PEOPLE OF MI V AARON TERENCE TAYLOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 25, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283747
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 07-006709-FH
AARON TERENCE TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of maintaining a drug house, MCL
333.7405(1)(d). He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to a
prison term of 34 to 180 months. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues that his right of confrontation was violated by a police officer’s
testimony concerning statements purportedly made by a nontestifying confidential informant that
drug trafficking was occurring at the house where defendant lived with his mother and that
“Aaron” had sold him cocaine. Defendant further argues that defense counsel’s failure to object
to this testimony deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel.
This Court reviews defendant’s unpreserved constitutional claim for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999);
People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 631; 683 NW2d 687 (2004). With regard to defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because defendant did not move for an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), this Court’s review
is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566
NW2d 649 (1997). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and he must
“overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s action constituted sound trial strategy under
the circumstances.” People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Defendant
must also demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different . . . .” Id. at 302-303 (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
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The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements
unless the declarant was unavailable for trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination. People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing Crawford
v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). Only “testimonial
statements” implicate the Confrontation Clause. Davis v Washington, 547 US 813; 126 S Ct
2266; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006). “A statement by a confidential informant to the authorities
generally constitutes a testimonial statement.” Chambers, supra at 10, citing United States v
Cromer, 389 F3d 662, 675 (CA 6, 2004). See also United States v McGee, 529 F3d 691, 697698 (CA 6, 2008).
Although we agree with defendant that admission of the officer’s testimony concerning
the confidential informant’s statements was plain error, defendant has not shown that admission
of this testimony affected his substantial rights. The location of drug paraphernalia found in the
home indicated that defendant’s room was the situs for drug-related activities, and defendant’s
testimony indicated that he was aware that drugs were being used in the house. Although the
confidential informant’s statements were probative of defendant’s identity as the seller, a
conviction for maintaining a drug house does not require proof that the defendant was involved
in the transactions. For example, in People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 152-153; 585 NW2d
341 (1998), the defendant was convicted where he admitted that he knew that drug deals were
occurring in the house he shared with others, and drug paraphernalia and a shotgun were located
in the room where he and another man were found at the time of the raid. We are not persuaded
that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the informant’s statements
through the officer’s testimony. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to relief with respect to this
unpreserved issue.
We likewise reject defendant’s related claim that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to this testimony. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that
counsel’s failure to object was a matter of trial strategy. Defense counsel repeatedly emphasized
differences between defendant’s appearance and the description allegedly provided by the
informant, who described the seller as bald and younger than defendant. Defense counsel noted
the discrepancies in his opening statement, during his cross-examination of the police officer,
and again in closing argument. Defense counsel may have made the strategic decision to allow
the officer’s testimony concerning the informant’s statements to support defendant’s theory that
he was not the seller, despite the incriminating items found in defendant’s bedroom. In addition,
for the reasons previously explained, defendant cannot establish a reasonable probability that but
for counsel’s failure to object, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Toma,
supra at 302-303.
Defendant also argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the prosecutor
elicited details about his prior drug-related convictions. Although defendant frames this issue as
a constitutional issue, his argument presents an evidentiary issue. To preserve an evidentiary
issue for appellate review, the party opposing the evidence must object at trial and state the same
ground for objection as the party asserts on appeal, unless the specific ground is apparent from
the context. MRE 103(a)(1); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
In this case, defendant did not state the ground for his objection on the record below and the
specific ground is not apparent from the context of the record. Even if it was apparent that the
prosecution was attempting to elicit evidence concerning defendant’s prior drug activities, it is
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not clear on what basis defendant was claiming that the evidence was inadmissible. Defendant’s
claim that the evidence was inadmissible character evidence is not the only possibility. In fact,
defendant had previously asked the trial court “to bar any 404(B) evidence in this case for failure
to comply with the rules of discovery in providing me that information.” Defendant’s
unspecified objection was insufficient to preserve this issue for appeal. Accordingly, defendant
must demonstrate a “plain error” under Carines, supra, to avoid forfeiture of the issue.
To be admissible under MRE 404(b)(1), other acts evidence generally must satisfy three
requirements: (1) it must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) it must be relevant, and (3) its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). During the challenged line of
questioning, the prosecutor elicited that defendant had been arrested twice for possession with
intent to deliver cocaine and once for possession of cocaine. The evidence of defendant’s prior
involvement with drugs was probative of defendant’s awareness that baggies, digital scales,
razors, and trays were used in drug trafficking. Thus, the evidence was admissible for a proper
purpose under MRE 404(b)(1). With respect to relevance, this Court inquires whether the
evidence was material and probative. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785
(1998). Defendant’s knowledge of ongoing drug activities was material in this prosecution for
keeping and maintaining a drug house. Defendant’s prior drug involvement was probative of his
knowledge that the baggies, scale, razor, and plate suggested ongoing drug activities in the home.
Although defendant contends that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
probative value of the evidence, the alleged imbalance was not so evident that any error could be
deemed “plain,” i.e., clear or obvious, as is necessary to satisfy Carines, supra.
Moreover, this case is comparable to People v Potra, 191 Mich App 503, 512; 479 NW2d
707 (1991), in which defense counsel did not object to testimony concerning prior drug
transactions between the defendant and the informant, and admitted to the trial court that he
purposely allowed the evidence so that he could use it to attack the informant’s credibility. This
Court stated, “Defendant may not now claim as error on appeal that evidence he purposely used
in support of his defense theory was inadmissible.” Here, defendant explored his criminal record
in great detail and attempted to show that he was a changed man, who had not had any positive
drug screens since he was paroled. He purposely used evidence of his past drug involvement and
contrasted it to the situation existing at the time of his arrest to support his claim that he was not
responsible for any drug trafficking at the home. Because defendant contributed to any prejudice
resulting from the evidence, he is not entitled to appellate relief.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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