PEOPLE OF MI V GEORGE MARTIN VANDENBERG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 24, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285309
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 05-011461-FH
GEORGE MARTIN VANDENBERG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Bandstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted his guilty plea conviction for child sexually abusive
activity, MCL 750.154c(2). Defendant was sentenced to 2 to 20 years’ imprisonment for this
conviction. We affirm defendant’s guilty plea, and remand for resentencing.1
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in scoring two sentencing offense variables
(OV) 10, MCL 777.40, and OV 13, MCL 777.43. Defendant preserved these claims of error
because he raised them in the trial court. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684 NW2d
669 (2004); MCL 769.34(10). We review the trial court’s scoring of defendant’s sentencing
variables to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion and whether there is record
evidence to support the score. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700
(2002). The trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that falls outside the
range of reasonable and principle outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d
231 (2003). The proper construction of the sentencing guidelines and the legal questions
involved in their applicability present issues of law that we review de novo. Id. at 253. The trial
court’s sentence may be invalid if it were based on a misconception of the law, improperly
scored guidelines, or based on other inaccurate information. MCR 769.34(10); People v Miles,
454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997).
1
This Court initially granted defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal limited only to
his sentencing issues. People v Vandenberg, unpublished order of the Michigan Court of
Appeals, entered June 6, 2008 (Docket No. 285309). Our Supreme Court subsequently ordered
this Court to also consider “as on leave granted” Issues IV and V contained in defendant’s
delayed application. People v Vandenberg, 482 Mich 980; 756 NW2d 50 (2008).
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Initially, we note that defendant repeatedly asserts on appeal that he only pleaded guilty
to an “attempt” to engage in child sexually abusive activity. But, in making this claim, defendant
misconstrues the statute and relevant case law. MCL 750.145c(2) provides:
A person who persuades, induces, entices, coerces, causes, or knowingly allows a
child to engage in a child sexually abusive activity for the purpose of producing
any child sexually abusive material, or a person who arranges for, produces,
makes, or finances, or a person who attempts or prepares or conspires to
arrange for, produce, make, or finance any child sexually abusive activity or
child sexually abusive material is guilty of a felony, punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $100,000.00,
or both, if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be
expected to know that the child is a child or that the child sexually abusive
material includes a child or that the depiction constituting the child sexually
abusive material appears to include a child, or that person has not taken
reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child. [Emphasis added.]
The statute defines “child sexually abusive activity” as “a child engaging in a listed
sexual act.” MCL 750.145c(1)(l). A “listed sexual act” is “sexual intercourse, erotic fondling,
sadomasochistic abuse, masturbation, passive sexual involvement, sexual excitement, or erotic
nudity.” MCL 750.145c(1)(h). A “child” is defined as “a person who is less than 18 years of
age, subject to the affirmative defense created in subsection (6) regarding persons emancipated
by operation of law.” MCL 750.145c(1)(b).
In People v Thousand, 241 Mich App 102, 104; 614 NW2d 674 (2000), rev’d in part on
other gds 465 Mich 149 (2001), the defendant communicated over the Internet with an
undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl, and arranged to meet the fictitious girl to
engage in sexual activity. The defendant argued that the doctrine of legal impossibility
precluded being charged under MCL 750.145c(2). Id. at 114. This Court concluded, “a person
may violate the statute simply by preparing for any child sexually abusive activity.” Id. at 115.
“Because the child sexually abusive activity statute requires only mere preparation, rather than
actual abusive activity, we are satisfied that a situation such as the case at bar comes within the
provision of the statute.” Id. The fact that the fictitious girl was an adult “does not change the
fact that defendant was endeavoring to find a child, to entice a child to engage in sexual activity,
or to arrange to meet a child for sexual activity.” Id. at 116. Thus, MCL 750.145c(2) “only
requires that the defendant prepare to arrange for child sexually abusive activity. The statute
does not require that those preparations actually proceed to the point of involving a child.” Id. at
117. Thus, defendant’s assertion that he only pleaded to “an attempt” to commit the crime for
which he was convicted is unavailing because the activity constituting an attempt actually
constitutes the crime prohibited by the statute.
With respect to the scoring of the challenged OVs, we first conclude that the trial court
erred in scoring 15 points for OV 10 for “predatory conduct” that was “directed at a victim for
the primary purpose of victimization.” MCL 777.40(3)(a). In this case, defendant did not
engage in “preoffense conduct” with an actual victim who was 14 years of age. Rather,
defendant was unwittingly conversing with an agent from the Attorney General’s office who was
posing as a 14-year-old girl. See People v Russell (On Remand), 281 Mich App 610, 615; 760
NW2d 841 (2008). Defendant’s “conduct did not place any vulnerable victim in jeopardy
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because there was, in fact, no vulnerable victim to be jeopardized.” Id. Further, there was “no
preoffense conduct” in this case because defendant’s interaction over the Internet with the person
he believed to be a 14-year-old girl was the offense itself. Id. at 615-616 n 2.
We conclude, however, that OV 13 was properly scored 25 points. MCL 777.43 provides
that 25 points is scored where “[t]he offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity
involving 3 or more crimes against a person.” It also provides:
(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 13:
(a) For determining the appropriate points under this variable, all crimes within a
5-year period, including the sentencing offense, shall be counted regardless of
whether the offense resulted in a conviction.
