PEOPLE OF MI V DANTE ERIC WELLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 9, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279714
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 06-030628-FH
DANTE ERIC WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Donofrio and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of receiving or concealing stolen property in excess of
$1000.00, MCL 750.535(3)(a), and was sentenced to 28 to 90 months in prison. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements to the police. He does not dispute that he signed a form acknowledging that he
understood his Miranda rights1 and that he wanted to talk to a police officer. However, he
claims he requested an attorney before initialing the agreement to talk, and that he continued to
request an attorney. The trial court found, consistent with testimony from the detectives who
dealt with defendant, that defendant never specifically said he wanted to talk to an attorney.
Rather, he said he eventually wanted a lawyer, but first wanted to sleep, to learn what deal the
prosecutor would offer, and to then resume talking with the detectives. These findings were not
clearly erroneous. People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001).
In People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 710-711; 703 NW2d 204 (2005), this Court
stated:
[T]he defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel must be unequivocal. Davis v
United States, 512 US 452, 457; 114 S Ct 2350; 129 L Ed 2d 362 (1994). “[I]f a
suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that
1
See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require
the cessation of questioning.” Id. at 459.
At a minimum, defendant’s statements were ambiguous and, at best, would have indicated he
might want counsel present. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
Defendant next argues that the evidence did not support a finding that the property at
issue, the money-changing machine, was worth more than $1000.00. There is no merit to
defendant’s claim that the representative of the company that owned the machine equivocated
regarding the value. The witness clearly stated that, although used, the machine was a “very
usable piece of equipment on the market” and that, despite its age, it was worth “roughly”
$1500.00.
Defendant next argues that he was entitled to jail credit for the time he served in jail
while the instant matter was pending. It is not clear, however, whether defendant is requesting
credit against his sentence on this offense, or on the offense for which he was on parole at the
time he committed the present crime. He appears to suggest that the credit should apply to this
sentence even though the crime was committed while he was on parole because parole
revocation proceedings might not be pursued and then the time served would not be applied to
his paroled offense.2 In People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705; 686 NW2d 821 (2004), this
Court held that when “a parolee is arrested for a new criminal offense, he is held on a parole
detainer until he is convicted of that offense, and he is not entitled to credit for time served in jail
on the sentence for the new offense.” See also MCL 769.11b. This rule applies even if prison
authorities do not pursue parole violation proceedings. People v Stewart, 203 Mich App 432,
434; 513 NW2d 147 (1994). Defendant is not entitled to credit on the sentence imposed in this
case.
If defendant is requesting jail credit against the prior sentence on the offense for which he
was on parole, he has already received credit for that time. Although defendant was on parole,
he was still considered to be in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections. As noted by
this Court in People v Johnson, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 279163,
decided April 14, 2009), “The only time a defendant stops accruing time toward his ultimate
discharge from the Department of Corrections is when a parolee has a warrant issued for a parole
violation, and the parolee remains at large.” See also MCL 791.238. A check of the trial court
record does not reveal that defendant was ever on absconder status as a parolee. Accordingly,
defendant continued to accrue time toward his maximum sentence on the offense for which he
was on parole. Defendant has failed to demonstrate entitlement to any relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
2
Defendant was on parole for an armed robbery conviction. Parole revocation is mandatory for
certain enumerated violent felonies. See MCL 791.240a(2) and MCL 791.236(18) Armed
robbery, of course, is a felony requiring mandatory revocation of parole.
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