IN RE AUSTIN MICHEAL CURTIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AUSTIN MICHEAL CURTIS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 290228
St. Joseph Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-000173-NA
JENNIFER ANNE CURTIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SCOTT ARON MOREY,
Respondent.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Jennifer Ann Curtis appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,
344-345; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 42; 549 NW2d 353 (1996).
The condition that led to the adjudication was the unexplained presence of several bruises
on the child’s back and both sides of his face, which the trial court determined were caused by
abuse. Respondent never admitted that she or her boyfriend caused the bruises. She claimed that
the child received some of the bruises by falling off his bunk bed, which was inconsistent with
the injuries depicted, but had no explanation for the remaining bruises. She later stated that the
child may have received his other bruises when she was roughhousing with him. Respondent
also asserted that she had no obligation to monitor the child’s bruises and continued to deny
picking the child up by the throat even though a witness, who the trial court found credible,
testified to seeing her do so. Respondent also admitted having an anger management problem,
but claimed that she had learned to control herself. Respondent was offered counseling, but
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refused to address the underlying causes of her anger and violence in her own troubled
childhood, or to work on breaking the pattern of abusive relationships. She also continued to
reside with her boyfriend, despite her claims that he was domestically violent. The trial court did
not clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and
were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time, considering the child’s age,
thereby justifying termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i).
With respect to § 19b(3)(g), the evidence showed that respondent failed to deal with the
original charges of abuse, her anger management issues, and the underlying causes of her
parenting problems. She continued to be dependent on others for transportation and housing, and
she had recently moved back into the home of her boyfriend, whom she accused of domestic
violence and who was the only other possible perpetrator of the child’s injuries, knowing that he
had not participated in services. She presented an excuse for every deficiency identified by the
agency. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent failed to provide proper care
and custody, and that there was no reasonable expectation that she would be able to do so within
a reasonable time, considering the child’s age. Therefore, termination was appropriate under §
19b(3)(g).
The trial court also did not clearly err in finding that termination was proper under §
19b(3)(j). The evidence that respondent failed to deal with the original charges of abuse and the
underlying causes of her parenting problems, and that she had moved back in with her boyfriend,
whom she had accused of domestic violence, supports the trial court’s reliance on that statutory
ground.
Respondent further argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the child’s
best interests. “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not
be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court’s best interests determination is also reviewed for
clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
We agree that the child’s attachment to his foster parents is not a permissible
consideration. Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 115; 92 NW2d 604 (1958); In re Foster, 226 Mich
App 348, 358; 573 NW2d 324 (1997). Additionally, it appears that the trial court did not
properly apply the best interest standard when, instead of determining whether termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests, it stated that it could not find that
returning the child to respondent’s care was in the child’s best interests. However, an error in
applying the best interests test may be harmless under MCR 2.613(A) (an error in a trial court’s
ruling is not a ground for reversal unless failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial
justice). In re Hansen, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 289903, issued July 21,
2009), slip op at 4. This Court in In re Hansen found that the trial court erred by not
“affirmatively find[ing] that termination of respondent’s parental rights would be in the child’s
best interests,” but concluded that the error was harmless because “the record is replete with
evidence that would justify that finding had the court applied the correct standard.” Id.
The evidence in this case showed that respondent failed to deal with the original charges
of abuse and the underlying causes of her parenting problems, failed to deal with her boyfriend’s
domestic violence, and remained dependent on others for housing and transportation. Further,
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the evidence showed that respondent was not fully bonded with her child, who at age five had
spent approximately half of his life in foster care, and that respondent had to be prompted to
interact with him. The child no longer became upset when respondent missed visits. Evidence
was also presented that the child needed stability, permanence, and consistency in an
environment where fighting was not the norm, and that continued instability could lead to serious
long-term consequences for his mental health. This evidence clearly shows that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. In light of this record, any error in
the trial court’s best interests analysis was harmless.
We affirm.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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