In People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 530, 532; 640 NW2d 314 (2001), the defendant was
scored 25 points for OV 13 because of his four concurrent convictions for making child sexually
abusive material, MCL 750.145c(2), when he took four nude photographs of two 15-year-old
girls. This Court held that 25 points were properly scored “because of defendant’s four
concurrent convictions under MCL 750.145c(2).” Id. at 532. Offense variable 13 counts
“crimes against a person,” MCL 777.5(a), and child sexually abusive activity is designated as a
crime against a person. MCL 777.16g.
The prosecutor argues that there were five different occasions when defendant violated
MCL 750.145d2 by using the Internet to solicit sexual intercourse with the fictitious girl. To
establish a violation of MCL 750.145d premised on a violation of MCL 750.145c, the prosecutor
must show “(1) that defendant used the Internet or a computer to communicate with any person,
(2) for the purpose of attempting to arrange for, produce, or make any child sexually abusive
material [or activity], and (3) defendant believed that the intended victim in the child sexually
abusive activity or material is a minor.” People v Cervi, 270 Mich App 603, 624; 717 NW2d
356 (2006).
Here, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support scoring 25 points for OV 13.
Between September 26, 2005, and October 10, 2005, defendant engaged in several conversations
over the Internet with the fictitious girl, and in these sexually explicit conversations defendant
requested that they engage in sexual intercourse and other sexual acts and arranged for a meeting
2
MCL 750.145d(1)(a) provides:
(1) A person shall not use the internet or a computer, computer program,
computer network, or computer system to communicate with any person for the
purpose of doing any of the following:
(a) Committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting another
person to commit conduct proscribed under section 145a, 145c, . . . in which the
victim or intended victim is a minor or is believed by that person to be a minor.
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in order to engage in sexual intercourse. Defendant was ultimately arrested when he arrived as
the designated place at the set time. We affirm the scoring OV 13 at 25 points.
Because OV 10 was improperly scored, defendant is entitled to a remand to the trial court
for resentencing. Defendant’s prior record variable (PRV) score is zero, placing him in PRV
level A, and his OV score of 45 placed him in level IV. The guidelines recommended a
minimum sentence range of 21 to 35 months’ imprisonment. MCL 777.63. But, if OV 10 had
been properly scored at zero points, defendant’s OV score should have been 30 points, and
placed him at OV level III (25-34 points). MCL 777.63. Thus, as properly scored, the
guidelines recommended minimum sentence range is 15 to 25 months’ imprisonment. Id.
Because the trial court based its sentence on inaccurately scored guidelines, which placed
defendant in an improper recommended sentence range, remand for resentencing is required.
MCR 769.34(10); People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).
On appeal, defendant also argues that his guilty plea lacked a sufficient factual basis and
that his “belief” that the fictitious girl was 14 years of age did not amount to “knowledge” of this
fact. We review this unpreserved issue to determine whether plain error affected defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). There is no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, which is within the discretion of the trial court. People v
Ovalle, 222 Mich App 463, 465; 564 NW2d 147 (1997). Whether particular conduct falls with
the prohibition of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Adkins,
272 Mich App 37, 39; 724 NW2d 710 (2006).
MCR 6.302 governs plea-taking procedures. People v Saffold, 465 Mich 268, 272; 631
NW2d 320 (2001). The trial court must establish the factual basis for the plea, MCR 6.302(D),
which is sufficient if the factfinder could properly convict on the basis of the defendant’s
admissions, People v Hogan, 225 Mich App 431, 433; 571 NW2d 737 (1997).
At the guilty plea proceeding, the prosecutor questioned defendant:
Q. Mr. Vandenberg, on or about those dates [September 26, 2005 through
October 10, 2005], were you using the Internet to communicate with
somebody who you believed was a 14-year-old girl?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And during the course of that communication, did you express an interest in
meeting with that person for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And was that sexual activity including sexual intercourse as well as oral sex?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And did you in fact show up on October 10th in the City of Rockford to meet
with the person for that purpose?
A. Yes, ma’am.
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At the time the plea was entered, the parties agreed with the trial court that this factual
basis was adequate. We also agree the trial court satisfied MCR 6.302(D).3
The facts presented in this case are substantially similar to those supporting the
defendant’s guilty plea in Adkins, supra at 43-44. There, in establishing the factual basis
supporting the defendant’s guilty plea for violating MCL 750.145c(2), he admitted that he used
the Internet to communicate with someone whom he believed to be 14 years old to attempt to
arrange for child sexually abusive activity. Id. Like the defendant in Adkins, defendant in the
present case admitted to the trial court that he was communicating over the Internet in a sexually
explicit way with someone whom he believed was 14 years of age and arranged to meet that
person to engage in sexual activity. This Court has previously rejected defendant’s argument
that there was insufficient evidence to show child sexually abusive activity because the fictitious
girl was actually an adult officer. Thousand, supra at 114-115. A factfinder could properly
convict defendant of violating the statute on the basis of his admissions. Adkins, supra at 44;
Hogan, supra at 433. Defendant has not established plain error affected his substantial rights.
Carines, supra at 763.
We affirm in part, but remand for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
3
To the extent that defendant raises a claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance
in advising defendant to plead guilty and in failing to object to the factual basis, we note that
defendant failed to fully brief this issue on appeal. This claim is therefore abandoned. People v
Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Regardless, the undisputed facts of
this case support that defendant’s conduct violated the statute under which he was charged and
thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise against or object to the plea.
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