SHEILA HARVEY V HARRY HARVEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHEILA HARVEY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285523
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-632479-DM
HARRY HARVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Shapiro, P.J., and Jansen and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating de novo hearing
proceedings in this divorce action. We reverse and remand for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
The parties were married in 1991 and have two children. Plaintiff is a lawyer and
defendant is retired from the military. Plaintiff filed for divorce in 2000. In September 2000,
while the divorce action was pending, plaintiff was in a serious vehicular accident and sustained
a closed head injury. The divorce judgment was entered in October 2001, but did not resolve
child custody or support, so the matter was referred to the Friend of the Court (FOC).
This is the parties’ third appearance before this Court. Plaintiff initially appealed an
order granting defendant sole legal and physical custody of the children. This Court reversed
and remanded and our Supreme Court affirmed. Harvey v Harvey, 257 Mich App 278; 668
NW2d 187 (2003), aff’d 470 Mich 186 (2004). After remand, defendant appealed and plaintiff
cross-appealed the trial court’s award of joint custody. This Court affirmed. Harvey v Harvey,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 14, 2005 (Docket No.
258938). The trial court then referred the case to the FOC for an investigation and
recommendation on child support. On the same date, the trial court entered an order requiring
defendant to pay $750 to plaintiff in monthly child support pending the FOC’s investigation and
recommendation.
Given the various changes in child custody and the fact that only temporary child support
orders had ever been issued, the FOC referee indicated that it was going to determine child
support going back to the October 2001 date of the divorce judgment. The referee requested tax
returns from both parties dating back to 2001. Plaintiff’s counsel represented that plaintiff “has
no tax returns for 2002 and 2003 because she had no income to report because she was not
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working.” The referee stated that counsel was to “gather up all prior tax returns, all of her
income statements, whatever else she has to show her income through that period of time.”
Plaintiff submitted “Addendum #1” which indicated that her annual gross income was $19,356
and “Addendum #2” which indicated that she had no income for tax years 2002 and 2003.
Plaintiff did disclose that she had received a cash settlement of $60,000 to $70,000 stemming
from her injuries in the automobile accident.
A proposed child support order was filed on January 18, 2006 recommending defendant
pay $969 in monthly support. On February 2, 2006, defendant filed various objections to the
recommendation, which the trial court considered and denied on March 10, 2006. On March 22,
2006, defendant filed a renewed motion objection objecting to the recommendation. The trial
court ordered defendant to obtain a copy of the FOC hearing transcripts and directed the parties
to appear for closing arguments on defendant’s objections. The trial court specifically prohibited
the parties from introducing new evidence absent a showing that the evidence was unavailable at
the FOC hearing.
Over a year later, on April 4, 2007, defendant filed a motion requesting a full evidentiary
hearing, and indicated that a limited hearing was currently scheduled for April 12, 2007 pursuant
to the trial court’s March 30, 2006 order. Defendant argued that he was unable to secure a
transcript of the FOC hearing and claimed that the FOC was unable to produce the full record,
including an affidavit from the FOC referee that he was unable to locate the audiotape of the
proceeding. Defendant requested that the parties be permitted to present evidence not presented
at the hearing. Plaintiff requested an adjournment if the trial court was inclined to grant the
request and otherwise opposed the motion.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on April 12, 2007 and September 28, 2007. At
the hearing, plaintiff admitted that the FOC referee asked her to provide income information and
that she submitted the two addendums in response. She maintained that she had no income to
report for 2002 or 2003 because she did not work during those two years. She testified that she
received uninsured motorist benefits and that she previously received monthly checks from
defendant’s insurance company, but she did not characterize the checks as wage-loss benefits.
Following the hearing, the trial court scheduled a November 28, 2007 hearing to address
the issue of the wage-loss benefits. The record indicates that no such hearing took place, but that
the parties appeared before the court at a March 31, 2008 hearing to address the issue. At that
hearing, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to report her wage-loss benefits as income during
the FOC hearing and that those funds constituted income to be considered when determining
child support. He indicated that he did not receive a full statement until six months after the
FOC hearing and that plaintiff received over $140,000 in wage-loss benefits. Plaintiff argued
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because defendant did not raise the objection within 21
days of the referees recommendation and that the information was available to defendant at the
time of the FOC hearing because defendant was the owner and insured of the vehicle. The trial
court concluded it had no jurisdiction.
On April 14, 2008, defendant filed a motion to retroactively modify and hold plaintiff in
contempt for failure to disclose her wage-loss benefits as income. The trial court again
concluded that it had no subject-matter jurisdiction and that, even if the objections had been
timely raised, the information was readily available to defendant at the time of the FOC hearing.
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Defendant filed another motion to retroactively modify and hold plaintiff in contempt, which the
trial court deemed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court noted that defendant claimed to
have discovered the evidence six months after the referee issued its recommendation, but failed
to file a motion regarding the evidence at the time he sought a full evidentiary hearing. The trial
court believed that defendant has held the information in his back pocket, awaiting the trial
court’s determination of the other objections and held:
Although this Court does not condone misleading and/or fraudulent
behavior, it also can not [sic] condone piece-meal litigation where parties attempt
to reserve issues so that they can try to take multiple bites from the proverbial
apple.
Defendant now appeals.
This Court reviews a trial court’s determination regarding the modification of child
support for an abuse of discretion. Burba v Burba (After Remand), 461 Mich 637, 647; 610
NW2d 873 (2000). “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12;
727 NW2d 132 (2007). In addition, we review de novo whether the trial court acted properly
within the child support guidelines, as well as questions involving statutory interpretation.
