PEOPLE OF MI V CARTER CONRAD GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284463
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-013655-FH
CARTER CONRAD GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Sawyer and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The court conducted a bench trial and convicted defendant of conducting a criminal
enterprise (racketeering), MCL 750.159i(l), and three counts of uttering and publishing, MCL
752.249. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 45 months to 20 years for
the racketeering conviction and 3 to 14 years for each uttering and publishing conviction. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant’s convictions, but vacate his sentences and
remand for resentencing.
I. Facts
Defendant’s convictions arise from his involvement in a scheme to convert cemetery trust
funds in excess of several million dollars. At trial, the prosecutor theorized that defendant aided
in the conversion of funds when he knowingly provided false financial documents to state
regulators during their investigation of the trust funds. The documents falsely indicated that trust
fund assets were properly invested in his company, Fondren International. Defendant took the
position that he had no knowledge of an illegal scheme, that the financial documents that he
provided were based on misrepresentations from William Leyton that defendant did not realize
were false, and that Leyton was setting defendant up as the “fall guy” for the operation.
II. MRE 404(b) Evidence
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his
involvement in prior fraudulent business transactions. We review a trial court’s decision to
admit evidence under MRE 404(b)(1) for an abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich
376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome
that does not fall within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Young, 276
Mich App 446, 448; 740 NW2d 347 (2007).
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To be admissible under MRE 404(b)(1), evidence of prior bad acts must satisfy three
requirements: (1) it must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) it must be relevant to an issue of
fact of consequence at trial, and (3) its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by
its potential for unfair prejudice. A proper purpose is one other than establishing the defendant’s
character to show his propensity to commit the offense. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 496; 577
NW2d 673 (1998); People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).
Here, the evidence demonstrated defendant’s intent and lack of mistake, both proper
purposes under MRE 404(b)(1). Further, defendant’s intent was an issue of fact at trial because
defendant took the position that he was deceived by Leyton and did not knowingly provide false
financial documents. When other acts evidence is offered to show intent, logical relevance
dictates only that the charged crime and the proffered other acts be of the same general category.
VanderVliet, supra at 80. Similar to the charged offenses here, the prior acts involved
defendant’s use of false financial statements in fraudulent business transactions. Thus, the prior
acts evidence was logically relevant to a disputed issue at defendant’s trial.
Also, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice under MRE 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger
that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.
Crawford, supra at 398. Here, the evidence was significantly probative of defendant’s intent,
which was the principal issue at trial. More significantly, defendant was tried before the court,
not a jury, and a judge is less likely to be influenced by improper considerations.1 People v
Edwards, 171 Mich App 613, 619; 431 NW2d 83 (1988). Under the circumstances, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of defendant’s prior business
transactions under MRE 404(b)(1).
III. Directed Verdict
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
of acquittal. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this Court reviews the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found that the essential elements of the charged crimes were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006).
Defendant says that he could not be convicted of uttering and publishing because there is
no evidence of presentation for payment, which defendant claims is a necessary element of
uttering and publishing.
1
Indeed, the trial court issued a lengthy written opinion detailing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and explaining its rationale for resolving the disputed issues in the case. A
review of that opinion discloses that the court was not improperly influenced by the prior acts
evidence.
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The trial court convicted defendant of violating MCL 750.249, which at the time the
offenses arose provided2:
Any person who shall utter and publish as true, any false, forged, altered
or counterfeit record, deed, instrument or other writing mentioned in the
preceding section, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeit,
with intent to injure or defraud as aforesaid, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 14 years.
Defendant’s reliance on People v Hammond, 161 Mich App 719, 722; 411 NW2d 837 (1987),
People v Grable, 95 Mich App 20, 24; 289 NW2d 871 (1980), People v Fudge, 66 Mich App
625, 631; 239 NW2d 686 (1976), and People v Kimble, 60 Mich App 690, 694; 233 NW2d 26
(1975), to argue that presentation for payment is a necessary element of uttering and publishing
is misplaced. Unlike this case, each of those cases involved instruments that were capable of
being presented for payment. But the statute itself does not contain any “presentation for
payment” requirement. Rather, the crime is committed by (1) uttering and publishing as true (2)
a false, forged, altered, or counterfeit (3) record, deed, instrument, or other writing mentioned in
MCL 750.248 (counterfeit financial transaction device), (4) with the intent to injure or defraud.
To “utter and publish” means to offer something as if it is real, whether or not anyone accepts it
as real. People v Harrison, 283 Mich App 374, 381-382; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). Indeed, this
Court has held that a defendant may be convicted of uttering and publishing a false or forged
record (that is not capable of being presented for payment) with the intent to defraud. See
People v Cassadime, 258 Mich App 395, 399; 671 NW2d 559 (2003), and People v Carter, 106
Mich App 765, 768; 309 NW2d 33 (1981). Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
the evidence here supported an inference that defendant offered as real three false financial
records with the intent to defraud. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
for a directed verdict with respect to the three counts of uttering and publishing.
