ROBERT LEWIS V ST JOSEPH COUNTY MEDICAL CONTROL AUTHORITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT LEWIS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant,
v
ST JOSEPH COUNTY MEDICAL CONTROL
AUTHORITY,
No. 283741
St. Joseph Circuit Court
LC No. 07-001-CZ
Defendant-Appellant/ CrossAppellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Talbot and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this summary disposition case, defendant/appellant/cross-appellee (“defendant”), St.
Joseph County Medical Control Authority (SJCMCA) appeals by leave granted from St. Joseph
Circuit Court Judge Paul Stutesman’s failure to grant summary disposition in favor of defendant
on a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) issue. Plaintiff/appellee/cross-appellant (“plaintiff”),
Robert Lewis, cross appeals the rulings of the trial court that defendant came within an exception
to the Open Meetings Act (OMA). He also argues that the trial court erred in its FOIA ruling,
and erred in its failure to grant summary disposition to plaintiff on his due process claim. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Facts
Plaintiff is a licensed Medical First Responder (MFR) and a firefighter. It is alleged that
on May 31, 2006 plaintiff failed to defer to the authority of a paramedic on the scene of a
personal injury accident.
Following this incident, the Fire Chief of the Sturgis Fire Department requested that
SJCMCA conduct a review of the situation. On August 29, 2006 plaintiff and his supervisor
were required to attend a meeting before the SJCMCA. At the meeting, plaintiff requested that
any discussion of disciplinary measures against him be held in an open meeting. Defendant
denied that request and went into a closed session. Immediately thereafter, defendant suspended
the MFR privileges of plaintiff to practice pre-hospital care in St. Joseph County for six months.
It also required plaintiff to complete an anger management course and NIMS (National Incident
Management Systems) training. The suspension was based on plaintiff’s violation of MCL
-1-
333.20967(1)1 because plaintiff refused the command of a higher medical authority at a scene
where emergency medical care was being administered.
Following this suspension, an article appeared in the newspaper, the Sturgis Journal. The
article mentioned the suspension and anger management classes. Plaintiff exhausted his
administrative appeals of the suspension to the SJCMCA and to the Michigan Department of
Public Health, Emergency Medical Services Coordinating Committee. Plaintiff then filed the
present lawsuit alleging three counts: 1) violation of the OMA with respect to two confidential,
deliberative review meetings of the SJCMCA that were closed to the public 2) violation of the
FOIA regarding SJCMCA’s refusal to provide Plaintiff with copies of the minutes of the closed,
deliberative portions of its review meetings; and 3) procedural and substantive violations of the
Federal Civil Rights Statute, 42 USC 1983.
Both parties filed motions for summary disposition. On August 28, 2007, in an opinion
and order, the trial court granted partial summary disposition in favor of defendant on the issue
of the OMA (holding that SJCMCA had properly met in closed sessions), but held that SJCMCA
had waived the FOIA exemption for the written minutes of closed meetings by disclosing the
results of their findings to the Sturgis Journal. The trial court also held that defendant is a local
entity under 42 USC 1983 and that questions of fact remained as to whether SJCMCA violated
42 USC 1983.2 Both parties moved for reconsideration and the court denied both motions.
II. Closed Sessions Under OMA and FOIA
Plaintiff argues on cross appeal that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion
for summary disposition on the OMA claim. We agree.
1
MCL 333.20967(1) states:
Authority for the management of a patient in an emergency is vested in the
licensed health professional or licensed emergency medical services personnel at
the scene of the emergency who has the most training specific to the provision of
emergency medical care. If a licensed health professional or licensed emergency
medical services personnel is not available, the authority is vested in the most
appropriately trained representative of a public safety agency at the scene of the
emergency.
2
SJCMCA argued unsuccessfully at the trial court level that it was an “arm or instrumentality”
of the State of Michigan, and as such, was immune from suit under 42 USC 1983. The trial court
followed Attorney General Opinion No. 6727 of August 21, 1999 and held that a local medical
control authority is not a state agency as a matter of law. This is not an issue on appeal.
However, on cross appeal plaintiff argues that he established that defendant violated 42 USC
1983 and that there is no genuine issue of material fact and plaintiff should have been granted
summary disposition on that matter.
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This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Whether a public
record is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA is a mixed question of fact and law, and we
review the trial court's factual findings for clear error and review questions of law de novo.
