WAYNE KELPIEN V CITY OF GREENVILLE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WAYNE KELPIEN and GLORIA KELPIEN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 28, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V
Nos. 285290, 285319
Montcalm Circuit Court
LC No. 08-010036-CH
CITY OF GREENVILLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Talbot and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, defendant appeals by right from the circuit court’s order
denying its motion for summary disposition predicated on governmental immunity in connection
with claims of trespass and nuisance, and appeals by leave granted from that same order’s denial
of its motion for summary disposition predicated on lack of evidentiary support in connection
with a claim that it failed to respond properly to a request under the Freedom of Information Act1
(FOIA). We reverse and remand for further proceedings. This appeal has been decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Facts
Defendant engaged a private entity to install a water test well in a public right of way
fronting land owned by plaintiffs. Asserting that the well and its installation intruded on their
property rights, plaintiffs asked defendant to remove it, but without success. On January 4, 2008,
plaintiffs filed a FOIA request for “information on the test water well labeled MW2 located on
our 80.85 acres, located at address 62511 South Fitzner Road.” Defendant, through its City
Manager, timely replied with a letter stating that no such well was located on plaintiffs’ property,
but adding that a well labeled MW2 was “located in the Right-Of-Way of Fitzner Road in that
vicinity.” Plaintiffs then, on January 18, 2008, filed a FOIA request for information relating to
the well described in defendant’s letter, but five days later filed the instant action.
1
MCL 15.231 et seq.
-1-
The complaint, styled as one for quiet title, sets forth claims of trespass, nuisance in fact,
and nuisance per se, with a fourth count seeking attorney fees and costs in connection with the
first FOIA request. Defendant reports that, in light of the lawsuit, it hesitated to disclose
information relating to it, see MCL 15.243(v), but in time defendant complied with plaintiffs’
second FOIA request, apparently to plaintiffs’ satisfaction.
Defendant sought summary disposition, citing governmental immunity in connection
with the tort claims, and asserting that there was no material question of fact that defendant had
properly responded to the first FOIA request. The trial court denied the motions without
prejudice, on the grounds that they were premature and that further discovery was required.
II. Standards of Review
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo as a
question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999).
MCR 2.116(C)(7) authorizes motions for summary disposition premised upon “immunity
granted by law . . . .” A motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity is
decided by examining all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting all wellpleaded allegations as true, and construing all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 87; 687 NW2d 333 (2004).
“In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings,
admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists
to warrant a trial.” Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004).
III. Trespass and Nuisance
Governmental agencies in this state are generally immune from tort liability for actions
taken in furtherance of governmental functions. MCL 691.1407(1). Plaintiffs cite none of the
statutory exceptions to governmental immunity in support of their tort claims, but argue that
immunity does not apply because defendant exceeded its governmental authority in placing a
water testing well on a roadway. The trial court, citing Cleveland v Detroit, 324 Mich 527; 37
NW2d 625 (1949), agreed that there was a question of fact whether defendant’s installation of a
test well to monitor ground water quality constituted a lawful use of the highway.
Cleveland concerned a municipality’s use of the subsurface of a public street for a
parking structure. The plaintiff owned land abutting the street and asserted ownership rights to
the street’s middle, subject to the public easement for uses consistent with a roadway, and argued
that the underground parking structure exceeded the scope of that easement. Id. at 529-530. The
Supreme Court held that it need not concern itself with whether the plaintiff in fact had
ownership rights to the middle of the boulevard, on the ground that the use in question was fully
consistent with any public highway easement to which that claim of ownership was subject. Id.
at 535-536. The Court reiterated caselaw to the effect that the customary rights of the public in
streets had long extended beyond mere passage and repassage, noting that “‘with the growth of
population in our cities have come increased needs for heating, lighting, draining, sewerage,
water, et cetera, and with these has come also a corresponding extension of the public rights in
-2-
the streets.’” Id., quoting Detroit City Railway v Mills, 85 Mich 634, 653; 48 NW 1007 (1891).
The Cleveland Court further noted that sewers were dug, soil removed, and culverts and drains
constructed, all without any duty to compensate abutting landowners. “‘It may now be
considered the well-settled rule that the streets of a city may be used for any purpose which is a
necessary public one, and the abutting owner will not be entitled to a new compensation, in the
absence of a statute giving it.’” Cleveland, supra at 536, quoting Detroit City Railway, supra.
Whether an abutting landowner owns to the center of the street or not, he or she has no
cognizable complaint over such uses provided only that he or she retains convenient ingress and
egress. Cleveland, supra at 536.
