IN RE SEAN LUKE TUCKER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SEAN LUKE TUCKER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 285268
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000006-NA
STEPHANIE TUCKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order that terminated her parental rights to the
minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 344345; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The child was made a temporary ward after respondent pleaded no
contest to the amended petition. The petition’s allegations concerned respondent’s failure to
protect the child from her boyfriend’s criminal activity, including a drug arrest and an instance of
domestic violence. Respondent was ordered to undergo a CARE assessment, attend Al-Anon,
complete a psychological evaluation, and attend parenting classes. Though the boyfriend was
offered a treatment plan, respondent testified that she asked him not to participate. By the time
of the termination hearing, respondent was in compliance with her treatment plan, but she had
taken up with her boyfriend once again. The progress respondent had made was called into
question now that she was back with her abuser. Because the boyfriend had not been involved
with petitioner, there was no way for the agency to actually monitor his progress. Essentially,
the parties were back to where they were at the beginning of this case.
There was also evidence that respondent could not properly parent the child. A
psychological evaluation revealed that respondent was not within normal limits for
understanding the basic developmental needs of a child. In addition, her interest in the child
began to wane throughout the proceedings and she stopped visiting with him. Respondent
argues that the failure to visit was the result of allowing the child, who was 13 years old, to
decide whether he wanted to see her. However, respondent testified that she was free to visit the
child at his uncle’s house at any time the uncle was there to supervise. She did not do so because
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she and the uncle did not get along. The worker testified, “I believe that over all the mom lacks
an appropriate interest, lacks the normal parental affection or sentiment for the youth. I believe
that she’s not benefited from a good portion of the parent agency agreement. I don’t believe that
she has the insight to manage Sean or an adolescent’s behaviors. She’s not able to communicate
with him, doesn’t seem to have an interest in the things that interest him.”
The trial court also did not clearly err in concluding that the child’s best interests did not
preclude termination of respondent’s parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors,
462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). As discussed above, respondent did not appear
to have the ability to care for the child. In addition, although respondent showed a desire to enter
into family therapy, the expert concluded that such therapy would not benefit the child and
would not restore their relationship. The child was entitled to permanence and stability.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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