IN RE MARCUS MOORE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ZIONE JONES, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286791
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000042-NA
LOLITA JONES,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of MARCUS MOORE, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286792
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000043-NA
LOLITA JONES,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Bandstra and Gleicher, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent appeals as of right from the circuit court’s
orders terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii),
(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (g). We affirm. These appeals have been decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent does not challenge the circuit court’s finding that the statutory grounds for
termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence. She contends only that the trial court
erred in ordering termination because petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that termination was in the children’s best interests. We disagree.
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At the time this case was decided, MCL 712A.19b(5) provided that “[i]f the court finds
that there are grounds for termination of parental rights, the court shall order termination of
parental rights . . . unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly
not in the child’s best interests.” As explained in In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350, 352; 612
NW2d 407 (2000), the petitioner “bears the burden of proving at least one ground for
termination,” but § 19b(5) does not “impose any further burden of proof on the petitioner once
the petitioner has carried its burden of establishing one or more grounds for termination.” Thus,
the trial court was not required to affirmatively find that termination was in the children’s best
interests. Id. at 357, 364 n 19.1
The children came into care because respondent was not a consistent presence in their
lives and neglected their basic needs. Respondent announced at the preliminary hearing that she
would not participate in parenting classes or visit the children. She did not participate in any of
the services recommended for reunification, she attended only two supervised visits, and she saw
the children only a handful of times during the 13 months they were in care. The evidence did
not clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in the children’s best
interests. Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the
children. Id. at 356-357.
We affirm.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
1
MCL 712A.19b(5) was amended, effective July 11, 2008, to require that, in order to terminate
parental rights, a court must affirmatively find that termination is in the children’s best interests.
However, respondent’s argument is not premised on this amendment, and further, because the
order terminating respondent’s parental rights was issued on June 26, 2008, the prior version of
MCL 712A.19b(5), quoted above, remains applicable to the determination whether termination
of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate in the instant case.
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