Detroit Free Press, Inc v City of Warren, 250 Mich App 164, 166; 645 NW2d 71 (2002). Our
Supreme Court has held that “the application of exemptions [under the FOIA] requiring legal
determinations are reviewed under a de novo standard, while application of exemptions requiring
determinations of a discretionary nature . . . are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.”
Federated Publications, Inc v Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 101; 649 NW2d 383 (2002). Further, the
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to review de novo. Brown v
Genesee Co Bd of Comm'rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430, 433; 628 NW2d 471 (2001).
In count one of the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the OMA
when it went into closed session to discuss the possibility of disciplinary measures against him
and when it went into closed session to consider his appeal. He claims defendant violated MCL
15.268(a). However, the trial court concluded that defendant was a “review entity” that is
afforded specific confidentiality under MCL 331.533 based upon the confidential material that
was being considered.
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant violated FOIA when it refused to permit access and
copying of the minutes of its closed sessions during the hearing and appeal of the administrative
complaint against him.
Subsection 3(1) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., mandates that
“[a]ll meetings of a public body shall be open to the public and shall be held in a place available
to the general public. All persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting except as otherwise
provided in this act.” MCL 15.263(1). Subsection 3(2) of the OMA further requires that “[a]ll
decisions of a public body shall be made at a meeting open to the public,” and subsection 3(3)
provides that “[a]ll deliberations of a public body constituting a quorum of its members shall
take place at a meeting open to the public except as provided in this section and sections 7 and
8.”3
This Court has recognized that “the purpose of the OMA is to promote governmental
accountability by facilitating public access to official decision making and to provide a means
through which the general public may better understand issues and decisions of public concern.”
Kitchen v Ferndale City Council, 253 Mich App 115, 125; 654 NW2d 918 (2002). Consistent
with the Legislature’s expressed preference for transparency in government, the OMA
substantially limits the purposes for which a public body may meet in a closed session. “[T]he
OMA should be construed broadly in favor of openness; exceptions should be construed
narrowly, with the public body bearing the burden of proving the applicability of an exemption.”
Manning v City of East Tawas, 234 Mich App 244, 250; 593 NW2d 649 (1999).
According to the pertinent portions of MCL 15.268,
3
The exceptions in MCL 15.263(7)-(11) and MCL 15.267 do not apply to this case.
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A public body may meet in a closed session only for the following
purposes:
(a)
To consider the dismissal, suspension, or disciplining of, or to hear
complaints or charges brought against, or to consider a periodic personnel
evaluation of, a public officer, employee, staff member, or individual agent, if the
named person requests a closed hearing. . . .
***
(h)
To consider material exempt from discussion or disclosure by state
or federal statute.
Plaintiff here did not request a closed hearing, rendering subsection (a) inapplicable. The trial
court concluded that subsection (h) authorized the closed session meeting because it expressly
allowed the medical control authority to go into closed session when discussing confidential
information about the treatment of a specific patient. We find that MCL 331.533 does not supply
the statutory authority envisioned under subsection (h) to justify a closed meeting.
Pursuant to MCL 331.533,
The identity of a person whose condition or treatment has been studied
under this act is confidential and a review entity shall remove the person’s name
and address from the record before the review entity releases or publishes a record
of its proceedings, or its reports, findings, and conclusions. Except as otherwise
provided in section 2, the record of a proceeding and the reports, findings, and
conclusions of a review entity and data collected by or for a review entity under
this act are confidential, are not public records, and are not discoverable and shall
not be used as evidence in a civil action or administrative proceeding. [Emphasis
added.]
This statute did not permit defendant to meet in closed session. Because defendant does not
qualify as “a review entity,” MCL 331.533 does not render the material discussed at the meeting
“exempt from discussion or disclosure by state … statute” under MCL 15.268(h). Furthermore,
even if defendant constituted a peer review entity, the second sentence of MCL 331.533,
referencing “section 2,” carves out an applicable exception to the confidentiality rule.
