PEOPLE OF MI V TROY WILLIAM CARPENTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285370
Otsego Circuit Court
LC No. 07-003810-FC
TROY WILLIAM CARPENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Whitbeck and K.F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i) (actor in same household as victim), and one count of seconddegree CSC (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(i) (actor in same household as victim). He was
sentenced to serve a prison term of 13 to 40 years on the CSC I convictions and a concurrent
term of 7 to 15 years for CSC II. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
convictions and sentences of defendant.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant a new trial
after it was discovered that a dismissed alternate juror was present during a portion of the jury
deliberations. This Court reviews a decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an
abuse of discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003).
After the trial, but before jury deliberations began, the court chose an alternate juror and
then excused her. The trial judge told the alternate juror, “You’re free to stay if you
like…whatever’s your pleasure and I appreciate your willingness to serve.” The jury began
deliberations around 10 a.m., however, around noon, it was discovered that the alternate juror
had been sitting in during the deliberations and that she had misconstrued the judge’s statement
to mean that she could sit in during deliberations. After being informed that she could not
participate in deliberations, the alternate juror left the courthouse before she could be questioned
by the trial court as to whether she participated in the deliberations. However, the trial court did
question the jurors collectively as to whether the alternate juror had participated in deliberations.
The transcript indicates that jurors (in the plural) stated, “No.” After an interjection by the court,
the jurors continued, “No. She wanted to. She did want to. She just kept quiet as a mouse.”
The trial judge instructed the jury that if she had said anything, the jury is to disregard it. At
about 3 p.m. the jury returned with a verdict.
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Defendant relies on People v Knapp, 42 Mich 267, 269-270; 3 NW 927 (1879), where
our Supreme Court granted a new trial after it was discovered that a court officer was present
during jury deliberations, even though there was no evidence that he spoke. In Knapp, the
defendant was being prosecuted for adultery. Our Supreme Court was concerned that the
presence of the officer could have an impact on the juror’s deliberations, such that the jurors may
feel compelled to reach a particular result or may feel constrained in what they can state in the
presence of a court officer. Our Supreme Court was also concerned that a court officer
overhearing jury deliberations was not bound by the same oath of a juror to keep and maintain
the confidences of the deliberations creating another myriad of potential problems. Our Supreme
Court held in Knapp that the officer’s presence was sufficient to justify a new trial. The
emphasis of the ruling in Knapp was that due to the nature of his job, a court officer’s presence
in the jury room would create, among other problems, a chilling effect on jury deliberations, by
stating: “We have said enough already to show that it is not conversation alone that is
mischievous; the mere presence of the officer within the hearing of the jury is often quite as
much so. In one case what he would say might influence the verdict; in another, what his
presence might restrain jurors from saying, might accomplish the same result.” Id. at 271-272.
Defendant also cites People v Chambers, 279 Mich 73, 79-81; 271 NW2d 556 (1937), where our
Supreme Court reversed a conviction because a court officer was present several times during
jury deliberations and admitted talking to the jurors briefly.
The cases cited by defendant in his brief are distinguishable from the facts presented to us
in this appeal. The individual in the room during part of the jury’s deliberations was not an
officer of the court, and absent an offer of proof by defendant, we presume that the alternate was
a member of the general public. Consequently, the basis for our Supreme Court’s decisions in
Knapp and Chambers are not present in this case. Rather, the case we find applicable to the facts
presented in this appeal is United States v Olano, 507 US 725; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508
(1993). Olano answered the question whether the presence of alternate jurors during
deliberations mandated reversal by ruling that “the ultimate inquiry” in a case such as this is
whether “the jury’s deliberations and thereby its verdict” were impacted by the intrusion into the
privacy of the jury room. Id. at 727. The Supreme Court went on to state:
There may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, but a
presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the
ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its
verdict? . . . The question, then, is whether the instant violation of Rule 24(c)
prejudiced respondents, either specifically or presumptively. In theory, the
presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations might prejudice a defendant
in two different ways: either because the alternates actually participated in the
deliberations, verbally or through ‘body language’; or because the alternates’
presence exerted a ‘chilling’ effect on the regular jurors . . . . Conversely, ‘if the
alternate in fact abided by the court’s instructions to remain orally silent and not
to otherwise indicate his views or attitude . . . and if the presence of the alternate
did not operate as a restraint upon the regular jurors’ freedom of expression and
action, we see little substantive difference between the presence of [the alternate]
and the presence in the juryroom of an unexamined book which had not been
admitted into evidence.’
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Respondents have made no specific showing that the alternate jurors in this case
either participated in the jury’s deliberations or ‘chilled’ deliberation by the
regular jurors . . . . On this record, we are not persuaded that the instant violation
of Rule 24(c) was actually prejudicial. Id. at 739-740.
As in Olano, defendant has “made no specific showing that the alternate[] either
participated in, or ‘chilled’ the jury’s deliberations.” Id.; Smith v Phillips, 455 US 209, 217; 71 L
Ed 2d 78, 102 S Ct 940 (1982) the United States Supreme Court summarized the jurisprudence
of juror intrusion by stating:
Due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a
potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be
constitutionally acceptable. . . . It is virtually impossible to shield jurors from
every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process
means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before
it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to
determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Id. at 217. See also,
Olano, supra at 738.
In this case the jurors were asked if the alternate had participated in jury deliberations.
