TRACY EDRY V MARC ADELMAN DO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRACY EDRY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 279676
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-070853-NH
MARC ADELMAN and MARC ADELMAN,
D.O., P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Owens and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order dismissing her medical malpractice claim “for
failure to meet the burden of proof.” We affirm.
I. Facts
In February 2005, plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer. Plaintiff subsequently filed
this medical malpractice action, alleging that defendant Dr. Marc Adelman, an
Obstetrician/Gynecologist (OB/GYN), committed malpractice by failing to diagnose the cancer
or order further testing after a small three-millimeter node was detected on plaintiff’s breast
during an examination in June 2003. Plaintiff alleged that the delay in diagnosing and treating
her condition resulted in a decrease of her opportunity to survive and subjected her to more
extensive and invasive medical treatment.
Plaintiff’s oncology expert, Dr. Barry Singer, testified that plaintiff’s survival rate would
have been 95 percent if she had been diagnosed in June 2003, but had decreased to less than 20
percent by the time she was actually diagnosed. Conversely, defendants’ expert, Dr. Joel Appel,
relying on data published by the American Joint Cancer Commissions (AJCC), testified that
plaintiff had a 60 percent chance of survival when she was diagnosed in February 2005.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that Dr. Singer’s
testimony did not refute the reliability of the AJCC survival statistics, and that Dr. Singer’s
testimony that plaintiff’s chance of survival had decreased to less than 20 percent was not
sufficiently reliable to be admitted under MRE 702. Accordingly, defendants argued, plaintiff
failed to show a greater than 50 percent loss of the opportunity to survive, as required by MCL
600.2912a(2).
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Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Dr. Singer’s testimony that plaintiff
had less than a 20 percent chance of survival at the time of diagnosis was not sufficiently
supported in the scientific community to be reliable under MRE 702. The court did not
expressly grant defendants’ motion for summary disposition, but entered an order providing that
Dr. Singer would not be permitted to testify at trial. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that, without Dr. Singer’s testimony, plaintiff could not meet her burden of
proving medical malpractice. The trial court granted defendants’ motion.
II. Loss of Opportunity
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed her complaint,
because Dr. Singer’s expert testimony was sufficiently reliable under MRE 702 to create an issue
of fact with respect to whether she sustained a greater than 50 percent loss of the opportunity to
survive under MCL 600.2912a(2).
Initially, the parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review. Although plaintiff
argues that the trial court dismissed this case on summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), defendants argue that it was dismissed for reasons other than summary disposition
and, therefore, the trial court’s decision should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The
record discloses that the trial court originally ruled, in response to defendants’ motion for
summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), that plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Singer,
would not be permitted to testify at trial, but refused to state whether it was granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition. Ultimately, the trial court relied on its determination that Dr.
Singer’s testimony was not admissible and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint because it found that
plaintiff failed to set forth evidentiary support to meet the burden of proof. The abuse of
discretion standard cited by defendant is based on dismissals as a sanction for a party’s failure to
comply with a court’s order, which is not what occurred here. See Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich
App 501, 506; 536 NW2d 280 (1995). Rather, the trial court referred to plaintiff’s failure to
establish evidentiary support for her claim as the basis for dismissal. We therefore conclude that
the trial court’s decision should be reviewed under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual
support for a claim. Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 192; 670 NW2d 675 (2003).
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Trost v Buckstop Lure Co, 249 Mich App 580, 583; 644 NW2d 54 (2002). In reviewing a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court “‘must consider the available pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, and other documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and determine whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Michigan Ed Employees Mut Ins Co v Turow, 242 Mich App 112, 114; 617 NW2d 725 (2000),
quoting Unisys Corp v Comm’r of Ins, 236 Mich App 686, 689; 601 NW2d 155 (1999).
This issue also involves the admissibility of expert testimony under MRE 702. A trial
court’s decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under MRE 702 is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 401; 541 NW2d 566 (1995). As
explained in Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006), the abuse
of discretion standard is more deferential than de novo review. The standard acknowledges that
there will be circumstances in which there will be more than one reasonable and principled
outcome. Id. When the trial court selects one of these principled outcomes, it has not abused its
discretion. Id.
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MCL 600.2912a(2) provides, in pertinent part:
In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for
loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless
the opportunity was greater than 50%.
This statute was enacted in response to our Supreme Court’s decision in Falcon v Mem Hosp,
436 Mich 443; 462 NW2d 44 (1990), which first recognized the “lost opportunity” doctrine.
Stone v Williamson, 482 Mich 144, 187, 193; 753 NW2d 106 (2008) (Markman J., concurring);
Ensink v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 262 Mich App 518, 529-530; 687 NW2d 143 (2004). Under the
statute, a plaintiff must show that the loss of the opportunity to survive or achieve a better result
exceeds 50 percent. Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70, 83; 655 NW2d 569
(2002).
The parties’ experts agreed that plaintiff would have had a 95 percent chance of survival
if she had been diagnosed in June 2003. The only evidence supporting a finding that plaintiff
sustained the loss of an opportunity to survive that was greater than 50 percent was Dr. Singer’s
testimony that plaintiff’s chance of survival had decreased to less than 20 percent by the time she
was actually diagnosed. But in order for evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact to
preclude summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the evidence must be substantively
admissible. MCR 2.116(G)(6). Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that Dr.
Singer’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable to be admissible under MRE 702.
