PEOPLE OF MI V TAMIR TAUHEED BELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282222
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-215014-FH
TAMIR TAUHEED BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to deliver 50 to 225 grams of
cocaine, MCL 750.157a, one count of possession with intent to deliver 50 to 225 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), one count of possession with intent to deliver less than 50
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He received concurrent sentences of
10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for his conspiracy to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine and his
possession with intent to deliver convictions, and 2 to 20 years’ imprisonment for his possession
with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine conviction, and a consecutive sentence of
two years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that various actions by the prosecutor denied him the right to a fair
trial. We disagree. Defendant failed to properly preserve this argument by challenging the
alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 625;
601 NW2d 393 (1999). We review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453-454;
678 NW2d 631 (2004). Reversal is necessary only if plain error resulted in the conviction of an
innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings, regardless of the defendant’s innocence. Id. at 454.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Prosecutors
may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by the evidence, but they are
free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as it relates to their theory
of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Prosecutorial
remarks must be considered in context, and an otherwise improper remark may not cause
reversible error if it was made in response to defense counsel’s argument. Watson, supra at 592-1-
593. A defendant’s convictions should not be reversed if the reviewing court is convinced that
the defendant was convicted based on the evidence presented, as opposed to the effects of the
alleged misconduct. See Bahoda, supra at 271-272.
After defense counsel elicited testimony that Tracy Cowan had been convicted in relation
to contraband that was seized at 19965 Appoline Street in Detroit, Michigan, the prosecutor
asked Officer Kevin Cronin whether Rory Jones had also “take[n] responsibility” for the
contraband found at the Appoline residence. Cronin replied that Jones had. During her closing
argument, the prosecutor stated:
In, in this particular case, [defendant] had an agreement with somebody, whether
it be [Jones] or [Cowan] or Joe Smith or Lisa Jones, he had an agreement with
somebody that was inside the Appoline [residence], most likely, given by the facts
that have been produced, [Cowan], who has taken responsibility—well, she didn’t
take responsibility. She was found guilty for the items in the homes—and Rory
Jones, who took responsibility for the items in the home.
Although the conviction of another person involved in a criminal enterprise is generally
not admissible at a defendant’s separate trial, People v Kincade, 162 Mich App 80, 84; 412
NW2d 252 (1987), the prosecutor’s closing argument merely commented on the evidence that
had already been submitted and thus was proper, Bahoda, supra at 289.1 Furthermore, defense
counsel elicited the improper testimony regarding the fact that Cowan had been convicted.
Therefore, although the testimony was improperly allowed into evidence, the improper
admission of this evidence cannot be attributed to the prosecutor. However, the prosecutor’s
elicitation of testimony from Cronin regarding whether Jones had taken responsibility for the
items found at the Appoline residence was clearly improper. Kincade, supra at 84. Nonetheless,
given that other evidence was presented to link Jones to the Appoline residence and defendant
(i.e., Jones’s vehicle was parked outside the Appoline residence when defendant entered the
residence, and cellular telephone records established that defendant called Jones multiple times
about the time he drove to the Appoline address to, presumably, get more cocaine), the
prosecutor’s improper elicitation of Jones’s conviction does not amount to plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Bahoda, supra at 271-272; Thomas, supra at 453-454.
We likewise reject defendant’s argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct when
she elicited alleged hearsay testimony from Cronin that Jones was also a target of a Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigation. Instead, we find that Cronin’s testimony was a nonresponsive answer, because the prosecutor was merely looking for a “yes” response so that she
could establish how the police became privy to Jones’s cellular telephone number.
Nonresponsive answers to a prosecutor’s questions by a prosecution witness are not attributable
as misconduct to the prosecutor unless the prosecutor knew, encouraged, or conspired with the
1
Even if we found that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument were improper, we
note that the jury was instructed that a prosecutor’s comments are not evidence. Jurors are
presumed to follow a trial court’s instructions. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749
NW2d 272 (2008). Therefore, we presume that the jury did not improperly consider these
comments and reversal is not warranted in this case.