Malone v Malone, 279 Mich App 280, 284; 761 NW2d 102 (2008).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to apply MCL 552.603b. This issue
involves the interpretation of that statute. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the Legislature’s intent. Id. at 285. “When the Legislature has unambiguously
conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself, and judicial construction is not
permitted.” Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).
“Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an
interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” Id.
Regarding the retroactive modification of child support orders, MCL 552.603(2)
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a support order that is part of
a judgment or is an order in a domestic relations matter is a judgment on and after
the date the support amount is due as prescribed in section 5c, with the full force,
effect, and attributes of a judgment of this state, and is not, on and after the date it
is due, subject to retroactive modification. Retroactive modification of a support
payment due under a support order is permissible with respect to a period during
which there is pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that
notice of the petition was given to the payer or recipient of support.
This statute prohibits the retroactive modification of child support orders except as provided in
MCL 552.603. Malone, supra at 286. MCL 552.603b provides an exception to the general
prohibition on the retroactive modification of child support orders:
If an individual who is required by the court to report his or her income to
the court or the office of the friend of the court knowingly and intentionally fails
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to report, refuses to report, or knowingly misrepresents that income, after notice
and an opportunity for a hearing, the court may retroactively correct the amount
of support.
The statutory text is unambiguous and specifically allows a court to retroactively modify child
support in the limited circumstances provided.
Defendant contends that MCL 552.603b required the trial court to conduct an inquiry
regarding whether plaintiff violated the statute by knowingly and intentionally failing to report,
refusing to report, or knowingly misrepresenting income. We agree.
The trial court refused to allow defendant to present evidence regarding plaintiff’s wageloss benefits, stating in part that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address the matter under
MCL 552.507(4), which states:
The court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the
subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon
motion of the court. The request of a party shall be made within 21 days after the
recommendation of the referee is made available to that party.
The trial court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address this issue because
defendant failed to raise the issue within 21 days following the referee’s recommendation. The
trial court’s determination is erroneous. Although defendant did not raise this issue within 21
days as provided in the statute, MCL 552.603b specifically provides that a court may
retroactively modify child support “after notice and an opportunity for a hearing.” Thus, despite
that defendant failed to raise the issue within the time provided for a de novo hearing under MCL
552.507(4), MCL 552.603b permitted the court to hold a hearing to address the issue. We note
that defendant was not even aware of plaintiff’s failure to report her income within the 21-day
time period provided in MCL 552.507(4) to request a de novo hearing. Therefore, the trial court
had subject-matter jurisdiction to address the issue pursuant to MCL 552.603b.
The trial court also refused to allow defendant to present evidence of plaintiff’s wage-loss
benefits because the evidence was readily available to defendant had he sought the information at
the time of the FOC hearing. Defendant admitted that he owned and insured the vehicle that
plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident, but denied knowing about the wage-loss benefits
paid to plaintiff at the time of the FOC hearing. Defendant’s testimony and a statement of
benefits paid with respect to the accident indicate that defendant was not aware of the wage-loss
benefits until May 19, 2006, approximately four months after the referee’s recommendation.
The statement of benefits was generated pursuant to defendant’s request at that time. Thus, the
trial court is correct that the information was readily available to defendant at the time of the
FOC hearing had he sought it.
However, there is no indication that defendant had any reason at the time of the FOC
hearing to request the information. It is possible that defendant had concerns but failed to
investigate, but it is equally possible that defendant did not obtain knowledge that there may
have been wage-loss benefits until shortly before he requested the information. We conclude
that, because there is no record evidence that defendant knew about or believed that there were
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wage-loss benefits, the information was not available to defendant at the time of the FOC
hearing.
We admit to having some confusion as to why defendant waited to raise the issue of the
wage-loss payments until September 28, 2007 when he obtained the information in May 2006.
However, we find no bar to defendant’s claim simply because he did not file his motion to
retroactively modify child support under MCL 552.603b until April 14, 2008, nearly two years
after he became aware of plaintiff’s collection of wage-loss benefits. MCL 552.603b places no
time limit on when a party may bring forth an allegation of knowing and intentional
misrepresentation of income.
Plaintiff was required to report her wage-loss benefits as income under § 2.01(F)(32) of
the 2004 Michigan Child Support Formula Manual and the record shows that plaintiff failed to
do so. We believe that once defendant brought this evidence to the trial court’s attention, the
trial court was obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing and determine whether plaintiff’s failure
to disclose the wage-loss benefits was a knowing and intentional refusal to report or a knowing
misrepresentation of her income. MCL 552.603b. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial
court to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding plaintiff’s actions.
We note that, if the trial court concludes that plaintiff’s failure to disclose falls under the
statute, the retroactive modification of child support is not mandatory, but remains within the
discretion of the trial court. Further, the trial court may consider the reason behind any delay by
defendant in bringing the information to the court’s attention when deciding whether to make
any modification. However, once allegations of fraud are brought to the attention of the court, it
has an obligation to investigate them with an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sanction
plaintiff for failing to accurately report her income as the Friend of the Court referee directed.
We disagree. Here, there is no evidence that plaintiff’s actions were misconduct that required
sanction. However, if, after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court determines that plaintiff’s
actions meet the requirements of MCL 552.603b, the trial court shall reconsider defendant’s
request for sanctions.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Defendant is entitled to costs. MCR 7.219(F).
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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