ARDYTHE J WILLIAMS V MEREDITH LOU THARP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ARDYTHE J. WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 280938
Benzie Circuit Court
LC No. 06-007813-CH
MEREDITH LOU THARP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murray, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendant on plaintiff’s “quiet title”1 action. We conclude that the trial court reached the right
outcome and we affirm.
At issue in this case is a determination of the parties’ rights to the property at 20514
Fewins Road, Interlochen, Michigan, 49643 (the Fewins Property), record title to which is held
in the name of plaintiff and defendant, who are mother and daughter, as joint tenants with full
rights of survivorship. In November 2000, plaintiff was the sole owner of property located at
5234 Goodrick2 Road, Traverse City, Michigan, 49684 (the Goodrick Property). On November
16, 2000, plaintiff conveyed the Goodrick Property by quitclaim deed to herself and defendant as
“joint tenants with full rights of survivorship” for “the sum of ONE AND NO/100 ($1.00)
DOLLARS and no other valuable consideration” (the Quit Claim Deed), which defendant paid
by placing “four quarters on the table.”
Sometime later, plaintiff decided to sell the Goodrick Property and use the proceeds to
purchase the Fewins Property. Because the closing on the Fewins Property occurred prior to the
closing on the Goodrick Property, plaintiff acquired a bridge loan to pay for the Fewins Property
1
Plaintiff’s claim is not asserted as an action to quiet title, but that is essentially the nature of the
action, as plaintiff seeks to have the trial court declare that she alone has rights to the property.
2
Although the deed refers to both “Goodrich” and “Goodrick” Road, there appears to be no
“Goodrich” Road in Traverse City. Thus, we conclude that the correct street name is
“Goodrick.”
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until the Goodrick Property closing occurred. Title to the Fewins Property was transferred to
plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship from a third-party by a
warranty deed dated May 30, 2001 (the Warranty Deed).
Plaintiff filed suit in October 2006, alleging that the Warranty Deed was simply an estate
planning device, not a present intent to convey a gift, and that plaintiff had mistakenly believed
that she was bequeathing the premises to defendant upon her death such that the apparent title
created in defendant could be changed at will. She also argued that defendant had paid
insufficient consideration of a single dollar and requested defendant be removed from the title
and that any interest defendant had be declared “only naked legal title” held for plaintiff’s
benefit.
Both parties moved for summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that the Warranty Deed for
the Fewins Property was intended to be a testamentary instrument as evidenced by the fact that
the property was completely under the control and possession of plaintiff, that defendant never
gave any consideration for the loan to purchase the property, never paid on the loan, was never
personally liable on the bridge loan, never paid taxes or performed upkeep on the property, and
never attempted to live there. Plaintiff also maintained that one dollar was clearly insufficient
consideration and that love and affection were clearly excluded under the terms of the deed.
Counsel did not designate which deed, but we assume it was a reference to the Quit Claim Deed,
as the Warranty Deed contains no such language.
Defendant argued that she had given plaintiff exactly the consideration proclaimed in the
Quit Claim Deed and that such consideration was often used in family transfers. Defendant also
asserted that the consideration proved that the property interest was not intended as a
bequeathment, as beneficiaries do not pay for a bequeathment. Finally, defendant argued
plaintiff’s sophisticated knowledge and use of estate planning devices rebutted any contention
that plaintiff was somehow unaware that using a deed as opposed to a will would result in
defendant receiving a present interest.
Concluding that there were no material facts in dispute, the trial court held that the deed
was not testamentary because there was no writing accompanying the deed, or any portion of the
deed, which indicated the land would continue to be plaintiff’s property during her lifetime with
the remainder to defendant at plaintiff’s death. Given that there was “a deed that passes an
interest in property, not by accident, not by deceit, or subterfuge, but by design” that “shows up
again” in the Warranty Deed,3 with no discussion between the parties that this was simply as a
testamentary instrument, the trial court concluded that “when all is said and done, this seems to
me to be a transaction wherein for reasons unbeknownst to the Court, perhaps being in a
relationship, or lack of it, or deteriorating relationship of the parties, the mother has simply
changed her mind,” and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
3
The trial court seems to refer to this property as the “Honor property.” We assume this is
because the bridge loan used to acquire the property was taken out with Honor State Bank
located in Honor, Michigan.
