RVP DEVELOPMENT CORP V FURNESS GOLF CONSTRUCTION INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FURNESS GOLF CONSTRUCTION, INC., f/k/a
CASTLE ROCK COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 2009
Plaintiff,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279398
Manistee Circuit Court
LC No. 00-009766-CH
RVP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________
RVP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
FURNESS GOLF CONSTRUCTION, INC., f/k/a
CASTLE ROCK COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant,
and
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Intervening Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Zahra, JJ.
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No. 279399
Manistee Circuit Court
LC No. 00-09791-CK
PER CURIAM.
RVP Development Corporation (RVP) appeals as of right a June 27, 2007 monetary
judgment entered on an award of case evaluation sanctions in favor of intervening defendant
Transcontinental Insurance Company, a/k/a CNA. Specifically, RVP claims CNA is not entitled
to any case evaluation sanctions because the trial court erred when it granted CNA the right to
intervene in this litigation to pursue case evaluation sanctions against RVP and because the trial
court erroneously set aside a satisfaction of judgment entered between RVP and Furness Golf
Construction, Inc. (Furness) that settled the matter of case evaluation sanctions. Alternatively,
RVP argues that even if CNA is deemed to be entitled to case evaluation sanctions, CNA’s
subrogation right is expressly limited to the recovery of amounts it actually paid to provide
counsel to Furness, its insured. Thus, RVP concludes, the trial court erred when it awarded
monetary sanctions that exceeded the total amount of attorneys’ fees actually paid by CNA. We
affirm the order granting CNA the right to intervene in order to pursue case evaluation sanctions
against RVP. We also affirm the order setting aside the satisfaction of judgment between RVP
and Furness. However, we reverse the monetary judgment based on the award of case evaluation
sanctions. We conclude CNA’s subrogation rights were contractually limited to the recovery of
payments actually made on behalf of its insured, Furness. Thus, the trial court erred in entering
judgment in an amount in excess of the actual attorneys’ fees paid by CNA. We remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Furness was retained by RVP to construct one of Michigan’s most beautiful golf courses,
Arcadia Bluffs. CNA provided liability insurance coverage for Furness. On September 26,
1988, a severe rainstorm passed over the golf course in the midst of construction, causing
substantial erosion damage and giving rise to two lawsuits. In January 2000, Furness brought
suit against RVP to collect $546,123.98 that was retained by RVP under the Construction Lien
Act, MCL 570.1101 et seq. In February 2000, RVP filed suit against Furness, seeking $4.5
million in damages that allegedly resulted from negligence and a breach of contract by Furness.
In accordance with the terms of its liability insurance policy with Furness, CNA retained
the law firm of Plunkett & Cooney to defend Furness in the negligence/breach of contract action.
The lower court consolidated the two lawsuits and tried them together. The jury rendered a
verdict of no cause of action in RVP’s negligence/breach of contract case. The jury also found in
favor of Furness in the construction lien case and a judgment was entered awarding Furness
$527,464.34, plus interest. Further, because RVP rejected the case evaluation, the trial court
awarded Furness case evaluation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) in the amount of
$330,188.00, plus costs and interest. The trial court arrived at this amount after determining that
$385 was a reasonable hourly rate for counsel representing Furness.
RVP claimed an appeal as of right in this Court. This Court affirmed the judgment of no
cause of action in the negligence/breach of contract case, as well as the judgment in favor of
Furness in the construction lien case. However, this Court found that the evidence did not
support the trial court’s finding that $385 per hour was a reasonable hourly billing rate for
Furness’s counsel. This Court issued an unpublished per curiam opinion on August 3, 2004, that
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reversed the award of case evaluation sanctions and remanded “to the trial court to determine
reasonable attorneys’ fees under MCR 2.403 . . .”1
In a letter dated November 18, 2004, the president and sole shareholder of Furness, Tim
Furness, authorized attorney Clay Ottoni2 to reach a negotiated settlement of any remaining
issues with RVP. In the letter, Tim Furness apprised Ottoni that he had instructed Plunkett &
Cooney to have no further contact with RVP’s attorneys in connection with settling any of the
pending issues, “including the amount of case evaluation sanctions that RVP may be required to
pay.”
