JOYCE LYNN MEMMINGER V MCKINLEY PROPERTIES INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOYCE LYNN MEMMINGER,
UNPUBLISHED
September 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 285542
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-100187-CZ
MCKINLEY PROPERTIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Whitbeck and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action asserting fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of an assumed duty to
provide security , plaintiff Joyce Memminger appeals as of right from a circuit court order that
granted defendant McKinley Properties, Inc.’s motion for summary disposition, which McKinley
Properties brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). We affirm. We decide this
appeal without oral argument.1
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
On September 21, 2004, Joyce Memminger’s ex-husband, Leonard Memminger accosted
her and held her hostage at her gated apartment complex, which was managed by McKinley
Properties. When she attempted to escape, he shot her twice. He entered a no-contest plea.
The present action is the second lawsuit that Joyce Memminger brought against
McKinley Properties in an attempt to recover for her injuries. In the first action, to which
Leonard Memminger was also a party, Joyce Memminger alleged that Leonard Memminger
gained unauthorized access because of the negligent acts of McKinley Properties and its agents
and that McKinley Properties breached express and implied warranties by permitting Leonard
Memminger’s unauthorized access. In that action, McKinley Properties moved for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis that it did not have a duty to protect
Joyce Memminger from a criminal attack, it did not create a dangerous condition, and it had not
voluntarily assumed any duty.
1
MCR 7.214(E).
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In its decision, the trial court noted that a landlord had only a duty to exercise reasonable
care and failed to see a prima facie case of liability. The trial court went on to say that McKinley
Properties did not act unreasonably or negligently in terms of protecting not only Joyce
Memminger but also other people in the complex. The trial court denied Joyce Memminger’s
request to amend the complaint to allege other causes of action but did not specify a reason for
the denial. The trial court commented, “I don’t know if there’s any way for me to prohibit the
filing of a new case, but I’m granting summary disposition on this motion here.” The trial court
dismissed the complaint with respect to McKinley Properties with prejudice, and later denied
Joyce Memminger’s motion for reconsideration. Although the trial court granted summary
disposition to Leonard Memminger with respect to his liability, the case against him evidently
went to trial on the issue of damages.
Joyce Memminger then filed the present action alleging that McKinley Properties
“fraudulently induced” her to rent the apartment by making false and misleading statements
about the security measures used at the facility and that she relied on those statements when
renting the apartment. According to the complaint, before she leased the apartment, Joyce
Memminger repeatedly informed McKinley Properties’ agent Deanna Filarski of the importance
of security in her decision where to live. According to Joyce Memminger, Filarski and security
personnel assured her that her ex-husband would not be permitted on the premises. Joyce
Memminger alleged that Filarski and security personnel repeatedly made representations about
the security measures that were untrue including that:
•
•
•
•
•
the security gate was the only way anyone could access the property,
“when it was well known that people, residents and non-residents alike, regularly
entered by going over the perimeter fence, or through the fence at locations of
breach, disrepair, distortion and/or irregularity;”
every non-resident seeking admission was required to register at the
security gate house, when in fact the procedure was not applied to non-resident
pedestrians;
the grounds were patrolled 24 hours by security personnel, when in fact
they were patrolled only during evening hours by a person who also divided his
time with other properties;
non-residents were not admitted without authorization of a resident
contacted by phone by the security guard, when in fact, the security personnel
never sought authorization before allowing admission;
the perimeter fence surrounded the entire property and prevented
unauthorized access, when in fact it was regularly scaled, and other breaches and
irregularities prevented it from serving as a physical barrier.
In addition to asserting that McKinley Properties fraudulently induced her to rent and reside at
the apartment, Joyce Memminger alleged that McKinley Properties “assumed the duty of
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preventing” Leonard Memminger’s unauthorized access to the property and that McKinley
Properties was “estopped from denying its liability.”2
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10).
