PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES HENRY TAYLOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 27, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284983
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 07-010401-FH
JAMES HENRY TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Whitbeck and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84, but acquitted of an alternative count of felonious assault, MCL 750.82.
Defendant’s conviction arose out of an altercation with Abrien Swires in which defendant struck
Swires. Some witnesses testified that defendant used a metal object, possibly a tire iron, while
others testified that defendant only used his fist. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual
offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 11 to 25 years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right.
We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remand for further proceedings with regard
to defendant’s challenges to the accuracy of the PSIR.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously scored offense variables (OV) 9 and
10. We disagree. Defendant did not object at his sentencing, and his motion for remand did not
comply with MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a); this issue is therefore unpreserved and our review is limited
to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 411;
740 NW2d 557 (2007).
We uphold a trial court’s scoring decision if it is supported by any evidence. People v
Endres, 269 Mich App 414, 417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006). Ten points are to be scored for OV 9
where there are “2 to 9 victims who were placed in danger of physical injury or death].]” MCL
777.39(1)(c). A trial court is to “[c]ount each person who was placed in danger of physical
injury or loss of life or property as a victim.” MCL 777.39(2)(a). Ten points may be scored for
OV 10 if a defendant “exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or
agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority status.” MCL
777.40(1)(b). “Exploit” means “to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical purposes.” MCL
777.40(3)(b). Points should be scored under OV 10 only when the victim’s vulnerability is
readily apparent. People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 158-159; 749 NW2d 257 (2008).
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Defendant initially threatened Swires’s girlfriend and began approaching her, causing her
to feel that she was in danger; Swires intervened to protect his girlfriend, and that was when
defendant assaulted him. This evidence supports a finding that defendant placed Swires’s
girlfriend in danger of physical injury, making her an additional victim within the meaning of
MCL 777.39(2)(a). A trial court’s scoring of OV 9 must be based only on the sentencing
offense. People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 133-134; ___ NW2d ___ (2009). But assaulting
Swires while Swires was intervening to protect his girlfriend from defendant indicates that the
risk of danger of physical injury to Swires’s girlfriend was intertwined with the sentencing
offense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in scoring ten points for OV 9.
The record also provides sufficient support for the trial court’s finding that defendant
exploited Swires’s youthfulness. Swires was a 16-year-old teenager at the time of the offense,
whereas defendant was almost 30 years old. The evidence showed that defendant used his
significant age difference to attempt to intimidate Swires, and then escalated the situation by
threatening Swires’s girlfriend to provoke Swires. This evidence supports a finding that
defendant manipulated Swires based on his youthfulness. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
scoring ten points for OV 10.
The remainder of defendant’s arguments were brought by defendant in propria persona,
in a brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in scoring ten points for OV 1 (the victim was
touched with a weapon other than a firearm, knife, or harmful substance), MCL 777.31(1)(d),
and one point for OV 2 (the offender possessed or used a potentially lethal weapon other than a
firearm, knife, explosive device, or harmful substance), MCL 777.32(1)(e). We disagree. The
testimony that defendant struck the victim in the head with some kind of metal object, leaving a
wound that required five staples, was sufficient to support the trial court’s scoring of these
offense variables. Endres, supra.
Defendant argues that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by the
submission to the jury of charges of both assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder and felonious assault, based on a single assault. We disagree. A double jeopardy issue
involves a question of law, which we review de novo. People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 599; 628
NW2d 528 (2001).
The Double Jeopardy Clause includes protection against multiple punishments for the
same offense, US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42,
49; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). In the absence of a clear legislative intent to impose multiple
punishments for the same offense, “multiple offenses may be punished if each offense has an
element that the other does not.” See People v McGee, 280 Mich App 680, 682-683; 761 NW2d
743 (2008). Felonious assault requires the use of a dangerous weapon during an assault, but does
not require an intent to cause great bodily harm. People v Walls, 265 Mich App 642, 645-646;
697 NW2d 535 (2005). Conversely, assault with intent to do great bodily harm requires that the
defendant commit an (1) an assault, (2) with the specific intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703 NW2d 230 (2005), but it does not require
the use of a dangerous weapon. Thus, each crime requires proof of an element that the other
does not. In any event, the charges were clearly intended to be alternative, and defendant was
convicted and sentenced for only a single offense. Under these circumstances, there was no
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double jeopardy violation. See People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 392; 633 NW2d 376
(2001).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial at his first trial. We
disagree. A trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 202; 526 NW2d 620 (1994); People v Blackburn, 94
Mich App 711, 714; 290 NW2d 61 (1980).
“A trial court should only grant a mistrial when the prejudicial effect of the error cannot
be removed in any other way.” People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 36; 755 NW2d 212 (2008).
Here, the trial court declared a mistrial because two jurors believed – albeit possibly erroneously
– that the victim spit on them during a lunch break. Only twelve jurors were seated at the time,
and defendant did not consent to proceeding with fewer than twelve jurors. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that a mistrial was manifestly necessary because
continuing with all twelve jurors would have made an impartial verdict highly unlikely and
dismissing the two jurors would violate defendant’s right to a jury of twelve jurors pursuant to
MCR 6.410(A). See People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 363; 592 NW2d 737 (1999).
Although the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, it did hold a hearing, which is all
that was required. From the record, it appears that the hearing memorialized discussions held in
chambers, and defendant was amenable to the mistrial. See People v William McGee, 469 Mich
956; 670 NW2d 665 (2003). We find no error.
