517 NW2d 797 (1994), newly discovered evidence
does not require a new trial where it would merely be used for impeachment purposes or would
relate only to a witness’s credibility, People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 516; 503 NW2d 457
(1993).
The newly discovered evidence presented by defendant in this case consists of three
affidavits from three different individuals who have been or are incarcerated with Robinson. We
conclude, however, that these affidavits do not establish that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Defendant contends that the affidavits show that Robinson has stated on repeated occasions that
she exaggerated defendant’s role in the victim’s murder. We acknowledge that this evidence is
arguably “newly discovered” because it was not available to defendant during trial. But
according to the affidavits, the testimony of the three individuals would only serve to impeach
Robinson’s testimony. This type of newly discovered evidence is generally not a sufficient
reason to grant a new trial. Davis, supra at 516.
Moreover, Robinson was subjected to extensive cross-examination at trial. And even if
Robinson’s testimony were to be impeached with this newly discovered evidence, it would not
change the testimony of the two other witnesses, Sofhia Steen and Kela Keys, who each testified
about defendant’s beating of the victim, even as the victim was incapacitated and not fighting
back. Defendant suggests that Steen’s testimony can be explained away because she had access
to Robinson’s testimony at a preliminary examination. However, this topic was explored on
cross-examination of Steen during trial. Defendant further suggests that Keys’s testimony is not
credible because she identified another man as having been involved in the crime. This issue
was also explored during cross-examination, and Keys clarified that although this other man
looked familiar, she had not positively identified him as being involved. The newly discovered
evidence would merely cast doubt on Robinson’s testimony; it would not alter the consistent and
inculpatory testimony of Keys and Steen regarding defendant’s involvement in the murder. We
cannot conclude that the newly discovered evidence would make a different result probable on
retrial. Cress, supra at 692.
Lastly, defendant argues that because he was only given notice that the prosecution
would seek enhanced sentencing as a second habitual offender, his sentence as a third habitual
offender was in error and he is entitled to resentencing. We agree.
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The prosecuting attorney may seek to enhance the sentence of a defendant as a habitual
offender by filing a written notice of his intent to do so within 21 days after the defendant’s
arraignment on the information charging the underlying offense or, if arraignment is waived,
within 21 days after the filing of the information charging the underlying offense. MCL
769.13(1); see also People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 470-471; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). The
purpose of MCL 769.13 is to ensure that a defendant has notice at an early stage in the
proceedings that he could be sentenced as a habitual offender. People v Morales, 240 Mich App
571, 582; 618 NW2d 10 (2000).
Defendant received notice in the felony information, as well as the amended felony
information, that he could be sentenced as a second habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing,
despite the fact that the prosecution never moved to amend the notice of enhancement, defendant
was sentenced as a third habitual offender rather than as a second. This failure to follow the
requirements of MCL 769.13, by not providing defendant with proper notice, constituted plain
error. See People v Barber, 466 Mich 877; 661 NW2d 578 (2002).
Defendant’s guidelines range as a third habitual offender was 270 to 675 months, while
as a second habitual offender it would have been 270 to 562 months. Defendant was sentenced
to a minimum sentence of 600 months (50 years) in prison. Thus, it is obvious that the trial court
sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, despite the lack of proper notice to defendant.
It is equally clear that that this notice and sentencing error affected defendant’s substantial rights,
as it resulted in a longer actual sentence than defendant otherwise would have received. People v
Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 312-313; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). Defendant is entitled to be resentenced
as a second habitual offender.
We affirm defendant’s conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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