In the trial court’s bench ruling on that motion, it mentioned res judicata, but did not rely on res
judicata in granting McKinley Properties’ motion:
Well, I think there’s room for arguing res judicata and collateral estoppel
with regard to these arguments. And I think some of them do apply, but the Court
nevertheless, because there are some different claims here, went through an
evaluation of those claims. And as Mr. Jarrett has indicated, you know, things are
a little different. I mean, we even had a trial on the case, a trial with her husband
and a lot of facts came out then. And he was very clever and sneaky and kind of
hard to use words to describe how he snuck into the building and got up to her
apartment and shot her the way he did.
But the one thing that is pretty clear here with respect to both the false
representations and the assumption of duty is that the apartment did give a
disclaimer. They talked about all their security features and what they could and
couldn’t do. They had it seemed most of the stuff in place, but, as we all
recognize, no system is infallible against the activities of a criminal, and in fact
they say that in their warranty.
In fact, it says the management of this apartment community, and I’m
quoting, does not promise, warrant, or guarantee the safety of [sic] security of
residents, personal property against the criminal actions of other residents, or third
parties. Each resident has responsibility to protect him or herself and to maintain
appropriate insurance to protect his or her belongings. Residents should contact
an insurance agent to arrange appropriate fire and theft insurance on the property,
and it kind of goes on and it does talk about clever criminals.
And, you know, the law is pretty clear that defendants are not responsible
for the criminal acts of third parties. And for her to have some kind of total
reliance on the complex’s security is really I think unreasonable reliance.
So even if res judicata doesn’t apply, I would think summary judgment is
appropriate with regard to false representations and assumption of duty and
collateral estoppel. So the Court accordingly is going to grant the motion for
summary disposition . . . .
The trial court then entered a written order stating that summary disposition was granted
for the reasons stated on the record.
2
The dismissal of the “estoppel” claim is not at issue on appeal.
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II. Summary Disposition
A. Standard Of Review
Joyce Memminger argues that the trial court erred by failing to recognize the distinction
between the claims made against McKinley Properties in this action and those asserted in a prior
action between these parties. Joyce Memminger further contends that res judicata bars only the
claims that were actually litigated, and because these claims were not asserted in the prior action,
res judicata does not apply.
Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate where a claim is
barred by prior judgment.3 This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for
summary disposition.4 The application of a legal doctrine, such as res judicata, is a question of
law that is also subject to de novo review.5
B. Res Judicata
Joyce Memminger’s argument is legally flawed because res judicata applies not only to
claims that were actually litigated, but also claims that could have been resolved in the prior
action. Res judicata “‘bars a second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was decided on
the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in the
second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.’”6 The doctrine applies to “claims
already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.”7
This Court uses a transactional test to determine if a matter could have been resolved in a
prior case.8 Joyce Memminger does not address this test. She also does not address whether,
exercising reasonable diligence, she could have raised the claims in the first action. Although
she unsuccessfully attempted to amend the complaint in the first action, she did not appeal the
trial court’s denial of her motion. The comments to § 25 of Restatement of Judgments state, “It
is immaterial that the plaintiff in the first action sought to prove the acts relied on in the second
action and was not permitted to do so because they were not alleged in the complaint and an
application to amend the complaint came too late.”9 The Reporter’s Notes further state, “With
3
RDM Holdings, Ltd v Continental Plastics Co, 281 Mich App 678, 687; 762 NW2d 529 (2008).
4
Id. at 686.
5
Id.
6
Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478 Mich 412, 418; 733 NW2d 755 (2007),
quoting Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 121; 680 NW2d 386 (2004).
7
ANR Pipeline Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 266 Mich App 190, 213; 699 NW2d 707 (2005).
8
Washington, supra at 420.
9
Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 25, Comment b, p 210.
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respect to a court’s refusal in the first action to allow late amendment, the plaintiff, if aggrieved,
would be expected to pursue any right of appeal within that action.”10
C. Disclaimer
Moreover, the trial court’s ruling was not premised on res judicata, but rather on the
effect of a disclaimer in a form, “Resident Security Notice and Acknowledgement.” Joyce
Memminger does not address the effect of the disclaimer. Her failure to address the basis for the
trial court’s decision precludes appellate relief.11
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
10
Id. at 225-226.
11
Roberts & Son Contracting, Inc v North Oakland Dev Corp, 163 Mich App 109, 113; 413
NW2d 744 (1987).
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