LORINDA HAINES V MAPLE ISLAND ESTATES INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LORINDA HAINES, MITCHELL TAYLOR and
LORINE TAYLOR,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
MAPLE ISLAND ESTATES, INC., and PAUL
AND MARLENE, INC.,
No. 285849
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 07-057672-CK
Defendants-Appellees,
and
SCHULT HOMES,
Defendants.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Murphy, C.J., and Zahra, J.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order of no cause of
action. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
In January 2006, plaintiffs entered into contract with defendants1 for the purchase and
installation of a modular home. Plaintiffs maintained that a sales representative for defendants
had told them before the sale that the kitchen cabinet doors and the interior trim throughout the
house would be “solid” or “real” wood. After the home was installed, plaintiffs sent defendant a
list of problems with home, including that the kitchen cabinet doors and the interior trim were
1
Schult Homes manufactured the home and was dismissed from the case by stipulation and
order. Because there is no dispute that ownership of the appellees is interwined, they will
collectively hereafter be referred to as “defendants.”
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manufactured wood. The list also indicated that the northeast corner of the basement leaked.
Defendants agreed to fix some of problems on the list, but plaintiffs were not satisfied with
defendants’ repairs or defendants’ refusal to repair. Plaintiffs filed a complaint that was later
amended to include claims for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, innocent
misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of Michigan
uniform mobile home warranty act. Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a written
opinion finding there no “deceit, misleading or misrepresentation by any of defendant[s’]
salespeople.” In regard to the basement, the trial court found no evidence of water in the
basement after defendants had the basement waterproofed and cracks in the basement could not
be attributed to defendants. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants. The instant
appeal ensued.
II. Fraudulent Representation
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. Triple E Produce Corp v
Mastronardi Produce, 209 Mich App 165, 171; 530 NW2d 772 (1995). “A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
B. Analysis
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendants’
representatives did not deceive, mislead or misrepresent the type of wood that plaintiffs would
have in their home. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s failed to consider evidence
presented that defendants’2 representative informed them that solid oak would be used
throughout the home.
In Hord v Environmental Research Inst, 463 Mich 399, 404; 617 NW2d 543 (2000), the
Michigan Supreme Court recognized the “six elements that must be proven to sustain a claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation:”
1. The defendant made a material representation.
2. The representation was false.
3. When the defendant made the representation, it knew that it was false, or the
defendant made the representation recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth,
and as a positive assertion.
4. The defendant made the representation with the intention that it should be
acted on by the plaintiff.
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5. The plaintiff acted in reliance on the representation.
6. The plaintiff suffered injury due to his reliance on the representation.
“A plaintiff’s subjective misunderstanding of information that is not objectively false or
misleading cannot mean that a defendant has committed the tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation.” Id. at 411. Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Foodland Distributors v Al-Naimi, 220 Mich App 453, 457; 559 NW2d 379 (1996).
Innocent misrepresentation exists when a “party detrimentally relies on a false
representation in such a manner that the injury inures to the benefit of the party making the
misrepresentation.” Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 211-212; 580 NW2d 876 (1998). It is not
necessary to prove that the person making the misrepresentations knew that the statements were
false. Id. at 212. Further, the false representation must be made in connection with the making
of a contract, and the plaintiff and the defendant must be in privity of contract. Id.
Plaintiff Lorine Taylor testified that she inquired whether her home would contain “real
wood” and Valerie House, defendants’ sales consultant, indicated that their home would contain
“real wood.” Plaintiff Mitchell Taylor also testified that they were clearly told that their home
would contain solid oak. House testified that she explained that just the front of the cabinets
were generally solid wood and that she never told plaintiffs that they would receive solid wood
doors or cabinets. Further, there was testimony indicating House appeared to believe that when
she said that the cabinet door was an oak door, she was not misrepresenting the nature of the
door, because the door was, in fact, “[r]eal oak finish” or “an actual, oak finished door.”
Credibility determinations are left to the fact-finder. In re Clark Estate, 237 Mich App 387, 395396; 603 NW2d 290 (1999).
Here, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that either House did not make a materially
false representation, or that when House made the representation, she did not know or believe
that it was false. Hord, supra. In either event, there is no evidence that House made a false
representation with the intention that it should be acted upon. Id. Thus, a reasonable fact-finder
could find that plaintiffs did not prove deceit, misleading statements, or misrepresentation by
clear and convincing evidence. Foodland Distributors, supra. Accordingly, the trial court’s
conclusion that there was no deceit, misleading, or misrepresentation and that the elements of
fraudulent misrepresentation and innocent misrepresentation were not met was not clearly
erroneous. Triple E Produce, supra.
Plaintiffs also argue the trial court clearly erred in finding no evidence of cracks and
leaks in the basement.
The amended complaint lists the only problem involving leaks in the basement as “[t]he
Northeast corner of the basement leaks.” Both Mitchell and Lorine testified that the
photographs, which depicted the cracks and leaking in the basement corner, were taken in 2006.
Lorine testified that Georgetown Waterproofing filled a lot of the cracks in the basement with
caulk sometime during the summer of 2006. Lorine was specifically asked how often water
appeared in the basement corner. She replied that that corner of the basement has remained dry
since the summer of 2006, which she characterized as an unusually wet summer. Lorine also
testified that after the gutters and downspouts were installed at the end of summer 2006, they still
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had some water entering through other cracks, but the amount of water entering was “very little.”
Given the subsequent lack of water in the basement and plaintiffs’ failure to present any
evidence of damages presented by excessive cracking that had been caulked, we cannot conclude
that the trial court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. Triple E Produce, supra.
Plaintiffs’ next argue that the inability to prove the exact costs of repair should not have
been detrimental to their recovery of damages. In Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich
App 55, 108; 535 NW2d 529 (1995), we stated:
A party asserting a claim has the burden of proving its damages with reasonable
certainty. Although damages based on speculation or conjecture are not
recoverable, damages are not speculative merely because they cannot be
ascertained with mathematical precision. It is sufficient if a reasonable basis for
computation exists, although the result be only approximate. Moreover, the
certainty requirement is relaxed where the fact of damages has been established
and the only question to be decided is the amount of damages. [Citations
omitted.]
The trial court indicated in its opinion that plaintiffs did not submit evidence of the cost to repair
or replace several of the items that plaintiffs thought were defective and needed to be repaired or
replaced. However, in each of these instances, the trial court also provided findings essentially
evidencing why it found that plaintiffs’ claims lacked merit. Thus, the trial court clearly made
substantive findings that plaintiffs failed to establish liability. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to
show that the trial court placed too stringent a threshold upon plaintiffs’ inability to prove the
exact costs of repair.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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