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witness to provide the unresponsive testimony. People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455
NW2d 358 (1990). Here, defendant has failed to establish that “the prosecutor knew,
encouraged, or conspired with” Cronin to provide the unresponsive testimony. Therefore, even
if Cronin’s answer regarding the DEA investigation was inadmissible hearsay, the improper
testimony was not attributable to the prosecutor. Id.
We also reject defendant’s argument that his convictions should be reversed based on the
prosecutor’s allegedly improper use of impeachment testimony as substantive evidence of
defendant’s guilt. After defendant’s brother, Terrell Bell, testified that he had never seen
defendant sell drugs, the prosecution properly elicited Terrell’s prior inconsistent statement to
the police that defendant was selling drugs. See MRE 613(b). In the prosecutor’s closing
argument, the prosecutor stated that the “only reason [Terrell] said that [defendant] sold drugs is
because he does.”
Previous inconsistent statements of a witness, admissible to impeach the credibility of a
witness, are inadmissible as substantive evidence unless they are also admissible under MRE
801(d)(1).2 See People v Lundy, 467 Mich 254, 257; 650 NW2d 332 (2002). Here, Terrell’s
prior statement to the police was not given under oath and thus was inadmissible hearsay. MRE
801(d)(1). Therefore, Terrell’s statement was not admissible as substantive evidence, but only as
impeachment evidence. See MRE 613(b) (“Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement
by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or
the interests of justice otherwise require.”) The prosecutor acted improperly when she made her
closing argument. However, given that testimony had been presented that defendant sold
Shannon Portis two eight balls, there was already strong substantive evidence that defendant sold
drugs. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that a prosecutor’s comments are not
evidence, and that the jury could only consider a witness’s prior inconsistent statements “in
deciding whether the testimony [of that witness] was truthful and in determining the facts of the
case.” Although the prosecutor’s comments were improper, they did not amount to plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Bahoda, supra at 271-272; Thomas, supra at 453-454.
We likewise reject defendant’s argument that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
credibility of her witnesses. Defendant takes issue with the fact that before the prosecutor was
allowed to introduce Portis’s prior testimony, she asked Portis whether his prior testimony was
2
MRE 801(d)(1) states,
Prior Statement of Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or
(B) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person . . . .
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truthful and Portis testified that it was. Defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor’s
comments during closing argument that the police “testified honestly” and that although Portis
was not a believable person, his prior testimony was truthful.
“[A] prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses by implying that he has
some special knowledge of their truthfulness,” but “he may comment on his own witnesses’
credibility during closing argument . . . .” Thomas, supra at 455. Furthermore, a prosecutor may
“argue from the facts that a witness is credible or that the defendant or another witness is not
worthy of belief.” People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). The
prosecutor’s proposed question to Portis regarding whether his prior testimony was truthful was
merely a question and, thus, could not be considered “vouching” for a witness. Furthermore, in
regard to the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument concerning the truthfulness or
untruthfulness of the testimony of the police officers and Portis, neither of the challenged
comments implied that the prosecutor had special knowledge of the witnesses’ testimony. In her
comments concerning the police and Portis, the prosecutor used facts to argue why their
testimony was believable. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s actions do not constitute improper
vouching. Thomas, supra at 455; Howard, supra at 548.
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted
Cronin to give expert testimony and allowed Officers Richard Wehby and David Scott to give
what allegedly amounted to expert testimony, despite the fact that the prosecution never moved
to qualify either Wehby or Scott as experts. We disagree. Defendant did not challenge the
police officers’ questioned testimony and thus has failed to properly preserve this argument.