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We review de novo a trial court’s decision on summary disposition. Kisiel v Holz, 272
Mich App 168, 170; 725 NW2d 67 (2006). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests
the factual sufficiency of the complaint. A trial court considers affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
to the opposing party. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). If the
evidence does not create a genuine issue of any material fact, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4); Maiden, supra at 120.
The heart of this case is whether plaintiff’s execution and recording of the Quit Claim
Deed constituted a valid conveyance, thereby creating defendant’s property interest as a joint
tenant. Plaintiff’s affidavit states that she added defendant’s name as an estate-planning device
and did not intend to pass a present interest. Because plaintiff’s argument involves a question of
intent, the issue is really one of delivery: “The purpose of the delivery requirement is to show
the grantor’s intent to convey the property described in the deed.” Energetics, Ltd v Whitmill,
442 Mich 38, 53; 497 NW2d 497 (1993). See also Resh v Fox, 365 Mich 288, 291; 112 NW2d
486 (1961).
Viewed in this context, we conclude that plaintiff simply has no claim. Plaintiff’s
argument that defendant has no interest in the Fewins Property relies on plaintiff’s alleged intent
in executing the Quit Claim Deed. The Quit Claim Deed passed title to the Goodrick Property,
not the Fewins Property. It is the Warranty Deed that passed title to the Fewins Property, and
plaintiff is not the grantor in the Warranty Deed. This simple fact precludes plaintiff from
receiving any relief, as a document in which plaintiff is not the grantor cannot constitute her
testamentary device. Plaintiff and defendant received their interests in the Fewins Property
simultaneously by means of the Warranty Deed from the third-party grantor. For these reasons,
we agree with the trial court that Bigley v Souvey, 45 Mich 370; 8 NW 98 (1881) is inapposite, as
that case involved the intent of the grantor.
Plaintiff does not expressly claim, but appears to imply, that defendant is a joint tenant of
the Fewins Property only because she was a joint tenant of the Goodrick Property. Plaintiff
provided no evidence in this regard, however. The record is devoid of any explanation for
defendant’s presence on the Warranty Deed, the entire argument being based on plaintiff’s intent
in executing the Quit Claim Deed and whether the consideration provided therein was sufficient.
Plaintiff failed to either allege or provide any evidence of some agreement between the parties
that whatever testamentary intent she alleged existed in the Quit Claim Deed was somehow
transferred to the Warranty Deed. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and
leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims.” Peterson Novelties v
City of Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003). Having failed to cite any evidence
to support her argument, plaintiff has abandoned it. Id.
We note that even if we were to consider some type of transfer theory, plaintiff’s claim
still must fail. Plaintiff argues defendant has no interest in the Fewins Property because it is
based on inadequate consideration paid for defendant’s interest in the Goodrick Property.
However, absent elements of bad faith, mere inadequacy of consideration does not warrant the
setting aside of a deed. See Olson v Rasmussen, 304 Mich 639, 644; 8 NW2d 668 (1943). Also,
to the extent the transfer of the property in the Quit Claim Deed was a gift, no consideration was
necessary for the deed to be valid. Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529, 545; 251 NW2d 77 (1976);
Daane v Lovell, 83 Mich App 282, 293; 268 NW2d 377 (1978).
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We find that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant. To the
extent that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition was based on a different reason, we
uphold the decision because the trial court reached the right result. Gleason v Dep’t of
Transportation, 256 Mich App 1, 3; 662 NW2d 822 (2003).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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