Defendant argues that because his case was originally assigned to Chief Judge Patrick
Joslyn, who presided at defendant’s first trial, it was improper for visiting Judge Michael
Matuzak to preside at his second trial. The record here indicates that Chief Judge Joslyn was
temporarily absent and unable to act because he was out of town. Thus, MCR 8.111(C)
permitted Chief Judge Joslyn to designate a judge to act temporarily in his absence.
Accordingly, there was no error when visiting Judge Matuzak presided at defendant’s second
trial.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to support his
conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. We disagree. The
evidence that defendant struck Swires in the head with such force that it caused an injury that
required five staples to close Swires’s head wound, viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich
1201 (1992), was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant assaulted Swires with “an intent to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.”
Brown, supra at 147. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on assault
and battery as a lesser offense to assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.
We review unpreserved claims of instructional error for plain error affecting substantial rights.
People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 353; 721 NW2d 815 (2006), aff’d 482 Mich 851 (2008).
An instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense “is proper if the charged greater offense
requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense
and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 646
NW2d 127 (2002) (footnote omitted). The disputed factual element that distinguishes the two
charges in this case is the intent to do great bodily harm. Given the severity of Swires’s injury,
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we conclude that the evidence in this case did not rationally support an instruction on
misdemeanor assault and battery. Failure to instruct on that offense was not plain error.1
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in excluding a demonstrative exhibit that
his attorney prepared. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 670-671; 664
NW2d 203 (2003).
The exhibit was described as a scaffold with a ceiling tile that was designed to resemble a
seven-foot high ceiling. Counsel intended to use the exhibit to assist the jury in evaluating the
witnesses’ testimony describing how defendant allegedly swung a tire iron or object over his
head and struck the victim’s head. The trial court concluded that the exhibit would not have
significantly assisted the jury in understanding the relative height of a common seven-foot
ceiling, and there were other less-disruptive ways for counsel to challenge whether defendant
could have swung a tire iron overhand in the room where the assault occurred. We do not find
that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the exhibit’s probative value was
insufficient to warrant its introduction in light of the likely disruption to proceedings. See
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 247; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Furthermore, the trial court’s
ruling admitting the exhibit in defendant’s first trial is not binding on a second trial after a
mistrial. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 552; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
Next, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial or resentencing because his trial
attorney was ineffective. In particular, defendant argues that trial counsel failed to interview any
witnesses before either trial, failed to cross-examine witnesses, failed to present his own medical
expert, should have anticipated that the demonstrative exhibit would have been challenged, failed
to acquire a complete transcript of his first trial, and failed to advocate proper sentencing scoring.
We disagree with all of these assertions.
Because defendant did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the trial
court, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. Matuszak, supra
at 48. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so
prejudiced defendant that he was denied his right to a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298,
338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466
NW2d 315 (1991). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v Johnnie Johnson, Jr, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). Defendant has the
burden of producing factual support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v
Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
1
Furthermore, we observe that defense counsel’s strategy was to argue to the jury that the most
defendant was guilty of was assault and battery, arguing that the jury should not convict
defendant of a greater crime merely because it believed that defendant was guilty of something.
We are not persuaded that this strategy was unsound.
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Defendant fails to identify any witnesses who were allegedly not interviewed or to
explain how any alleged insufficient interviewing prejudiced his trial. The record shows that
defense counsel did cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses, and defendant has not explained
how that cross-examination was deficient. Defendant has not explained how it was unsound for
trial counsel to challenge the prosecutor’s medical expert through cross-examination instead of
through another medical expert, particularly given that the nature of the victim’s injuries were
not a significant issue and the medical expert could not identify what caused the injury beyond
blunt force trauma or a non-sharp object. The record shows that defense counsel competently
argued for admission of the demonstrative exhibit and that, in its absence, counsel nevertheless
explored the relative height of the ceiling in the room where the assault occurred.
Defense counsel did not receive a complete copy of defendant’s first trial, but he did
request it, as well as a continuance when it was not timely received. Counsel received a
transcript of all witness testimony from the first trial before the second trial began. After the
second trial, defense counsel received a transcript of the trial court’s mistrial ruling at the first
trial and used it to seek post-conviction relief. Defense counsel objected to the scoring of OV 1
and OV 2, but not to OV 9 or OV 10. Nevertheless, the trial court overruled the objections
regarding OV 1 and OV 2, and as discussed, the court’s scoring of all offense variables was
proper. Defendant does not articulate what other objections, if any, defense counsel should have
made.
We find that defendant has not factually supported his claim of ineffective assistance.
See People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). An appellant may not leave
it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject his position. People v Traylor, 245
Mich App 460, 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). Defendant has not shown that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to correct the presentence
investigation report (PSIR) in response to his challenges to the accuracy of the report at
sentencing. We agree.
Once a defendant challenges the accuracy of information in the PSIR, the trial court is
required to respond to the challenge. People v Uphaus (On Remand), 278 Mich App 174, 182;
748 NW2d 899 (2008). The court may determine the accuracy of the information, accept the
defendant’s version, or simply disregard the challenged information. Id. Because the
Department of Corrections uses the PSIR to make decisions regarding a defendant’s status, the
PSIR must accurately reflect any determination the sentencing judge has made concerning the
accuracy or relevancy of the information contained in the report. Id. In this case, although the
trial court stated that it would disregard certain information describing a similar offense, the trial
court did not delete that information from the PSIR; the court also did not respond to other
objections raised by defendant. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for the court to
address defendant’s challenges to the PSIR and to correct the PSIR as appropriate, after which a
corrected copy of the PSIR shall be forwarded to the Department of Corrections.
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We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remand for further proceedings with
regard to defendant’s challenges to the accuracy of the PSIR in accordance with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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