People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 508; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). We review unpreserved claims of
error for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
MRE 702 states,
If the court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness had applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
This Court has held that a prosecutor may use expert testimony from police officers to aid the
jury in understanding evidence seized in controlled substance cases. People v Ray, 191 Mich
App 706, 707-708; 479 NW2d 1 (1991). For such expert testimony to be admissible, “(1) the
expert must be qualified; (2) the evidence must serve to give the trier of fact a better
understanding of the evidence or assist in determining a fact in issue; and (3) the evidence must
be from a recognized discipline.” People v Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 541;
499 NW2d 404 (1993).
The trial court qualified Cronin as an expert in “the area of narcotics trafficking.” Before
Cronin was qualified as an expert, the prosecution established that Cronin had been a police
officer for 14 years, had worked for Detroit’s “Drug Enforcement Administration,” as well as
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“SONIC” and the “Oakland County Narcotics Unit” and “conspiracy unit.” The prosecution
further established that Cronin had extensive narcotics training in Michigan and Florida and
years of practical experience, which included participating in the execution of over 400 search
warrants and purchasing cocaine in an undercover capacity. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion, let alone commit plain error, when it qualified Cronin as an expert in “the area of
narcotics trafficking.” MRE 702. Furthermore, Cronin’s challenged expert testimony regarding
(1) the general tiered system of drug sales, (2) the fact that the cocaine seized from 23510 Clarita
Street in Detroit, Michigan, was pressed in the same manner as the cocaine from the Appoline
residence, (3) that a seller would not generally drive around unnecessarily with cocaine in his car
to pick up more cocaine if he already had enough cocaine to sell, and (4) that the amount of
cocaine that was found at the Clarita residence was consistent with an intent to distribute, would
help the jury understand the evidence presented and assist the jurors in determining whether
defendant was guilty of the charged offenses. Furthermore, this testimony was based on
Cronin’s past experience and expertise in the field of narcotics. Accordingly, the trial court did
not commit plain error when it allowed Cronin to give the challenged expert testimony.
Williams, supra at 541; Ray, supra at 707-708.
Defendant also takes issue with Wheby’s testimony that the cocaine found at the
Appoline residence was powder cocaine that had “been rocked up” in the kilo form, which is
how cocaine is “usually shipped from a larger . . . supplier.” Defendant also challenges Wehby’s
testimony that cocaine is usually weighed out in equal amounts on a digital scale and packaged
in Ziploc bags before it is sold, and that the going rate between friends for two eight balls was
$220. Defendant additionally takes issue with Scott’s testimony that the hydraulic jack that was
found is commonly used to press cocaine into blocks, that it is common to blend cutting agents
(such as baking soda) with cocaine to dilute the cocaine so it is more profitable, that it is
common to not be able to find proof of residency inside a home, and that people generally do not
store their cocaine where they live.
MRE 701 permits lay witnesses to provide testimony in the form of opinions and
inferences if this testimony is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.”
We conclude that Wehby’s and Scott’s questioned testimony was basic opinion testimony
stemming from evidence that they personally observed and, furthermore, would be helpful to the
jury in determining facts in issue. Pursuant to MRE 701, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, let alone commit plain error, when it failed to sua sponte suppress the challenged
testimony. Peterson, supra at 362; McLaughlin, supra at 657. Similarly, the prosecutor’s
comments during closing arguments regarding this testimony were proper. See Bahoda, supra at
282. Further, because Wehby and Scott did not testify as expert witnesses, no corresponding
instruction was needed with regard to their testimony.
In regard to defendant’s argument that the trial court committed error requiring reversal
when it failed to give a cautionary instruction regarding Cronin’s “dual roles” as a fact and
expert witness, we conclude that defendant waived this argument when he expressed his
satisfaction with the jury instructions. See People v Hall (On Remand), 256 Mich App 674, 679;
671 NW2d 545 (2003).
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it
admitted the contents of the police laboratory report and when it allowed Portis’s testimony from
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a previous trial to be read into evidence. Once again we disagree. Although defendant
challenged the admission of Portis’s prior testimony, he failed to challenge the admission of the
contents of the police laboratory report. We review defendant’s preserved argument regarding
the admission of Portis’s prior testimony for an abuse of discretion, People v Starr, 457 Mich
490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998), and review his unpreserved argument regarding admission of
the contents of the police report for plain error affecting his substantial rights, Carines, supra at
763-764.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c).