On April 18, 2005, RVP and Furness entered into a settlement agreement. The
agreement included the provision that RVP would pay $100,000 to Glenn Arden, who is the
father-in-law of Tim Furness and who was identified as the assignee of Thumb National Bank, a
creditor of Furness. A satisfaction of judgment was filed in the trial court on May 9, 2005,
releasing the parties “from all claims for further fees and costs.” CNA was not provided with
notice of the satisfaction of judgment.
On May 16, 2005, Plunkett & Cooney, acting on behalf of CNA and in a manner
arguably inconsistent with the interests of its client, Furness, filed a motion to set aside the
satisfaction of judgment. Plunkett & Cooney posited that the satisfaction of judgment entered
between RVP and its client, Furness, was “void” and “bogus.” Plunkett & Cooney asserted that
Furness had “absolutely no right to give up any attorney fees claim in this case.”
The trial court granted CNA’s motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment and
allowed CNA to intervene. The trial court concluded that CNA had subrogation rights pursuant
to its contract of insurance with Furness that permitted CNA to assert the right to recover case
evaluation sanctions. Thereafter, RVP moved for summary disposition asserting that CNA’s
subrogation claim (for case evaluation sanctions) was limited to the amount it actually paid.
RVP argued that CNA actually paid Plunkett & Cooney an attorney fee of $115 per hour. CNA
responded that RVP did not have standing to raise any issues with regard to the contract between
Furness and CNA. It also argued that CNA had the right, pursuant to its insurance contract and
the case evaluation court rule, to recover reasonable attorney fees. CNA also raised equitable
subrogation in the alternative.
The trial court concluded that RVP had the right to be heard regarding the reasonableness
of the attorney fees, but that RVP did not have standing under the insurance contract between
CNA and Furness to argue that attorney fees should be limited to the attorney fees actually paid.
Thus, the trial court concluded that CNA’s general subrogation rights, together with the court
rule on case evaluation sanctions, entitled CNA to reasonable attorney fees. In the alternative,
1
Unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, entered August 3, 2004 (Docket Nos.
241125 and 241126). The Supreme Court denied RVP’s application for leave to appeal.
Furness Golf Construction, Inc. v RVP Development Corp, 472 Mich 894; 695 NW2d 76 (2005).
2
Ottoni was the corporate attorney for Furness.
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the trial court concluded that even if RVP had standing to object to the amount of attorney fees
under the contract, that equitable subrogation entitled CNA to recover reasonable attorney fees
and not merely actual attorneys fees.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney fees. Following the
evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the evidence supported a finding that $385 per
hour was a reasonable hourly rate for the services provided by Plunkett & Cooney in this case.
This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. The Intervention of CNA and the Setting Aside of the Satisfaction of Judgment
This Court has previously considered RVP’s claims on these matters. “The law of the
case doctrine provides that ‘if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the
case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not
be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain
materially the same.’” City of Kalamazoo v Department of Corrections, 229 Mich App 132, 135;
580 NW2d 475 (1998), quoting CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428; 454, 302
NW2d 164 (1981). However, “the law of the case doctrine does not operate as a limitation on
the power of appellate courts, but rather as a discretionary rule of practice.” Id. at 135-136,
citing Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 109, 476 NW2d 112 (1991).
In RVP Development Corp v Furness Golf Construction, Inc, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered October 27, 2006 (Docket Nos. 272919, 272920), a panel of this Court
considered RVP’s applications for leave to appeal the order granting CNA’s motion to set aside
the satisfaction of judgment entered between RVP and Furness. This Court denied RVP’s
applications “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” Id. In RVP Development Corp v
Furness Golf Construction, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 27,
2006 (Docket Nos. 272721, 272723); a panel of this Court considered RVP’s application for
leave to appeal from an order granting CNA’s motion to intervene in order to pursue case
evaluation sanctions against RVP. This Court denied RVP’s applications “for lack of merit in
the grounds presented.” Id.
As reflected in the language of these orders it is clear that “in determining how to dispose
of [these] application[s] for leave to appeal, [this Court] look[ed] to the merits of the claims
made in the application.” Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605, 610; 125 S Ct 2582; 162 L Ed 2d
552 (2005). A denial on the merits becomes the law of the case. Grievance Administrator v
Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000). Here, this Court clearly addressed RVP’s
claims in regard to setting aside the satisfaction of judgment and the motion to intervene.