MRE 702 provides:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The party offering the evidence bears the burden of demonstrating its acceptance in the
medical community. SPECT Imaging, Inc v Allstate Ins Co, 246 Mich App 568, 578; 633 NW2d
461 (2001). As the Court explained in SPECT Imaging, id. at 578-579, the trial court is required
to:
determine the evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness of the facts and data
underlying an expert's testimony before that testimony may be admitted. To
determine whether the requisite standard of reliability has been met, the court
must determine whether the proposed testimony is derived from recognized
[medical] knowledge. To be derived from recognized [medical] knowledge, the
proposed testimony must contain inferences or assertions, the source of which
rests in an application of [medical] methods. Additionally, the inferences or
assertions must be supported by appropriate objective and independent validation
based on what is known, e.g., scientific and medical literature. This is not to say,
however, that the subject of the [medical] testimony must be known to a certainty.
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As long as the basic methodology and principles employed by an expert to reach a
conclusion are sound and create a trustworthy foundation for the conclusion
reached, the expert testimony is admissible no matter how novel. [Quoting
Nelson v American Sterilizer Co (On Remand), 223 Mich App 485, 491-491; 566
NW2d 671 (1997).]
The trial court shall undertake the threshold determination whether, under Davis-Frye,1 it has
been demonstrated that the evidence has gained general acceptance in the medical community.
SPECT Imaging, supra at 579.
In this case, Dr. Singer’s testimony clearly contradicted the AACJ standards.
Additionally, defendants’ expert, Dr. Appel, testified that it was medically improper to simply
use the number of positive lymph nodes, as Dr. Singer had done, to assess the chance of survival.
Dr. Appel also claimed that Dr. Singer’s opinion that plaintiff had less than a 20 percent chance
of survival due to the number of positive lymph nodes was not based on any scientific, technical,
or specialized knowledge, was not generally accepted within the scientific community, and could
not be substantiated by any medical evidence. At his deposition, Dr. Singer testified that his
opinion was supported by the medical literature. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to submit the
articles that Dr. Singer claimed supported his opinion, but never did so. Instead, plaintiff
presented generalized Internet articles that did not clearly support Dr. Singer’s testimony. In
particular, none of the articles that plaintiff submitted indicated that a person with plaintiff’s
pathology (i.e., tumor size and number of positive nodes) had less than a 20 percent chance of
survival. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr.
Singer’s testimony was not shown to be sufficiently accepted in the scientific community to be
reliable and, therefore, was not admissible. Without Dr. Singer’s testimony, plaintiff had no
other evidence showing that she sustained a loss of the opportunity to survive that was greater
than 50 percent.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s claim premised on the loss of an opportunity to survive fails for a
different reason. In Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 62; 631 NW2d 686
(2001), the Court concluded that “a living plaintiff may not recover for loss of an opportunity to
survive on the basis of a decrease in her chances of long-term survival.” The facts in Wickens
are similar to those presented here. In Wickens, the plaintiff’s expert opined that the defendants’
one-year delay in diagnosing breast cancer caused the plaintiff to suffer a reduction in her
chances of surviving another ten years. The Court held that the first sentence of MCL
600.2912a(2) “expressly limits recovery to injuries that have already been suffered and more
probably than not were caused by the defendant’s malpractice.” Wickens, supra at 60. Because
the plaintiff survived, she had not suffered a loss of an opportunity to survive. Id.
For these reasons, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s malpractice claim to the
extent that it was based on the loss of an opportunity to survive.
1
People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955); Frye v United States, 54 US App DC 46;
293 F 1013 (1923).
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Plaintiff additionally argues that, even if the trial court properly dismissed her lost
opportunity claim, it erred in dismissing her entire complaint because she also alleged that the
delayed diagnosis required her to undergo increased medical treatment.
Although the surviving plaintiff in Wickens was not allowed to pursue a claim for loss of
an opportunity to survive, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s claim that she suffered
more invasive medical treatment caused by a delay in diagnosis could proceed because that claim
was not premised on her decreased chances of long-term survival. Wickens, supra at 61-62. In
this case, however, plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
additional treatment aspect of her claim.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that an earlier diagnosis “would have prevented the need for
the extensive chemotherapy, radiation and the mastectomy that she has undergone.” As
defendants argued at the trial court level, only an oncologist would be qualified to offer an
opinion on the treatment options for cancer, including the impact of any delay with respect to
those options.2 Dr. Singer was plaintiff’s only oncology expert. Although plaintiff argued that
Dr. Singer was qualified to offer testimony on the subject of additional treatment, she offered
nothing to indicate what that testimony might be. Dr. Singer never testified in his deposition that
plaintiff was required to undergo additional treatment because of the delay in diagnosis, and Dr.
Singer’s affidavit of merit is similarly silent on this issue. To the extent that Dr. Singer had an
opinion to offer on this subject, plaintiff could have presented that opinion in the form of an
affidavit, but she did not do so, nor did she offer anything else indicating either that Dr. Singer
was prepared to testify that the delay in diagnosis required her to undergo additional treatment,
or what that testimony might be.
Without a showing of evidentiary support for the additional treatment aspect of plaintiff’s
claim, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude either that Dr. Singer had admissible
testimony to offer, or that a genuine issue of material fact existed to preclude summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
2
Both of plaintiff’s ob/gyn experts deferred any opinion on the growth rate of her cancer to an
oncologist.
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