Hearsay is generally not admissible as substantive evidence. MRE 802.
Here, without objection, the contents of a police laboratory report were read into
evidence. MRE 803(8), the public records exception, provides that the following public records
are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even if the declarant is available as a witness:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices
or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, and subject to the limitations of MCL
257.624.
Although the literal terms of MRE 803(8)(B) appear to exclude, in all criminal cases,
reports containing matters observed by police officers, we need not consider whether this
evidence was admissible because any potential error arising from the admission of the contents
of the police laboratory report was harmless. Here, the admitted police report merely discusses
the fingerprint analysis of items that were found at the Appoline and Clarita residences,
establishing that a cellophane wrapper found in Cowan’s bedroom at the Appoline residence had
Cowan’s fingerprint on it. Prior testimony had already established that the items listed in the
report were found at the Appoline and Clarita residences, and that proof of residency for Cowan
was found at the Appoline residence. The testimony regarding the contents of the police report
did not establish defendant’s presence at either residence and was not otherwise adversarial to
defendant. Therefore, any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless.
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to read Portis’s
testimony from an October 23, 2002, proceeding into the record. MRE 803(5) provides:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in the witness’ memory and to reflect that knowledge
correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but
may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
To be admissible under MRE 803(5), “(1) The document must pertain to matters about which the
declarant once had knowledge; (2) The declarant must now have an insufficient recollection as to
such matters; (3) The document must be shown to have been made by the declarant . . . .”
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People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 667-668; 482 NW2d 176 (1991), quoting People v J D
Williams, 117 Mich App 505, 508-509; 324 NW2d 70 (1982), rev’d and remanded on other
grounds 412 Mich 711 (1982).
Here, Portis alleged that he could not remember certain events concerning the incident at
hand, but he remembered previously testifying truthfully about the incident on October 23, 2002,
when the incident was “fresher” in his mind. Furthermore, defendant acknowledged that the
document being read into evidence was his testimony from the October 23, 2002, proceeding.
Portis’s testimony from the October 23, 2002, proceeding was therefore admissible pursuant to
MRE 803(5), Daniels, supra at 667-668, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it allowed the testimony to be read into the record.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial
on the ground that he had not been denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel. We disagree. We review a trial court’s factual findings regarding whether a defendant
was denied effective assistance of counsel for clear error, while reviewing the trial court’s
constitutional determinations de novo. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d
342 (2004).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). To show that
counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness, “a defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s action constituted sound trial strategy under
the circumstances.” Id. at 302. Counsel’s performance must be measured against an objective
standard of reasonableness and without the benefit of hindsight. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich
207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995). “[C]ounsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to
raise futile objections.” People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
As previously discussed, Cronin was properly qualified as an expert in the area of
narcotics to give his challenged testimony, Wehby’s and Scott’s challenged testimony was
proper under MRE 701, and the admission of the contents of the police laboratory report was not
outcome-determinative. Therefore, any challenge to the aforementioned testimony would have
been futile. Defendant’s argument that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of
counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to the challenged testimony lacks merit.
Ackerman, supra at 455.