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Accordingly, we will not revisit these issues since they were raised and in prior appeals and
another panel of this Court determined that these issues were without legal merit.
B. The Judgment Entered in Favor of CNA
The only issue raised anew in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by awarding
CNA case evaluation sanctions in an amount higher than the amount of attorney fees actually
paid by CNA.3
1. Standard of Review
A trial court's grant of case evaluation sanctions is subject to de novo review on appeal.
Elia v Hazen, 242 Mich App 374, 376-377; 619 NW2d 1 (2000). However, a trial court's
determination of reasonable attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 377;
Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich App 179, 197; 667 NW2d 887 (2003). An abuse of discretion will
be found where the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, reaches a result that is outside the
range of principle outcomes. Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006).
Additionally, “[a]n error of law may lead a trial court to abuse its discretion.” Gawlik v
Rengachary, 270 Mich App 1, 8-9; 714 NW2d 386 (2006). As a general matter, a court “‘by
definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.’” People v Giovannini, 271 Mich
App 409, 417; 722 NW2d 237 (2006), quoting Koon v United States, 518 US 81; 100, 116 S Ct
2035; 135 L Ed 2d 392 (1996).
2. Standing
CNA argues, and the trial court concluded, that RVP lacked standing to claim CNA’s
subrogation rights were limited to recovering attorneys’ fees actually paid by CNA. We
disagree. We conclude the trial court committed an error of law when it concluded that RVP
lacks legal standing to challenge the scope of CNA’s subrogation rights.
Standing is a legal term used to denote the existence of a party’s interest in the
outcome of litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. However,
evidence that a party will engage in full and vigorous advocacy, by itself, is
insufficient to establish standing. Standing requires a demonstration that the
3
In attacking the merits of the monetary judgment entered against it, RVP also claims: (1) CNA
did not satisfy the contractual conditions necessary to become subrogated to the rights of
Furness; and (2) even if subrogation applies, CNA would stand in the shoes of Furness, which
has already released the subrogated claim and filed a satisfaction of judgment. RVP further
argues that if subrogation applies but the release of RVP is not honored, CNA’s claim would still
be subordinate to the claim of Glenn Arden, Thumb National Bank’s assignee, because Furness
granted Thumb National Bank a first security interest in all its assets—including its right to
collect case evaluation sanctions. RVP therefore asserts that it acted properly in paying Arden,
who perfected his secured position before CNA asserted its subrogation claim. Significantly, all
of these arguments were presented in the prior appeals. Therefore we decline to consider them
again in this appeal.
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plaintiff's substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different
from the citizenry at large. [House Speaker v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547,
554; 495 NW2d 539 (1993).]
RVP is not denied standing merely because it is not a party to the insurance contract.
While a stranger to a contract generally cannot maintain a claim for breach of the contract, First
Security Savings Bank v Aitken, 226 Mich App 291, 305; 573 NW2d 307 (1997), overruled on
other grounds, Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1998), the issue in
the present case does not relate to a breach of the agreement. Rather, the issue is whether the
terms of the subrogation provision of the contract permit CNA to recover an amount greater than
the amount actually paid by CNA. On that issue, RVP, which is the party that must ultimately
pay any award, has a substantial interest that is singularly unique and on which it has every
reason to ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Therefore, CNA's claim that RVP does not
have standing to challenge the scope of CNA’s subrogation rights is without merit.
3. CNA’s Contractual Subrogation Rights
RVP argues that CNA’s subrogation claim was limited to the amount of fees and costs
actually paid by CNA in providing counsel to Furness. We agree.
CNA’s subrogation rights are derived from the policy of insurance it issued to its insured,
Furness. An insurance policy is a contractual agreement that must be interpreted pursuant to the
law of contracts. Citizens Ins Co v Pro-Seal Serv Group, Inc, 477 Mich 75, 82; 730 NW2d 682
(2007); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 566; 489 NW2d 431 (1992); Tenneco
Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 444; 761 NW2d 846 (2008). The primary goal
in the interpretation of a contract is to honor the intent of the parties, Klapp v United Ins Group
Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 473; 663 NW2d 447 (2003); Tenneco Inc, supra at 444, and when
presented with a dispute, a court must determine what the parties’ agreement is and enforce it,
Shefman v Auto Owners Ins Co, 262 Mich App 631, 637; 687 NW2d 300 (2004). The
contractual language is to be given its ordinary and plain meaning, and technical and constrained
constructions should be avoided. Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 47; 664 NW2d
776 (2003); Berkeypile v Westfield Ins Co, 280 Mich App 172, 178; 760 NW2d 624 (2008);
Singer v American States Ins, 245 Mich App 370, 374; 631 NW2d 34 (2001). An insurance
contract is clear if it fairly admits of but one interpretation. Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Nikkel,
460 Mich 558, 566; 596 NW2d 915 (1999); Hellebuyck v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 262 Mich
App 250, 254; 685 NW2d 684 (2004). If an insurance contract’s language is clear, its
construction is a question of law for the court. Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460
Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999).