In 1967 PA 270, as amended, MCL 331.531 et seq., the Legislature enacted three
statutes, including MCL 331.533, “commonly referred to as Michigan’s peer review immunity
statute.” Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp, 475 Mich 663, 666; 719 NW2d 1 (2006). In Attorney Gen v
Bruce, 422 Mich 157, 171-172; 369 NW2d 826 (1985), our Supreme Court explained that 1967
PA 270 “protects persons, organizations, and entities that choose to disclose information to a
review entity,” potentially immunizing those persons from liability. (Emphasis in original). The
act commences as follows with MCL 331.531(1): “A person, organization, or entity may
provide to a review entity information or data relating to the physical or psychological condition
of a person, the necessity, appropriateness, or quality of health care rendered to a person, or the
qualifications, competence, or performance of a health care provider.” The balance of the act
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defines the term “review entity,” sets forth the manner in which information given to a review
entity may be used, and establishes the parameters for peer review immunity.
In MCL 331.531(2), the Legislature defined a “review entity” to mean “1 of the
following”:
(a)
A duly appointed peer review committee of 1 of the following:
(i)
The state.
(ii)
A state or county association of health care professionals.
(iii)
A health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public
health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.20101 to 333.22260.
(iv)
A health care association.
(v)
A health care network, a health care organization, or a health care
delivery system composed of health professionals licensed under article 15 of the
public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838, or composed of
health facilities licensed under article 17 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368,
MCL 333.20101 to 333.22260, or both.
(vi)
A health plan qualified under the program for medical assistance
administered by the department of human services under the social welfare act,
1939 PA 280, MCL 400.1 to 400.119b.
(b)
A professional standards review organization qualified under
federal or state law.
(c)
A foundation or organization acting pursuant to the approval of a
state or county association of health care professionals.
(d)
A state department or agency whose jurisdiction encompasses the
information described in subsection (1).
(e)
An organization established by a state association of hospitals or
physicians, or both, that collects and verifies the authenticity of documents and
other data concerning the qualifications, competence, or performance of licensed
health care professionals and that acts as a health facility’s agent pursuant to the
health care quality improvement act of 1986, title IV of Public Law 99-660, 42
USC 11101 to 11152. . . .
Defendant is a local medical control authority (MCA), and not a “duly appointed peer
review committee,” a “professional standards review organization,” an organization “acting
pursuant to the approval of a state or county association of health care professionals,” a state
department or agency, or an “organization established by a state association of hospitals or
physicians . . . .” Rather, MCAs supervise and coordinate countywide emergency medical
services, and are administered by participating hospitals. MCL 333.20906(5)-(6), MCL
-5-
333.20918. This Court described MCAs in DenBoer v Lakola Medical Control Auth, 240 Mich
App 498, 500-501; 618 NW2d 8 (2000), as follows:
The statewide emergency medical services system is governed by local
MCAs, which are organized and administered by local hospitals within each
geographic region. … Each person licensed under the emergency medical
services act … is accountable to their local MCA in the provision of emergency
medical services. … The MCAs have statutory power and authority to supervise
emergency medical services … and to govern the practice of licensed medical
services personnel . . . .” [Citations omitted.]
The above descriptions of the nature of MCAs do not support the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant qualifies as a “review entity,” as our Legislature defined that term in MCL 331.531(2).
And no record evidence exists showing that defendant appointed its own peer review committee.
Defendant contends that MCL 333.20919(1)(g) establishes its status as a review entity.
Subsection 20919(1)(g) requires that an MCA “establish written protocols” that “ensure a quality
improvement program is in place” and “provide[] data protection as provided in 1967 PA 270,
MCL 331.531 to 331.533.” Defendant’s “quality improvement program” protocol includes the
following “confidentiality assurance” provision:
All information obtained for the purpose of Quality Review will be used
solely to determine if the current protocols in the Medical Control Authority are
being followed. Under no circumstances will patient names be disclosed during
this review or in any reporting process related to this review. Data is protected
under P.A. 270 of 1967, MCL 331.531 to 331.533.
MCL 333.20919(1)(g) does not envision the creation of a “review entity” otherwise unmentioned
in MCL 331.531(2). No authority supports that defendant’s establishment of a quality
improvement program duly protecting patient privacy operates as an impenetrable shield against
application of the OMA. Logically, defendant could have conducted an open meeting to discuss
plaintiff’s discipline, while requiring that, in accordance with its quality improvement protocol,
participants make no mention of patient names. This course of action would have comported
with MCL 331.533, which directs that a review entity must remove a patient’s name and address
before releasing a record of its proceedings.