We also reject defendant’s argument that he was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel when his defense counsel (1) elicited testimony that co-conspirator Cowan
had been convicted as a result of the items seized from the Appoline residence, (2) failed to
challenge Cronin’s testimony that Jones had also been convicted as a result of the items seized
from the Appoline residence, (3) failed to challenge Cronin’s alleged hearsay testimony that
Jones was part of a DEA investigation, and (4) failed to challenge the prosecutor’s comments
during closing argument that Cowan and Jones had been convicted as a result of the items seized
from the Appoline residence. Evidence that Jones was part of a DEA investigation is likely
inadmissible hearsay, and furthermore, as previously discussed, Cowan’s and Jones’s
convictions were not admissible evidence. Thus, defense counsel should not have elicited this
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evidence and should have challenged both the prosecutor’s attempts to elicit this evidence and
her reference to this evidence in her closing argument. However, the solicitation of evidence of
Cowan’s conviction, as well as defense counsel’s failure to challenge the admission of evidence
regarding Jones’s conviction, the DEA investigation of Jones, and the prosecutor’s comments
during closing argument regarding the convictions, all coincided with defense counsel’s strategy
to refute the charges against defendant on the ground that he was not a resident of either
residence where the drugs were found and was not present at either residence when the drugs
were found. Defense counsel’s actions and inactions in this regard furthered his strategy by
establishing that other individuals were already convicted for the items found at the Appoline
residence. In fact, in regard to the DEA investigation, defendant furthered his strategy on crossexamination by eliciting from Cronin that the DEA was not investigating defendant and did not
even have his name. The fact that defense counsel’s strategy, which he discussed with defendant
and which defendant approved, failed to work does not render counsel’s performance in this
regard ineffective. Toma, supra at 302; LaVearn, supra at 216.
Finally, we also reject defendant’s argument that he was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to challenge the prosecutor’s statement during
her closing argument that the “only reason [Terrell] said that [defendant] sold drugs is because
he does.” As previously discussed, the prosecutor improperly used Terrell’s statement to the
police as substantive evidence that defendant was a drug dealer. But again, given the evidence
presented, as well as the trial court’s instructions, the comments did not deny defendant his right
to a fair trial. For the same reasons, defense counsel’s failure to challenge the comments did not
affect the outcome of the proceedings and thus does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. Toma, supra at 302-303.
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that insufficient evidence was presented to
support his felony-firearm convictions. We disagree. “[W]hen determining whether sufficient
evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence may constitute
satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense.” People v Warren (After Remand), 200 Mich
App 586, 588; 504 NW2d 907 (1993).
This Court has interpreted MCL 750.227b to require the prosecution to show “that the
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.”
People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). To establish constructive
possession of a firearm, the prosecution must show that the defendant knew of the firearm’s
location, the firearm was accessible to the defendant, and the defendant had the right to control
the firearm. People v Terry, 124 Mich App 656, 661-663; 335 NW2d 116 (1983).
When the police searched the detached garage at the Clarita residence, they found a 12gauge shotgun wrapped in a blanket lying against a side wall of the garage, as well as two
shoeboxes in the rafters directly above the garage door. One shoebox contained 96 grams of
cocaine that was packaged for sale. The other shoebox contained a loaded nine-millimeter
handgun, 12-gauge shotgun shells, a .38-caliber bullet, and two prescription pill bottles.
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Although the prescription pill bottles were in Terrell’s name, the prosecution presented
evidence indicating that the prescriptions were in Terrell’s name because defendant posed as
Terrell when he went to the dentist so that his visit would be covered by Terrell’s dental
insurance. The prosecution also presented circumstantial evidence establishing that one of the
guns that was seized was found in box next to defendant’s prescription pills, while the other gun
that was seized was found in close proximity to defendant’s prescription pills. Furthermore,
immediately before defendant was seen selling two eight balls of cocaine to Portis, the police
saw defendant walk into the detached garage. Thus, a rational trier of fact could have inferred
that at the time defendant committed the felony of possession with intent to deliver cocaine,3 he
knew the location of the firearms, the firearms were accessible to him, and he had the right to
control the firearms. Warren, supra at 588. After viewing the evidence presented in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the elements of felony-firearm were met. Avant, supra at 505; Terry,
supra at 658, 661, 663.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
3
Defendant does not dispute that sufficient evidence was presented to support his possession
with intent to deliver cocaine convictions.
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