Section IV, subpart 8 of the insurance policy between CNA and Furness provided, in
pertinent part:
If the insured has rights to recover all or part of any payment we have made
under this Coverage Part, those rights are transferred to us. The insured must do
nothing after loss to impair them. At our request, the insured will bring “suit” or
transfer those rights to us and help us enforce them. [Emphasis added.]
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Significantly, the above quoted language is clear and easily understood. Stated in the simplest of
terms, this language provides that when Furness gained the right to recover attorneys’ fees
pursuant to the case evaluation court rule, CNA was vested with the right to recover “all or part”
of the fees it paid to provide Furness with counsel. We reject CNA’s claim that this provision
grants it the right to pursue all case evaluation sanctions the trial court may impose. Such an
interpretation is unsupported by the express language of the insurance contract.
We also reject the argument, embraced by the trial court, that the purpose and the intent
of the case evaluation court rule enhances and expands CNA’s contractual subrogation rights. A
court rule cannot modify the rights and duties of a clear and unambiguous contract that is not in
violation of public policy. Farmers Ins Exch v Kurzmann, 257 Mich App 412, 418; 668 NW2d
199 (2003). Here, CNA’s right to recover is not expanded by the case evaluation court rule;
rather, CNA’s right to recover is limited by the clear and unambiguous contract of insurance it
issued to Furness.
4. Equitable Subrogation
CNA also argues that it possesses a right to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees under the
court rule pursuant to the doctrine of equitable subrogation. We disagree.
Equitable subrogation is a very narrow principle that has been described as follows:
“[E]quitable subrogation is a legal fiction through which a person who pays a debt
for which another is primarily responsible is substituted or subrogated to all the
rights and remedies of the other.” Auto-Owners Ins v Amoco Production, 468
Mich 53, 59; 658 NW2d 460 (2003), quoting Commercial Union Ins Co v
Medical Protective Co, 426 Mich 109, 117; 393 NW2d 479 (1986) (opinion by
Williams, C.J.) The doctrine of equitable subrogation is best understood as
allowing a wronged party to stand in the place of the client, assuming specific
conditions are met. Those conditions are: (1) a special relationship must exist
between the client and the third party in which the potential for conflicts of
interest is eliminated because the interests of the two are merged with regard to
the particular issue where negligence of counsel is alleged, (2) the third party
must lack any other available legal remedy, and (3) the third party must not be a
“mere volunteer,” i.e., the damage must have been incurred as a consequence of
the third party’s fulfillment of a legal or equitable duty the third party owed to the
client. [Beaty, v Hertzberg & Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 254-255; 571 NW2d
716 (1997) (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted).]
Applying the above legal principles to the present case, we conclude CNA does not
possess any rights under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. First, CNA is not a “wronged
party.” By awarding it only actual attorney fees it will get exactly what it contracted to
receive—subrogation of the amount it paid to provide its insured with legal counsel. Second,
CNA has available a legal remedy— an action for contractual subrogation. It has long been
understood that “equity will not imply a contract in law where an express contract exists.”
Ramirez v Bureau of State Lottery, 186 Mich App 275, 285; 463 NW2d 245 (1990) (holding that
equity will not interfere where a legal remedy is available); see also LaBour v Michigan Nat
Bank, 335 Mich 298, 302; 55 NW2d 838 (1952) (“It is fundamental that equity follow the law.”).
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Since CNA has an express contractual subrogation agreement, it cannot rely on equity to claim
more than it is entitled to under its insurance contract.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the order granting CNA the right to intervene. We affirm the order setting
aside the satisfaction of judgment between RVP and Furness. We reverse the monetary
judgment entered against RVP and in favor of CNA. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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