Defendant also argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the racketeering
charge. The elements of this offense are described as follows in People v Martin, 271 Mich App
280, 289; 721 NW2d 815 (2006):
In order to prove a racketeering violation, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was employed by, or associated
with, an enterprise and knowingly conducted or participated in the affairs of the
enterprise directly or indirectly through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Pursuant to MCL 750.159f(c), a pattern of racketeering activity means the
commission of not less than two incidents of racketeering, to which all of the
following characteristics apply:
2
After defendant was convicted, MCL 750.249 was amended by 2008 PA 378, effective
December 23, 2008.
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“(i) The incidents have the same or a substantially similar purpose, result,
participant, victim, or method of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated acts.
(ii) The incidents amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.
(iii) At least 1 of the incidents occurred within this state on or after the
effective date of the amendatory act that added this section, and the last of the
incidents occurred within 10 years after the commission of any prior incident,
excluding any period of imprisonment served by a person engaging in the
racketeering activity.”
“Racketeering” is further defined as “committing, attempting to commit,
conspiring to commit, or aiding or abetting, soliciting, coercing, or intimidating a
person to commit” certain enumerated offenses for financial gain. Hence, the
prosecution must normally prove the commission of each element of the predicate
acts of racketeering, in addition to the other elements of racketeering, in order to
prove a racketeering violation. [Citations omitted.]
Here, defendant contends that his actions did not amount to, or pose a threat of, continued
criminal activity, as required by 750.159f(c). The evidence showed that defendant participated
in the enterprise by providing false financial documents to different entities and investigators on
multiple occasions over a lengthy span of time. This evidence is clearly sufficient to support a
conviction for racketeering. Therefore, the trial court also properly denied defendant’s motion
for a directed verdict with respect to the racketeering count.
IV. Claims of Bias
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because of judicial bias. Because
defendant did not object to the trial court’s conduct or move to disqualify the trial court below,
this issue is not preserved. Therefore, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A party claiming judicial bias bears a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of
judicial impartiality. In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151; 486 NW2d 326
(1992). Portions of the record may not be taken out of context in an attempt to show a trial
court’s bias; rather, the record is reviewed as a whole. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336,
340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
Here, the record does not support defendant’s claim of judicial bias. Though defendant
argues that the trial court sometimes interrupted counsel to ask questions, a trial court is
permitted to question witnesses to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant testimony, and
the court has greater discretion in questioning witnesses in a bench trial. In re Forfeiture of
$1,159,420, supra at 153. Nothing about the trial court’s questioning indicates bias. We also
reject defendant’s argument that his claim of bias is supported by the trial court’s rulings against
him. Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a claim of
bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 440; 664 NW2d 231 (2003).
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Here, defendant focuses on two evidentiary rulings concerning the relevancy of testimony. Both
rulings were made in response to a party’s objection, and the court’s decisions were based on the
purpose and nature of the proposed testimony. Nothing about the court’s rulings reflects any
favoritism or antagonism by the trial judge. Thus, we find no merit to this issue.
V. Sentence
Defendant avers that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court improperly
considered victims of financial loss as victims for purposes of offense variable (OV) 9, MCL
777.39, and therefore erred in scoring 25 points for this variable on the basis that there were ten
or more victims. Because defendant did not object to the scoring of OV 9 on this basis below,
this issue is not preserved. People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414, 417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006).
However, we may review the issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 312; 684 NW2d 669 (2004).
We agree that the trial court plainly erred in scoring 25 points for OV 9. A trial court
must score the sentencing guidelines under the version of the guidelines in effect on the date the
crime was committed. MCL 769.34(2). The guidelines were scored for defendant’s racketeering
conviction. Defendant was charged with racketeering based on conduct committed in 2005 and
2006. Under the version of the guidelines in effect at that time, 25 points were to be scored for
OV 9 if there were ten or more victims, MCL 777.39(1)(b), but only persons at risk of physical
injury, and not financial injury, were to be counted as a victim for purposes of OV 9. People v
Melton, 271 Mich App 590, 595-596; 722 NW2d 698 (2006). Because there is no evidence that
any person was placed in danger of physical injury or loss of life, 0 points should have been
scored for OV 9, and the trial court plainly erred in scoring 25 points for this variable. Further,
the error affects defendant’s substantial rights because it affects the appropriate guidelines range.
Therefore, resentencing is required. People v Sargent, 481 Mich 346, 351; 750 NW2d 161
(2008).
We disagree with plaintiff that MCL 777.39, as amended by 2006 PA 548 to expressly
allow victims of financial loss to be counted as victims for purposes of OV 9, applies to this case.
The amendment was effective March 30, 2007. Plaintiff contends that the amendment applies
because the amended information listed an offense date of “01/01/2003 – 04/30/2007.”
However, the racketeering count, for which the guidelines were scored, charged defendant with
“knowingly conduct[ing] or participat[ing] in the affairs of the enterprise directly or indirectly
through a pattern of racketeering activity, consisting of two or more of the following incidents of
racketeering, to wit . . . .” Each alleged incident of racketeering listed in the amended
information involved conduct committed in either 2005 or 2006. Similarly, the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law reveal that it found defendant guilty of racketeering based
on conduct committed in 2005 and 2006. Thus, the date of the crime of which defendant was
convicted precedes the effective date of MCL 777.39 as amended.
Defendant’s convictions are affirmed but his sentences are vacated and we remand for
resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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