They collectively responded that she did not participate in deliberations. Furthermore, the trial
court then instructed the members of the jury to disregard any remarks the alternate juror may
have made. “It is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People
v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Thus, in the absence of any evidence that
the presence of the alternate juror had a chilling effect on the jury’s deliberations or its verdict,
we find that defendant has failed to establish that he has been prejudiced by the presence of the
alternate juror during part of the jury’s deliberations. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting complainant’s prior
consistent statements through the testimony of two witnesses. We review this unpreserved issue
for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763;
597 NW2d 130 (1990). Reversal is warranted if defendant shows that he was actually innocent
or that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings independent of his innocence. Id.
Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, MRE 802, a statement “consistent with the
declarant’s testimony [that] is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive” is not hearsay and therefore admissible.
MRE 801(d)(1)(B). Whether proffered evidence satisfies this exemption is left to the discretion
of the trial court. People v Harris, 160 Mich App 301, 305; 272 NW2d 635 (1978).
In People v Jones, 240 Mich App 704, 707; 613 NW2d 411 (2000), this Court adopted
the following test applied in United States v Bao, 189 F3d 860, 864 (CA 9, 1999) for offering
prior consistent statements:
“(1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination; (2)
there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper
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influence or motive of the declarant’s testimony; (3) the proponent must offer a
prior consistent statement that is consistent with the declarant’s challenged incourt testimony; and, (4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the
time that the supposed motive to falsify arose.”
Defendant’s argument is focused on testimony provided by the complainant’s friend,
Natalie Bajaras, and Darcy Schiller, a school counselor, regarding the complainant’s statements
to them about the sexual contact. In relevant part, Bajaras testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Did she ever discuss with you her relationship with her mother’s exboyfriend?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you know that person to be Troy Carpenter?
A. Yes.
Q. Based on those conversations that you had with her, did you ever make any
recommendations to her?
A. Yes.
Q. And what where those recommendations?
A. I told her she, ah, should go talk to our school counselor, Mrs. Schiller. I gave
her a card that had a sexual assault hotline number on it . . . so she could talk
to somebody. I even told her to go to her mother or call the cops, just in
general.
Defendant also objects to a statement by Schiller in which she testified in response to a query on
how she met the complainant by stating that the complainant “came into my office to tell me that
she had been sexually abused by Troy Carpenter.”
Defendant asserts on appeal that the complainant fabricated her allegations against
defendant after defendant broke off his relationship with her mother, the point at which the
motive to fabricate arose. Therefore, he argues, because the statements to Bajaras and Schiller
were made after the motive to falsify arose, the evidence failed to satisfy the requirements of
MRE 801(d)(1)(B) and Jones.
The testimony provided by Bajaras did not recount a prior statement by the complainant.
Instead, she simply responded in the affirmative when asked if the complainant discussed with
her the complainant’s relationship with defendant. Thus, Bajaras statement does not qualify as a
prior consistent statement by the complainant. As for the statement by Schiller, while it did
recount a prior consistent statement made by the complainant, the testimony was unresponsive to
the prosecutor’s question regarding how the counselor met the girl. Additionally, Schiller did
not elaborate on the statement or recount anything else that the complainant told her with respect
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to defendant. Moreover, defense counsel made clear on cross-examination that Schiller had no
personal information regarding the allegations of sexual abuse other than what the complainant
had told her. Under the circumstances, and given the weight of the evidence adduced,
particularly that of the complainant, defendant has not established that his substantial rights were
impacted. See People v Rodriguez (On Remand), 216 Mich App 329, 332; 549 NW2d 359
(1996).
Next, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial
counsel’s failure to request a mistrial upon the discovery of the dismissed juror’s presence during
jury deliberations and his failure to object to the admission of the alleged prior consistent
statements. The right to effective assistance of counsel is substantive and focuses on the actual
assistance received. People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589, 596; 548 NW2d 595 (1996).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a
heavy burden of proving otherwise. In order to overcome this presumption,
defendant must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured
against an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances and
according to prevailing professional norms. Second, defendant must show that
the deficiency was so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial such that there
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the trial
outcome would have been different. [People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 625;
709 NW2d 595 (2005) (citations omitted).]
Regarding the alternate juror, as discussed above, there is no evidence that the dismissed
juror participated in the deliberations or that her mere presence had a chilling effect on the jury’s
deliberations or its verdict. Accordingly, since there was no showing on appeal that defendant
had been prejudiced by the alternate juror’s presence during part of the deliberations, there
would have been no showing of prejudice if the issue had been raised immediately after it was
discovered. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial, nor can
counsel be faulted for failing to bring a motion for mistrial predicated on the same argument that
failed on appeal. See People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998). As for the
alleged instances of bolstering the complainant, we have concluded that the testimony of Bajaras
did not amount to improper bolstering, and the isolated and unresponsive remark offered by
Schiller did not impact the proceedings. Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to bring a
meritless motion for mistrial predicated on the same argument. Id.
Lastly, defendant contends that the cumulative errors in this case deprived him of a fair
trial. The cumulative effect of several minor errors can warrant reversal even when the
individual errors would not. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 258; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
However, “[i]n making this determination, only actual errors are aggregated to determine their
cumulative effect.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 592 n 12; 640 NW2d 246 (2002) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). We have concluded that none of the alleged errors
previously raised has merit under the relevant rules of appellate review. Moreover, defendant
failed to establish with respect to the one new argument raised here—that a new trial is
warranted because the complaint violated a sequestration order—that he sustained the requisite
prejudice. See People v King, 215 Mich App 301, 309; 544 NW2d 765 (1996).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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