IN RE BRADLEY WILLIAM MILLER JR MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRADLEY WILLIAM MILLER,
JR., Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 287955
St. Joseph Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-000318-NA
GLORIA L. ALLERTON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRADLEY WILLIAM MILLER, SR.,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio, P.J. and K.F. Kelly and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from an order that terminated her parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and (l). We affirm.
Respondent mother first argues that the trial court erred in failing to recuse himself from
the case because he had heard her prior termination cases and was biased against her. We
disagree. Respondent mother failed to preserve the issue for review because she failed to pursue
the disqualification claim in the trial court. In re Schmeltzer, 175 Mich App 666, 673; 438
NW2d 866 (1989). As such, her claim is reviewed for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the party who asserts partiality has a heavy
burden of overcoming the presumption. Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 497; 548
NW2d 210 (1996). A showing of personal prejudice usually requires that the source of the bias
be in events or information from outside the judicial proceeding. Id. at 495-496. “Opinions
formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring during the course of the
current proceedings . . . do not constitute bias or partiality unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Schellenberg v Rochester
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Lodge No. 2225 of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 228 Mich App 20, 39; 577 NW2d
163 (1998).
It is true that respondent mother had a long and extensive history with the judge, dating
back to when she was a ward of the court. Still, that did not mean that the judge was biased
against her. Respondent mother provides no concrete example of the judge’s alleged bias.
Throughout the proceedings the judge was at all times respectful and sympathetic to respondent
mother. There was absolutely no evidence of personal animus. In addition, the result of the
proceedings would have been the same regardless of who presided over the case. Respondent
mother had three prior terminations, and those court files were part of the current case. It was
clear that respondent mother had not benefited from past services. The prior terminations and
respondent mother’s continued instability provided a basis for termination. In addition, it was in
the child’s best interests to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights, especially in light of
the child’s special needs. There is simply no indication that the judge was unfair or impartial,
nor was there any reason to believe that the result would have been different had it been assigned
to a different judge.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were proven by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). In 2000, respondent mother’s parental rights to her two oldest children
were terminated by court order after attempts at reunification failed. Also in 2000, respondent
mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her newborn third child after termination
proceedings were instituted. In both cases, respondent mother received all reunification services
the agency could offer. The prior terminations alone provided an adequate basis for termination
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). However, as the trial court noted, respondent mother’s
continued instability also formed a basis for termination pursuant to MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(g) and
(j). Respondent mother’s own testimony revealed that little had changed since the prior
terminations. When respondent mother moved back to Michigan, she stayed with a male “pen
pal” in Iron Mountain. She then went to a domestic assault shelter because respondent father
was threatening her. While at the shelter, respondent mother met Todd Galbraith over the
Internet and moved in with him. While respondent mother was still living with Galbraith, she
started writing to Ron Allerton in prison. Allerton, who had served ten years in prison for OUIL
causing death, said he needed a place to stay, so Galbraith allowed him to come and stay at his
home. Respondent mother married Allerton in November 2007. By the time of the termination
hearing, respondent mother and Allerton were in the process of divorcing and she could not
afford their apartment. Respondent mother was living at a hotel because she was on a waiting
list for subsidized housing. Respondent mother’s moving was also a problem in 1999 and 2000.
Respondent mother relied on men for housing and never once had independent housing. In
addition to problems with housing and men, respondent mother had depression, posttraumatic
stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Respondent mother lacked the stability she
needed to properly parent the minor child.
Having found the statutory grounds for termination proven by clear and convincing
evidence, the trial court was obligated to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights if it was
in the minor child’s best interests to do so. MCL 712A.19b(5). The testimony revealed that the
minor child was very troubled. He was “out of control” and literally “climbed the walls.” He
lacked any direction whatsoever. His experienced foster care parents could no longer handle him
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and a new placement was being sought, possibly an institution. At one point, the worker
requested permission from the court to hospitalize the minor child if his condition worsened.
Respondent mother, who was unable to parent three other children in the past, would be unable
to this child’s special needs. He needed specialized care and had already spent nearly two years
in the foster care system in Indiana before moving back to Michigan, where he was removed
once again. He was entitled to permanence and stability.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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