PEOPLE OF MI V ARRON JAMES WIELAND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282699
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 05-026271-FC
ARRON JAMES WIELAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Cavanagh and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, MCL
750.316, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MCL 750.157a, three counts
of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, carjacking, MCL
750.529a(1), conspiracy to commit carjacking, MCL 750.529a(1); MCL 750.157a, conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MCL 750.157a, and carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether defendant was denied the right to a speedy
trial. Defendant was arrested on December 1, 2004, and remained incarcerated for a total of 34
months before trial commended on October 2, 2007. A number of procedural events attributed
to this delay, including: defendant’s petition for a forensic and competency examination that
resulted in delay of three months; defendant’s joinder in a motion in limine filed by his codefendant to suppress certain evidence, which the trial court granted on October 13, 2005, and
which resulted in a delay of only a few weeks; and, the prosecution’s appeal of the trial court’s
ruling on the motion in limine shortly thereafer, which resulted in a delay of 17 months while the
matter was pending before this Court, see People v Wieland, unpublished per curiam opinion of
the Court of Appeals, issued March 27, 2007 (Docket Nos. 265799 and 265800). In addition, a
number of other delays occurred that appear to be without reason on the record. On numerous
occasions before trial, defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial—once when his attorney filed
his appearance and later in numerous letters addressed to the trial court.
Subsequently, after defendant was convicted, he filed a post-judgment motion seeking
dismissal with prejudice on the basis that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. In response,
the prosecution argued that it was not responsible for the delay and that defendant had not been
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prejudiced because the delay had not affected defendant’s ability to prepare a defense. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion, stating:
The Court has read the motion and answer and authorities cited in both, and I’ll
deny the motion at this time. I agree that the 17 months that the Court of Appeals
took to decide this decision was quite a bit of time, but I guess I can’t tell the
Court of Appeals when to do their thing, and they can tell me how to do mine.
This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Whether a defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial is a mixed question of fact and
law. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). We review the trial
court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id. “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491,
497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002). Constitutional issues present questions of law that we review
de novo. Gilmore, supra at 459.
III. Applicable Law
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a right
to a speedy trial. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; see also MCL 768.1; MCR
6.004(A). In determining whether a defendant has been denied this right, we apply a four-part
balancing test. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261-262; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). The fourfactors include: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s
assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to defendant.” Id. at 261-262. The first and fourth
factors are critical to this analysis. If the total delay, which runs from the date of defendant’s
arrest until the time that trial commences, id. at 261, is under 18 months, then the burden is upon
defendant to show that he suffered prejudice. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112; 605 NW2d
28 (1999). Conversely, if the delay is over 18 months, prejudice is presumed and the burden is
on the prosecution to rebut the presumption. Id.
IV. Application
Applying these principles to the present matter, we cannot conclude, despite the
considerable length of delay in this matter, that the trial court erred in finding that defendant’s
right to a speedy trial was not violated.
A. Length of Delay
Because the length of the delay between defendant’s arrest and his trial was
approximately 34 months, the delay was presumptively prejudicial and the burden was upon the
prosecution to rebut the presumption. Id. Although the length of delay in this case tends to
reach the outer limits of other delays that we have addressed, People v Cutler, 86 Mich App 118,
126-127; 272 NW2d 206 (1978) (37-month delay, but no violation); People v Smith, 57 Mich
App 556, 563-567; 226 NW2d 673 (1975) (19-year delay, but no violation), we note that there is
no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy
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trial claim, Williams, supra at 261. In any case, this factor weights in defendant’s favor and,
since the delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, it is necessary for us to examine the
remaining factors. Id. at 262.
B. Reasons for Delay
In assessing the reasons for delay, we must examine whether each period of delay is
attributable to the defendant or the prosecution. People v Walker, 276 Mich App 528, 541-542;
741 NW2d 843 (2007), vac’d in part on other grounds 480 Mich 1059 (2008). “Unexplained
delays are charged against the prosecution. Scheduling delays and docket congestion are also
charged against the prosecution.” Walker, supra at 542 (footnotes omitted). However,
“[a]lthough delays inherent in the court system, e.g., docket congestion are technically
attributable to the prosecution, they are given a neutral tint and are assigned only minimal weight
in determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial.” Williams, supra at 263 (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Here, many of the reasons for delay are not discernable from the record, while in other
instances it is clear that defendant caused some of the delays. Shortly after defendant’s arrest,
defendant petitioned for a forensic examination and a ruling on his competence to stand trial.