Moreover, even if MCL 333.20919(1)(g) or another statutory provision did establish
defendant as a review entity, MCL 331.532(d) would mandate the disclosure of the meeting’s
minutes. In MCL 331.532, the Legislature provided, in pertinent part:
The release or publication of a record of the proceedings or of the reports,
findings, and conclusions of a review entity shall be for 1 or more of the
following purposes:
***
(d)
To provide evidence relating to the ethics or discipline of a health
care provider, entity, or practitioner.
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And although MCL 331.533 envisions that a review entity’s proceedings qualify as confidential
and “not public records,” this statute also specifically exempts the provisions of MCL 331.532:
Except as otherwise provided in section 2, the record of a proceeding and
the reports, findings, and conclusions of a review entity and data collected by or
for a review entity under this act are confidential, are not public records, and are
not discoverable and shall not be used as evidence in a civil action or
administrative proceeding. [Emphasis added.]
When discerning legislative intent, this Court gives effect to every word, phrase, and
clause in a statute. People v Hill, 269 Mich App 505, 515; 715 NW2d 301 (2006). The Court
must avoid construing a statute in a manner that renders statutory language nugatory or
surplusage. Id. “‘We construe an act as a whole to harmonize its provisions and carry out the
purpose of the Legislature.’” Id., quoting Macomb Co Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149,
159-160; 627 NW2d 247 (2001). Plainly, the unambiguous exemption created by the Legislature
in MCL 331.532(d) signifies that “evidence relating to the ethics or discipline of a health care
provider, entity, or practitioner” falls outside the confidentiality strictures of MCL 331.533.
The August 29, 2006 meeting minutes establish that defendant held the special meeting
“for the purpose of concluding a complaint against Tri-Township MFR, Robert Lewis by Sturgis
Fire Ambulance.” This expressed purpose negates that the meeting fell within any exception to
the OMA. The OMA permits a public body to conduct a closed meeting to “hear complaints or
charges brought against” a public officer, employee or individual agent only “if the named
person requests a closed hearing.” MCL 15.268(a) (emphasis added). The OMA further allows
a person who has requested a closed hearing to rescind the request “at any time, in which case
the matter at issue shall be considered after the recission only in open sessions.” Id. In this case,
however, plaintiff requested an open meeting. The OMA provisions governing meetings
convened to hear charges against a public officer plainly reflect the Legislature’s intent that the
officer, rather than the public body, controls whether a meeting will be open or closed. No
authority tends to support that absent plaintiff’s request for a closed meeting, defendant could
lawfully conduct a closed meeting to “hear complaints or charges brought against” one of its
agents.
MCL 15.268(a) affords a publicly employed health care agent or employee the right to
insist on an open meeting. And pursuant to the same logic, we further hold that because
defendant improperly closed its August 29, 2006 meeting to the public, the minutes of that
meeting are subject to disclosure. See Manning, supra at 249-250. We reverse the trial court’s
grant of summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s OMA claim, and affirm its ruling regarding
plaintiff’s FOIA allegation.
III. Protocol Violations
This issue is not framed as one of trial court error and the trial court did not discuss this
issue in terms of violation of protocol in its opinion. Plaintiff brought a claim based on
violations of the OMA, FOIA and his right to due process. Plaintiff argues that defendant
unlawfully violated its protocol, yet we are not sure under which of his claims he is raising this
argument. The best fit would probably be within the due process argument; however, the trial
court determined that genuine issues of material fact remain on that count. Therefore, for this
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Court to step in and make a fact-dependent determination about whether defendant violated
protocol would be improper at this stage. This issue is not properly before this court.
IV. Due Process
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in declining to grant his motion for summary
disposition on the issue of due process. We disagree. Summary disposition in favor of plaintiff
is not appropriate where genuine issues of material fact exist.
The trial court determined that “whether or not defendant violated 42 USC 1983 is a
question of fact and will go to trial.” Plaintiff argues that there is not genuine issue of fact that
defendant violated his procedural due process rights as a matter of law. No person may be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. US Const, Am XIV; Const
1963, art 1, § 17; Tolksdorf v Grifith, 464 Mich 1, 7; 626 NW2d 163 (2001). 42 USC 1983
provides in relevant part:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. [42 USC 1983].
In this case, the alleged constitutional violation is in the form of an alleged due process
violation. Plaintiff was suspended on August 29, 2006. He claims he did not receive notice of
what he was charged with until over 30 days after his suspension.
