THOMAS HOLLIDAY V PIONEER STATE MUT INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
March 5, 2009
THOMAS HOLLIDAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 281319
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-078526-ND
PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INS CO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Meter and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action involving a home insurance policy, plaintiff appeals as of right from the
trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
We affirm.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling regarding a motion for summary
disposition. Greene v AP Products, 475 Mich 502, 507; 717 NW2d 855 (2006). MCR
2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition when there is no genuine issue regarding any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.
Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). A trial court may grant
a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the pleadings, affidavits, and other
documentary evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, who
must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt, show that there is no genuine issue
concerning any material fact. Greene, supra at 507. “Only if there is no factual dispute, making
the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law, would summary disposition be
appropriate.” Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 252 Mich App 25, 31; 651 NW2d 188 (2002).
“However, the nonmoving party must present more than mere allegations in order to demonstrate
that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, making trial necessary.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that wind-blown water infiltrating his roof during a storm caused his loss
and, as such, was a covered loss. Plaintiff bases his argument for coverage on two different
sections of his policy with defendant. The first section is paragraph 11 under the section entitled
“Additional Coverages,” which provides:
11. Landlord’s Furnishings. We will pay up to $2500 for your
appliances, carpeting and other household furnishings, in an apartment on the
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residence premises regularly rented or held for rental to others by an insured, for
loss caused only by the following Perils Insured Against:
***
b.
Windstorm or hail.
This peril does not include loss to the property contained in a
building caused by rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust unless the direct force of wind
or hail damages the building causing an opening in a roof of wall and the rain,
snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening.
Plaintiff also relies on paragraph two under “Section C-Personal Property” of the policy, which
is identical to the windstorm or hail section quoted above.
This Court interprets an insurance contract similarly to any other contract, looking to the
plain language of the insurance policy and interpreting the terms therein in accordance with
Michigan’s principles of contract construction. Henderson v State Farm Fire and Cas Co, 460
Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999); Busch v Holmes, 256 Mich App 4, 9; 662 NW2d 64
(2003). Considering the plain language of this insurance policy, neither section applies to
plaintiff’s loss. Paragraph 11 specifically applies to appliances, carpeting, and other household
furnishings in an apartment on the premises. At no time did plaintiff request reimbursement for
losses to any appliances, carpeting, or furnishings or for any damage to anything but his own
residence. The second provision that plaintiff relies on is listed under coverage of personal
property. However, plaintiff did not make any claims for personal property. Plaintiff submitted
bills for his roof repair and repair to the walls and ceilings in his house. Accordingly, the trial
court properly concluded that plaintiff could not rely on either section for coverage.
Alternatively, a policy exclusion applied. As plaintiff acknowledges, the policy
specifically excludes coverage for any seepage/leakage of water damage that continues over a
period of weeks or longer. The specific exclusion contained in “Endorsement HO AMN3 0903”
provides:
We insure against risks of direct loss to property described in Coverages A
and B only if that loss is a physical loss to property; however, we do not insure
loss;
***
2.
caused by;
***
e.
or resulting from constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water
or the presence of condensation or humidity, moisture, or vapor, over a period of
weeks, months or years.
Plaintiff argues that his loss occurred as a result of strong winds that created an opening in his
roof and allowed rain to enter the home. Plaintiff further contends that he did not expect
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defendant to repair his entire roof, but only the part that had been damaged as a result of the wind
raising the roof and allowing the rain to enter the home.
“Exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly construed in favor of the insured.”
Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 574; 686 NW2d 273 (2004). “Coverage under a
policy is lost if any exclusion in the policy applies to an insured’s particular claims.” Id. “Clear
and specific exclusions must be given effect because an insurance company cannot be liable for a
risk it did not assume.” Id. “When reviewing an exclusionary clause, we read the contract as a
whole to effectuate the overall intent of the parties.” Id. at 575. Where the language is clear and
unambiguous, the insurance policy must be enforced as written. Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of
Michigan v Nikkel, 460 Mich 558, 566; 596 NW2d 915 (1999).
In support of its motion for summary disposition, defendant included affidavits and
letters or reports from Robert Bise of Great Lakes Insurance Restorations, Terry Wiczuk of
Wiczuk Roofing, and Chad Zielinski, a licensed professional engineer. All three inspected
plaintiff’s roof and concluded that the roof had been leaking for a long period and that the
damage was long-term because the roof and attic showed signs of advanced decay and mold.
Moreover, Zielinski concluded that the water damage and mold in plaintiff’s attic were the direct
result of defective construction and ongoing deterioration. Zielinski explained that the roof
covering should have been installed under the metal edging but was instead installed over the
metal edging. As a result, the roof covering became detached from the metal edging, which
allowed rain to easily penetrate the roof covering. According to Zielinksi, the roof had been
leaking for several years, and he did not find any evidence that the damage to the roof covering
had been wind-related.
Once the moving party satisfies its burden by showing that the non-movant’s claim
cannot be supported by evidence at trial, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish
the existence of a material factual dispute. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597
NW2d 28 (1999), superceded on other grounds by statute as stated in McLiechey v Bristol West
Ins Co, 408 F Supp 2d 516 (WD Mich, 2006). Defendant provided ample evidence to support its
motion for summary disposition including affidavits, an engineer’s report, and photographs.
Plaintiff did not submit any evidence to refute defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff stated in his interrogatories that he “believe[d] that the flat roof was damaged
during a wind storm that blew branches into the roof and damaged it, which allowed winds to lift
the roof and resulted in wind-blown water entering the inside of the dwelling.” However,
plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support this theory. Moreover, Wiczuk discredited
plaintiff’s theory of the cause of the damage. When plaintiff told Wiczuk that branches had
struck the roof, Wiczuk inspected the roof and found some indentations that could have been
consistent with tree branches hitting the roof. However, Wiczuk concluded that the water was
not entering the home from that spot. The water entered the home where the roof covering had
separated from the metal on the roof, which was caused by poor installation.
Accordingly, there was no material factual dispute that plaintiff’s loss was excluded from
coverage because it was a result of “constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or the
presence of condensation or humidity, moisture, or vapor, over a period of weeks, months or
years.”
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Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a material factual dispute, and the trial court
properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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