PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN PAUL CASBAR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 20, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280647
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-213597-FH
STEVEN PAUL CASBAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (person under 13 years of age), and sentenced as a recidivist CSC
offender, MCL 750.520f, to 5 to 22-1/2 years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
The 45-year-old defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his live-in girlfriend’s
12-year-old daughter over a one-month period in the summer of 2005. The charged incidents
occurred in the family home when the victim’s mother was at work and her siblings were asleep.
The victim, age 13 at the time of trial, testified that defendant inappropriately touched her breast
and buttocks more than once but less than ten times. According to the victim, defendant told her
“to keep this [their] little secret.” The victim stated that the first incident occurred when she
went in defendant’s bedroom to say goodnight and, as she hugged him, he moved his hand over
her breasts and buttocks over her clothing. The victim stated that, on another occasion,
defendant tried to pull down her pajama pants, indicating that he “just want[ed] to take a little
peek.” The victim recalled another incident when defendant picked her up, placed her on his
bed, and asked in a “sexual manner” “if [she] wanted to have a little fun.” She declined,
indicating that she was tired. In the fall or winter of 2005, the victim told a classmate what
defendant had done. The classmate testified that she told her own mother, but nothing was done.
The victim indicated that “at one point,” defendant moved out and the victim’s mother briefly
dated another man. The victim subsequently learned that defendant would be moving back in
and that defendant and her mother had wed. In early 2006, the victim told a different classmate
about the incidents. The classmate testified that she encouraged the victim to disclose the
incidents to an adult. The victim testified that, at the urging of her friend, she told her counselor
about the incidents in February 2006.
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The defense theory was that the victim fabricated the allegations because she did not like
defendant, was jealous of how much time her mother spent with him, and did not support her
mother’s marriage to him. On cross-examination, the victim admitted that she argued with
defendant and her mother about her poor performance in school, yelled and threw things at her
mother on one occasion, and that defendant had confronted her about her behavior. On redirect
examination, the victim indicated that although she disliked some of her mother’s other
partners,1 she had not accused any of them of sexual assault.
II. Other Uncharged Acts
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because evidence of other
uncharged sexual incidents involving his daughter and his former girlfriend’s son were
improperly admitted, contrary to MCL 768.27a and MRE 404(b). We disagree.
A. The Other Acts
A police lieutenant, formerly a detective in a sex crimes and child abuse unit, testified
that in March 1990, she investigated a CSC matter involving defendant. The two sexual assault
complainants were defendant’s three-year-old stepdaughter, over whom he had legal
guardianship, and defendant’s then live-in girlfriend’s seven-year-old son. As part of the
investigation, the lieutenant interviewed defendant and the two children. In the first interview
with defendant, he denied touching the children. In a second interview, defendant admitted
touching his stepdaughter’s vagina “two different times.” He stated that while he was bathing
his stepdaughter, she touched her vagina and then he touched her vagina for about 30 seconds.
The lieutenant indicated that defendant’s description of the second incident was nearly identical
to the first. Defendant stated that while he was bathing his stepdaughter, she began rubbing her
vagina and, in turn, he touched her vagina between the lips for about 30 seconds. He stopped
because he knew it was wrong, and he did not do it again. Defendant restated these admissions
in a written statement. Charges were brought against defendant, but were subsequently
dismissed after a district court ruled that the three-year-old child was too young to testify. With
regard to the seven-year-old boy, defendant admitted that he slept in a bed with the boy during an
out-of-town trip and that the boy was not wearing any underwear, only a T-shirt. Defendant
stated that he was lying next to the boy, woke up during the night because the bed was shaking,
and observed the boy masturbating himself. The lieutenant testified that defendant was charged
with and pleaded guilty to second-degree CSC. A certified copy of the judgment of sentence
was admitted as an exhibit at trial.
B. Unfairly Prejudicial
Defendant contends that the evidence was inadmissible under both MCL 768.27a and
MRE 404(b) because any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. A trial court’s decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). A trial court abuses
1
The victim’s mother had been married about five other times and had boyfriends in between her
husbands.
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its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 379; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). If there is an underlying
question of law, such as whether admissibility is precluded by a rule of evidence, we review that
question of law de novo. McDaniel, supra at 412.
