IN RE HEGLER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DAMONI ALVIN HEGLER,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 287936
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-000272-NA
LASHIEKA HUSSEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Beckering , JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm. This appeal has
been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(j) and (l) were both established
by clear and convincing legally admissible evidence. MCR 3.977(E)(3); In re Archer, 277 Mich
App 71, 73; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). Respondent admitted that she had a long-term history of drug
abuse, that three other children had been the subject of child protection proceedings, and that her
parental rights to those children were eventually terminated. Respondent used cocaine during
her pregnancy with the present child, and a meconium drug screen was positive for cocaine at the
time of the child’s birth. Although she was in a substance abuse treatment program, respondent
had a relapse within weeks after the child was born, had just 11 weeks of sobriety since then, and
had not completed treatment. Because she had not demonstrated an ability to remain drug-free
on her own for any extended period of time, it was likely that the child would be harmed if
returned to respondent’s care. Contrary to what respondent argues, petitioner was not required to
prove that she would neglect her children for the long-term future as held in Fritts v Krugh, 354
Mich 97, 114; 92 NW2d 604 (1958), overruled on other grounds by In re Hatcher, 443 Mich
426, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). That decision predates the enactment of § 19b(3), which now
governs the criteria for termination. Because the trial court properly found that grounds for
termination were established under §§ 19b(3)(j) and (l), it is unnecessary to determine whether
termination was also warranted under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (i), inasmuch as any error in relying on
those grounds was harmless. In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
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The trial court also did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to
the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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