We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate that the placement of a
water testing well, the purpose of which is to monitor groundwater quality, is similar in character
and fully consistent with such uses as constructing sewers and drains. A “governmental
function” is “an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution,
statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.” MCL 691.1401(f). Municipalities are
authorized by both statute and constitution to operate such public utilities as water and sewage
departments, and so enjoy governmental immunity in connection with doing so. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co v Corby Energy Services, Inc, 271 Mich App 480, 483-484; 722 NW2d 906
(2006), citing Const 1963, art 7 § 24; MCL 117.4f(c). Monitoring of groundwater quality
potentially relates to operation of either utility. Further, MCL 117.4h(4) authorizes a city to
provide in its charter for “the use, control and regulation of streams, waters and water courses
within its boundaries . . . .” A municipality’s explicit authorization to provide water and sewage,
and to control or regulate water courses, impliedly authorizes the installation and use of water
testing wells.
Plaintiffs characterize as ultra vires defendant’s actions in issuing a permit for a private
entity to install the water testing well in the portion of the public roadway over which plaintiffs
claim ownership rights. However, “ultra vires activity is not activity that a governmental agency
performs in an unauthorized manner. Instead, it is activity that the governmental agency lacks
legal authority to perform in any manner.” Richardson v Jackson Co, 432 Mich 377, 387; 443
NW2d 105 (1989) (footnote omitted). As discussed above, operating a water testing well is duly
authorized municipal activity.
For these reasons, governmental immunity applies to bar plaintiffs’ tort claims. This
applies to their claims for injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. See Jackson Co Drain
Comm’r v Village of Stockbridge, 270 Mich App 273, 283-284; 717 NW2d 391 (2006). The trial
court thus erred in denying defendant summary disposition on those claims.
IV. FOIA
A prevailing party in a FOIA suit is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees,
costs, and disbursements. MCL 15.240(6). A plaintiff prevails for this purpose if the action was
reasonably necessary to compel disclosure, and if the action had a substantial causative effect on
the delivery of the information to the plaintiff. Local Area Watch v Grand Rapids, 262 Mich
App 136, 149; 683 NW2d 745 (2004). See also Scharret v City of Berkley, 249 Mich App 405,
414; 642 NW2d 685 (2002). Whether a defendant’s actions were reasonable is no defense to a
prevailing party’s claim for attorney fees. Local Area Watch, supra at 150.
-3-
At issue here is defendant’s response to plaintiffs’ first January 4, 2008, FOIA request,
not the request that followed on January 18. The trial court opined that defendant’s compliance
with that request could not be determined without further discovery to establish the extent of
plaintiffs’ ownership of the land upon which the subject well was installed, citing Werner v Hinz,
172 Mich 360; 137 NW 662 (1912) and Hall v Wantz, 336 Mich 112; 57 NW2d 462 (1953),2 and
whether this action was reasonably necessary to cause defendant to deliver the information
sought, citing Scharret, supra.
In fact, further discovery was unnecessary. It is clear from the record that plaintiffs own
the abutting property, and the case law is clear that “a landowner with property abutting a
highway . . . retains the fee in the property.” Eyde Bros Dev Co v Eaton Co Drain Comm’r, 427
Mich 271, 297; 398 NW2d 297 (1986). Accordingly, there were no outstanding questions of
fact. Plaintiffs were the fee owners of the land under the well.3 Accordingly, plaintiffs FOIA
request accurately characterized the well as being on their land, making defendant’s initial denial
wrongful, even if reasonable. Local Area Watch, supra at 150.
However, in the course of its denial, defendant conceded the existence of a well labeled
MW2 in the vicinity of plaintiffs’ property, making it easy for plaintiffs to ask about that specific
well if, indeed, that was the well in which they were interested. That timely gesture had the
effect of allowing plaintiffs to clarify which well they wanted information on, regardless of
whether MW2 was located on, or simply near, plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs then filed a second
request. However, the time to answer plaintiffs’ second request had not yet expired when
plaintiffs filed suit. Based on defendant’s actions, there is simply nothing in the record to
support a determination that plaintiffs needed to commence action to obtain the information they
sought. Defendant was timely responding to plaintiff’s requests and providing helpful
information when there was some question, at least in defendant’s mind, as to which well
plaintiffs’ were referring. Indeed, it actually appears that plaintiffs’ decision to file suit prior to
the expiration date of the second request actually resulted in a delayed response because the
action triggered the disclosure exception of MCL 15.243(v) for “[r]ecords or information relating
to a civil action in which the requesting party and the public body are parties.”
Because the record indicates that there are no outstanding issues of fact and plaintiffs
cannot prove that litigation was necessary in order to obtain a response to their FOIA request, the
trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for summary disposition.
2
“The rights of a riparian owner are somewhat similar to those of an abutting owner in the case
of highways and streets. The latter owns the fee to the middle of the highway or street, subject
only to the easement in the public to use the same for highway or street purposes.” Hall, supra
at 117, citing Werner, supra.
3
We note that this ownership interest does not entitle plaintiffs to any compensation relative to
the well, however. See Eyde Bros, supra, relying on Cleveland, supra at 537.
-4-
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.