IN RE OLSON ESTATE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of MARY HELEN GREEN OLSON,
Deceased.
KAREN ASTRID HOAD, Personal Representative
of the Estate of MARY HELEN GREEN OLSON,
UNPUBLISHED
September 29, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283818
Van Buren Probate Court
LC No. 2005-000002-CZ
UNITY MORTGAGE CORPORATION, d/b/a
REVERSE MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Unity Mortgage Corporation (UMC) appeals by right the trial court’s order
granting petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and to quiet title of the estate to thirty acres of a
40-acre parcel that Mary Helen Green Olson mortgaged to UMC in 1995. We affirm.
Respondent UMC argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion because it
improperly relied on MCR 2.119(F) and MCR 2.612 when issuing its order following
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent contends the petitioner did not present any
new arguments or evidence that the trial court had not already considered in its original opinion
and order dismissing petitioner’s action to quiet title and permitting UMC to foreclose on the
entire 40-acre parcel. UMC also argues that the trial court failed to specify either the substantive
or procedural basis for its decision to reverse or change its original opinion and order.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding both a motion for
reconsideration under MCR 2.119(F) and motion for relief from judgment under MCR
2.612(C)(1). Peterson v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 274 Mich App 407, 412; 733 NW2d 413 (2007);
Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 233; 611 NW2d 333 (2000). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the principled range of
outcomes.” Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006).
-1-
The Interpretation and application of the court rules, however, presents a question of law
we review de novo. Auto Club Ins Ass’n v General Motors Corp, 217 Mich App 594, 598; 552
NW2d 523 (1996). When interpreting the meaning of a court rule, we apply principles of
statutory construction to enforce the ordinary meaning of the words used in light of the purpose
to be accomplished. Meece v Meece, 223 Mich App 344, 346-347; 566 NW2d 310 (1997).
The plain language of MCR 2.119(F) provides that it applies when a party requests
rehearing or reconsideration of a trial court’s decision on a motion. MCR 2.119(F)(1) states the
time within which “a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision on a motion must be
served and filed . . . .” (Emphasis added). Further, MCR 2.119(F)(3) provides, generally, “[t]he
moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been
misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result from correction of the
error.” (Emphasis added). Our reading of MCR 2.119(F) is supported by this Court’s decisions
in Smith v Sinai Hospital of Detroit, 152 Mich App 716, 723; 394 NW2d 82 (1986), holding
MCR 2.119(F) affords trial courts the discretion to afford a “second chance” on a previously
denied motion, and In re Estate of Moukalled, 269 Mich App 708, 714; 714 NW2d 400 (2006),
holding the court rule grants trial courts considerable discretion to reconsider a decision on a
motion, even if on the same arguments previously presented and decided.
Here, petitioner did not request rehearing or reconsideration of a decision on a motion;
instead petitioner sought rehearing of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
after a bench trial. From the plain language of MCR 2.119(F) it is patent it was not the
appropriate court rule with which to analyze petitioner’s motion. But in rendering its decision,
the trial court did not indicate that it was doing so under the authority of MCR 2.119(F), only
that petitioner had brought her motion pursuant to MCR 2.119(F) and MCR 2.612. We conclude
that petitioner’s motion was properly brought and decided under MCR 2.612. In sum, while
petitioner’s motion was not appropriate under MCR 2.119(F), the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, and its decision should not be reversed simply because the trial court noted that
petitioner brought her motion under both MCR 2.119(F) and MCR 2.612.
In the trial court’s order following the motion for reconsideration, the court stated that
petitioner requested clarification of the court’s original ruling regarding the number of acres that
Olson mortgaged as security. Specifically, petitioner asked whether Olson’s 1995 mortgage to
UMC included: (a) the house plus three acres, (b) the house plus ten acres, or (c) the house plus
the entire 40 acres. The trial court noted that “[w]hile this Court has previously ruled that the
mortgage is valid and that Unity Mortgage may foreclose on the mortgage the Court’s opinion
and the record are unclear as to how much of the land is subject to the foreclosure.” Our review
of the record convinces us that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding, “there was a
multitude of evidence that anything above the house plus three acres was ‘excess land’ and
would not qualify for a HUD approved loan . . . .” Nevertheless, rather than focus on the amount
of land that the parties intended to act as security for funds advanced by UMC, the trial court in
its original opinion and order focused on whether a mortgage in violation of the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) guidelines for federal insurance could
be enforceable. The trial court on this issue originally determined that a “violation of HUD
-2-
guidelines does not give the mortgagor an independent cause of action to void the mortgage.”
This finding ended the trial court’s analysis of the issues presented during the bench trial. It was
not until petitioner moved for reconsideration that the trial court appeared to realize that it did
not take its analysis an additional step. Specifically, the trial court failed to determine whether
UMC could foreclose on the home and all 40 acres when, in fact, the 1995 mortgage as drafted
included excess acreage as defined in HUD guidelines,1 and UMC sought to receive the “double
benefit of having their loan insured by the federal government while also having the mortgage
protected by excess land.” We conclude, contrary to UMC’s argument on appeal, that the trial
court did not consider and dispose of this issue in its original opinion and order.
MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) governs motions for relief from judgment and provides that “[o]n
motion and on just terms, the court may relieve a party or the legal representative of a party from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding” on the basis of “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” “Mistake” for purposes of MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a), may be that of the trial
court. Fisher v Belcher, 269 Mich App 247, 262; 713 NW2d 6 (2005), citing Altman v Nelson,
197 Mich App 467, 477; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). This Court has also held that relief from a
judgment will generally only be granted in extraordinary circumstances and where the failure to
grant the relief would result in a substantial injustice. Gillispie v Bd of Tenant Affairs of the
Detroit Housing Comm, 145 Mich App 424, 427-428; 377 NW2d 864 (1985). In the end, the
trial court “must balance the public interest in achieving finality in litigation versus the private
interest of remedying an injustice.” Mikedis v Perfection Heat Treating Co, 180 Mich App 189,
203; 446 NW2d 648 (1989).
In Fisher, supra, this Court found that the trial court readily admitted that it had
inadvertently reached the merits regarding its jurisdiction by granting custody administratively.
Hence, the trial court inadvertently made a mistake. “The [trial] court also noted that defendant
had contested jurisdiction from the onset of the proceedings.” Id. at 263. Therefore, this Court
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in setting aside its order because the
issue of jurisdiction had not been properly examined. Id. Similarly, in this case, the trial court
readily admitted that its original opinion and order was unclear as to the number of acres that
were intend to serve as security for the money UMC loaned Olson, and thus, how much of the
estate’s property was subject to foreclosure under the 1995 mortgage. Consequently, just as the
Fisher Court concluded that the trial court in that case did not abuse its discretion setting aside
1
This and other evidence suggests the parties intended the 1995 mortgage to cover only the
house and three acres. Other evidence included the fact that before the execution of the 1995
mortgage, UMC commissioned an amended survey that carved from Olson’s 40-acre parcel a
three-acre parcel immediately surrounding her home. Further, the legal description of this threeacre parcel governed the parties’ subsequent actions, including Olson’s conveying the three-acre
parcel and the 37-acre parcel by separate description into trust in 1997. And in 2003, UMC took
a second mortgage from Olson on only the three-acre parcel. UMC conceded at trial that the
2003 mortgage was unenforceable. Despite this evidence, the trial court seized on a statement in
an appraiser’s letter written one month before the revised survey was completed that “anything
above the Estate house plus ten acres would be considered ‘excess land.’” Petitioner has not
cross appealed the trial court’s determination that the 1995 mortgage be limited to the house plus
ten acres, as opposed to the house plus three acres.
-3-
its order because the issue of jurisdiction inadvertently had not been properly examined, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by further clarifying or completing its
ruling on an issue it had inadvertently overlooked, i.e., that the 1995 mortgage pertained only to
the home plus ten acres, and that the remaining 30 acres were held in fee simple by Olson’s
estate. The trial court’s determination regarding the number of acres that secured the mortgage,
and thus how much of the land was subject to foreclosure, was pivotal to the case. Moreover, the
trial court’s decision on that issue, “balanc[ing] the public interest in achieving finality in
litigation versus the private interest of remedying an injustice,” Mikedis, supra at 203, was
within the range of principled of outcomes, Woodard, supra at 557. In sum, MCR
2.612(C)(1)(a) provided the procedural basis for the trial court to grant petitioner’s motion, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
We find that UMC’s remaining arguments have no merit. In its original opinion and
order, the trial court did not conclude that there was no excess land or that there was insufficient
evidence to find that HUD guidelines were violated, but rather it merely speculated on these
issues but never reached a conclusion. The only clear ruling the trial court reached was that a
“violation of HUD guidelines does not give the mortgagor an independent cause of action to void
the mortgage.” In addition, as set forth above, the trial court, based on its own admission and the
analysis in its original opinion and order, failed to initially analyze or reach a conclusion as to
how much of the land was subject to foreclosure despite the fact that it granted UMC judgment
of its counter-complaint.
We also reject UMC’s argument that the trial court’s discussion of Manufacturers
Hanover Mortgage Corp v Snell, 142 Mich App 548, 554-556; 370 NW2d 401 (1985) in its
original opinion and order somehow renders the court’s subsequent decision improper. In its
original opinion and order, the trial court relied on Hanover for the proposition that a violation of
HUD guidelines does not give a mortgagor an independent cause of action to void the mortgage.
This finding was not contrary to the trial court’s subsequent equitable ruling that UMC is not
entitled to the double benefit of having its loan insured by the Federal Housing Administration
while also retaining the ability to foreclose on excess land. Stated otherwise, a violation of HUD
guidelines does not void a mortgage, but neither does it prevent the grant of equitable relief when
the facts warrant it.2
UMC also argues that the trial court failed to adequately specify the basis, either
substantively or procedurally, for its decision to reverse or change its original opinion and order.
Specifically, UMC argues that the trial court in its order following the motion for reconsideration
failed to specify what mistake allowed the invocation of MCR 2.612. UMC does not cite any
authority to support its argument, nor does it devote attention to it. An appellant may not merely
announce its position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for its claims;
2
Michigan courts have long exercised equitable jurisdiction to reform conveyances that while
absolute in form were intended by the parties to serve only as security for a debt. See, e.g.,
Sheets v Huben, 354 Mich 536, 540; 93 NW2d 168 (1958), holding “[t]he intent of the parties is
the determining factor and no form of words employed in the written instrument is conclusive of
that intent.” The same principle would apply regarding the amount of property encumbered.
-4-
nor may it give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation to supporting authority.
Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003). For this reason,
and for the reasons already discussed, UMC’s argument lacks merit.
We affirm. As the prevailing party, petitioner may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