The proceedings were delayed for approximately three months between his petition, submitted
on December 27, 2004, and the date he was found competent to stand trial, March 28, 2005.
Because defendant sought the competency examination, this delay is attributable to defendant.
Subsequently, there was a three-month delay between the competency ruling and the preliminary
examination, held on July 8, 2005. No reason for this delay is apparent on the record. Similarly,
an unexplained six-month delay occurred between the time that this Court issued its opinion
ruling on the prosecutor’s interlocutory appeal on March 27, 2007 and the time that trial
commenced on October 2, 2007. Because these delays are unexplained, they were likely due to
docket congestion. Thus, these unexplained delays, totaling approximately nine months, are
attributable to the prosecutor, but we give them a “neutral tint” and assign them only minimal
weight in defendant’s favor. Id.
Defendant’s main contention, however, is that the delay caused by the prosecutor’s
interlocutory appeal that pended before this Court for 17 months should be weighed against the
government. Defendant argues that this delay is not attributable to the prosecution, but is more
generally attributable to the government due to this Court’s failure to give precedence to the
prosecutor’s interlocutory criminal appeal as required by MCR 7.213(C). However, this Court
has held that the period of time the prosecution takes to successfully pursue an interlocutory
appeal is “taken out of the calculation.” People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 321; 299 NW2d
346 (1980). Thus, we decline to assign this delay any weight in favor of either party.
In sum, both the prosecution and the defendant were responsible for some of the shorter
delays, while the 17-month delay is not attributable to either party. Accordingly, we conclude
that this factor favors neither party.
C. Assertion of Right
After our review of the record, it is plain that defendant timely asserted his right to a
speedy trial. When defense counsel entered his appearance on December 14, 2004, defendant
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articulated his demand for a “speedy trial pursuant to the United States and Michigan
Constitutions . . . .” The record also contains letters from defendant to the trial court, the earliest
of which was dated February 1, 2007, requesting information regarding the status of his case and
reasons for the delay. We conclude that this factor weighs in defendant’s favor.
D. Prejudice
With respect to prejudice, defendant argues that he was personally prejudiced because he
was incarcerated throughout the 34-month delay and suffered anxiety during this time, but
concedes that his defense was not prejudiced by the delay. We agree that defendant suffered
personal prejudice, but conclude that this factor weighs heavily against defendant. In assessing
this factor, we recognize that “there are two types of prejudice[:] prejudice to the person and
prejudice to the defense.” People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 112; 503 NW2d 701 (1993).
Of the two types, “[p]rejudice to the defense is the more serious concern, because the inability of
a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Williams,
supra at 264 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, it is obvious that defendant suffered personal prejudice: Defendant was
incarcerated pending a trial that would decide the future course of his life and suffered anxiety as
a result. While we are sympathetic to defendant’s personal plight, “anxiety, alone, is insufficient
to establish a violation of [his] right to a speedy trial.” Gilmore, supra at 462. Defendant also
makes much of the fact that he was incarcerated for the entire 34-month period and that in other
cases of lengthy pretrial delay that did not violate the defendants’ constitutional rights, the
defendants were not incarcerated but free on bond. Our Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly
recognized in the context of lengthy pre-trial incarcerations, that the most significant concern is
whether defendant’s ability to defend himself has been prejudiced. Williams, supra at 264 (19month delay while incarcerated); People v Chism, 390 Mich 104, 115; 211 NW2d 193 (1973)
(27-month delay while incarcerated); People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590, 606-607; 202 NW2d
278 (1972) (19-month delay while incarcerated), overruled on other grounds in People v White,
390 Mich 245 (1973), overruled on other grounds in People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565 (2004). That
is not the case here, as defendant has admitted. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily against
defendant.
Although a 34-month delay is presumptively prejudicial and defendant timely asserted
his right, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that defendant’s right to a
speedy trial was not violated, where the reasons for the delay favored neither party and
defendant’s ability to prepare a defense was not thereby prejudiced.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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