PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES DEWAYNE MYLES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 31, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284595
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 07-000905-FH
CHARLES DEWAYNE MYLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Meter and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury convictions of inducing a minor to commit a
felony, MCL 333.7416, assaulting or resisting an officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and delivery of less
than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). The trial court sentenced defendant as a
third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of two to twenty years for
inducing a minor to commit a felony, two to four years for assaulting or resisting an officer, and
two to forty years for delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine. We affirm. This case has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues that he should be granted a new trial because the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal argument. Specifically, defendant claims the
prosecutor’s remarks impermissibly suggested that the defense intentionally tried to mislead the
jury, shifted the burden of proof onto the defense, and called into question defense counsel’s
credibility. Because defendant did not raise these objections at the trial level, this Court reviews
them to determine whether they constituted plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
“A defendant’s right to a fair trial may be violated when the prosecutor interjects issues
broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused.” People v Rice, 235 Mich App 429, 438; 597
NW2d 843 (1999). Further, a prosecutor may not make factual statements that are not supported
by the evidence, but is free to draw “reasonable inferences” derived from the facts of the case.
People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 66; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Otherwise improper
prosecutorial conduct or remarks might not require reversal if they address issues that were
raised by defense counsel. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 353; 662 NW2d 376 (2003); People v
Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977); Dobek, supra at 64. In determining whether an
invited response merits reversal, a court should consider the conduct that prompted the
prosecutorial response and the proportionality of that response. Jones, supra at 353. A new trial
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is not required due to prosecutorial misconduct if the prejudicial effect was removed by the trial
court’s instructions to the jury. See Duncan, supra at 16-17; People v Watson, 245 Mich App
572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
In the case at bar, defense counsel suggested during closing argument that there was
insufficient proof of defendant’s guilt because the sixteen-year-old boy who participated in the
drug transaction was not called to testify by the prosecutor. In his rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor responded: “The thing is, he [defense counsel] knows where [the minor witness] is.
We know where [the minor witness] is, and the fact that [the minor witness] isn’t here isn’t
something that really you can consider.” Contrary to what defendant claims on appeal, we do
not believe the prosecutor’s statement shifted the burden of proof onto the defense. The
prosecutor never stated or implied that defendant bore the burden of proving his innocence by
producing the witness or presenting any evidence. In any event, a prosecutor does not
necessarily shift the burden of proof simply by commenting on a defendant’s failure to call a
witness. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 112; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). Further, the trial court
cured any possible prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s remark by instructing the jury that
defendant is presumed innocent at every stage of the case and that at no time does the burden
shift onto him to prove his innocence. See Duncan, supra; Watson, supra. Defendant has shown
no error, let alone plain error, in this regard.
Defendant next contends the prosecutor’s remarks created an inference that the defense
engaged in misconduct by trying to prevent the minor witness from testifying at the trial. We
disagree. The prosecutor’s statements were reasonable in light of their relation to defense
counsel’s remark that the absence of the witness should create a reasonable doubt as to
defendant’s guilt in the minds of the jurors. Dobek, supra. Accordingly, defendant has not
established plain error on this basis.
Finally, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument did not impugn defense counsel’s credibility
by suggesting that he was intentionally misleading the jury. Cf., People v Unger, 278 Mich App
210, 236; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Rather, the prosecutor was permissibly explaining, based on
reasonable inferences from the evidence, why defendant used the sixteen-year-old boy to carry
the drugs and money, i.e., to attempt to make successful prosecution of defendant more difficult.
This did not constitute plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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