MCL 768.27a provides, in relevant part, that “in a criminal case in which the defendant is
accused of committing a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed
another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.” As defendant acknowledges, all of the sexual assaults at issue are
“listed offenses” under MCL 768.27a. A “[l]isted offense” is any offense defined in MCL
28.722(e). MCL 768.27a(2)(a). The evidence meets the minimum threshold for relevancy, MRE
401,2 and defendant has not demonstrated that he was unfairly prejudiced by the evidence, MRE
403. The evidence assisted the jury in weighing the victim’s credibility, particularly where
defendant argued that the victim was not credible, and it showed a pattern of defendant engaging
in sexual contact with juveniles to whom he had ready access. Furthermore, while the acts
described were serious and incriminating, such characteristics are inherent in the underlying
crimes for which defendant was accused. The danger that MRE 403 seeks to avoid is that of
unfair prejudice, because, presumably, all evidence presented by the prosecution is prejudicial to
the defendant to some degree. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 336; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
The probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
Because the evidence was offered and properly admitted under MCL 768.27a,
defendant’s argument that the evidence was not admissible under MRE 404(b)3 is inapposite in
this case. “When a defendant is charged with a sexual offense against a minor, MCL 768.27a
allows prosecutors to introduce evidence of a defendant’s uncharged sexual offenses against
[other] minors without having to justify their admissibility under MRE 404(b).” People v
Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 618-619; 741 NW2d 558 (2007); see also People v Watkins, 277
Mich App 358, 364-365; 745 NW2d 149 (2007), lv gtd 480 Mich 1167 (2008), lv den – vacating
order granting lv __ Mich __, issued December 17, 2008 (Docket No. 135787).
B. Inadmissible Hearsay
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence because the
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his right of confrontation, where he was
not given the opportunity to cross-examine the two minor complainants. Hearsay, which is a
2
MRE 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” The relevancy “threshold is minimal: ‘any’
tendency is sufficient probative force.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 390; 582 NW2d 785
(1998).
3
MRE 404(b)(1) prohibits “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove a defendant’s
character or propensity to commit the charged crime. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674
NW2d 366 (2004).
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statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial unless there is a specific exception
allowing its introduction. See MRE 801, MRE 802, and People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 331; 587
NW2d 10 (1998)(BOYLE, J, concurring). Pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2), a statement that is
offered against a party and is the party’s own statement is not hearsay. Defendant’s statements
made to the police lieutenant were admissible under MRE 801(d)(2) as admissions by a partyopponent. The Confrontation Clause argument lacks merit because testimonial statements by the
previous victims were not used; rather, it was defendant’s own statements to police that were
admitted into evidence. See Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d
177 (2004)(out-of-court statement by a witness that is testimonial in nature is inadmissible under
the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
C. Judgment of Sentence
Defendant also argues that pursuant to MRE 410, the trial court erred in admitting the
judgment of sentence for his prior second-degree CSC conviction because the conviction was
pursuant to a no-contest plea. Because defendant did not raise this issue below, we review this
unpreserved claim for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
752-753, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Defendant bears the burden of showing actual
prejudice, People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 274; 715 NW2d 290 (2006), and reversal is only
warranted if the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or if the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, independent
of the defendant’s innocence, Carines, supra at 763.
In relevant part, MRE 410(2) generally provides that, “in any civil or criminal
proceeding,” a plea of no contest is inadmissible against the defendant who entered the plea.
Therefore, evidence of the prior conviction based on defendant’s plea of no contest should not
have been admitted. However, this unpreserved issue does not warrant appellate relief. Carines,
supra.
First, the trial court was not informed that defendant had pleaded no contest. At the
hearing on the prosecution’s motion to admit other uncharged acts, the prosecutor indicated that
defendant had a prior conviction. Defense counsel indicated that defendant had “pleaded guilty.”
At trial, the police lieutenant testified that defendant pleaded guilty. In rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor stated that defendant “pleaded guilty to molesting” the boy. Indeed, throughout the
proceedings, defendant did nothing to advise the trial court that he pleaded no contest. Given
defendant’s failure to take any action in this regard, he cannot now complain of an error. To
hold otherwise would allow defendant to harbor error as an appellate parachute. See People v
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Furthermore, the substance of the admissible evidence rendered the admission of the
evidence of the actual conviction harmless. The victim provided detailed testimony regarding
the charged acts. Two witnesses testified that the victim told them about defendant’s actions on
different occasions. Moreover, the prior conviction related only to the seven-year-old boy; it had
no bearing on defendant’s admissions that he touched his three-year-old daughter’s vagina on
two different occasions. In short, the erroneous admission of the judgment of conviction did not
affect the outcome and, therefore, did not affect defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We also reject defendant’s alternative argument that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to object to the evidence of the prior
conviction on MRE 410 grounds. Given the admissible evidence against defendant, there is no
basis for concluding that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to object,
the jury’s verdict would have been different. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d
713 (2007).
III. Presentence Report
We disagree with defendant’s final claim that a remand is warranted to correct an error in
his presentence investigation report (PSIR). Defendant now claims that the Criminal Justice
section of the PSIR inaccurately states on page six that he was previously convicted of firstdegree CSC, even though it is undisputed that he was only convicted of second-degree CSC.
Defendant did not raise this issue at sentencing. Regarding the prior offense, the Criminal
Justice section states that the “Charge(s)” at the time of arrest was first-degree CSC, that the
“Final Charge[]” was first-degree CSC, that there was a no contest plea in July 1991, and, after a
delayed sentence, defendant was sentenced to one year probation in March 1992. The section
does not identify the actual conviction. However, the Evaluation and Plan section and the
Agent’s Description of the Offense section both state that defendant had a prior conviction for
second-degree CSC. Consequently, the PSIR accurately reports defendant’s prior conviction as
second-degree CSC, and no correction is warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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