“Due process requires fundamental fairness, which is determined in a particular situation
first by ‘considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are
at stake.’ “ In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 111; 499 NW2d 752 (1993), quoting Lassiter v Durham
Co Dep't of Social Services, 452 US 18, 25; 101 S Ct 2153; 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981). Under
Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), three factors are
generally considered to determine what due process requires in a particular case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. See also In re Brock, 442 Mich at
111, 499 NW2d 752, quoting Mathews. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 92-93, 763
NW2d 587 (2009)
The opportunity to be heard does not mean a full trial-like proceeding, but it does require
a hearing to allow a party the chance to know and respond to the evidence.” Hinky Dinky
Supermarket, Inc v Dep't of Community Health, 261 Mich App 604, 606; 683 NW2d 759 (2004),
quoting Cummings v Wayne Co, 210 Mich App 249, 253; 533 NW2d 13 (1995).
“Administrative procedures must provide the affected party with an opportunity to explain its
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position and rebut adverse evidence.” Westland Convalescent Ctr. v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Mich, 414 Mich 247, 272; 324 NW2d 851 (1982). “The critical element provided by a judicial
trial or an administrative hearing is the opportunity for a party to present arguments and evidence
in support of its position before a decision is rendered, the chance to respond before final action
is taken.” Id. at 268.
According to defendant, on June 26, 2006 Scott Hopkins, Deputy Chief of the Sturgis
Fire Department, filed a formal complaint about this incident with the SJCMCA under its
Complaint Investigation & Resolution protocol. The complaint did not specifically identify
plaintiff, but it described his conduct at the scene. Defendant contends that there were multiple
e-mail exchanges between plaintiff and Hopkins that indicate that plaintiff was aware that the
complaint had been filed against him. In one e-mail message to Hopkins, plaintiff requested a
formal complaint so that he would receive “due process.” According to the SJCMCA PreHospital Care Incident Report, the complaint was served on plaintiff and his supervisor on June
26, 2006. Their reply was requested by July 10, 2006.
Defendant also claims that pursuant to the SJCMCA Complaint Investigation &
Resolution protocol, the complaint and all of the documentation, including plaintiff’s own
statements were reviewed by the MCA Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) on
July 27, 2006. Thereafter, a formal quality review was scheduled before the SJCMCA on
August 11, 2006 and notice of the review was provided to plaintiff and his supervisor.
Plaintiff claims that he did not receive notice of what he was charged with until 30 days
after he had already been suspended. Plaintiff claims he had no notice that the August 29, 2006
meeting was actually a disciplinary hearing and that he thought it was just a meeting to discuss
what happened. He also claims that at the hearing he was not allowed to refute or cross-examine
his accusers. He claims that the facts admitted by defendant in the pleadings establish due
process violations and that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
Based on these conflicting versions of events, we find that there remains a genuine issue
of material fact and that the trial court correctly determined that summary disposition was not
appropriate on this issue.
V. Waiver
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in holding that defendant had
waived the exemption from FOIA by disclosing the results of their findings to the Sturgis
Journal. We agree.
This Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.
MCR 3.977(J). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
McTaggart v Lindsey, 202 Mich App 612, 616; 509 NW2d 881 (1993).
The trial court reasoned that, “the Court feels that for Defendant to disclose information
to the public and then deny further access to Plaintiff would not be consistent with the intent of
FOIA.” The trial court’s finding that defendant disclosed the closed meeting minutes, or at least
their substance, to the Sturgis Journal is clearly erroneous. The newspaper article, the reporter’s
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affidavit and the attachments thereto are the only evidence on the matter. They clearly indicate
that the reporter was not present in the closed meeting and that the minutes were never disclosed
to the newspaper. Indeed, the article itself reflects exactly the substance of the motion to
suspend plaintiff’s license, which was made in open session. And it does not indicate that
anyone other than plaintiff was interviewed for the article. There is no record evidence
whatsoever that would support the trial court’s finding. And without that factual finding, there is
no basis for the trial court’s conclusion that defendant waived its exemption from disclosure.
However, since defendant violated the OMA by going into closed session, the minutes were
subject to disclosure under FOIA.
Thus the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition of the
FOIA claim, albeit for a different reason.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do
not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed
in full.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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