IN RE ZAVION JEREMIAH THOMAS MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ZAVION JEREMIAH THOMAS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 284754
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-737608-NA
SHANIQUE SIMONE ROCHEL THOMAS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), (g), and (l). We affirm.
Respondent first argues that the trial court violated her due process rights when it entered
an order to take the child into custody pursuant to MCL 3.963(B). This issue has not been
preserved for appeal because respondent did not raise it below. Rooyakker & Sitz, PLLC v
Plante & Moran, PLLC, 276 Mich App 146, 162; 742 NW2d 409 (2007). Therefore, the issue is
reviewed for plain error. Kloian v Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232, 242; 725 NW2d 671 (2006).
The application for and issuance of an order taking the child into custody is not the equivalent of
the preliminary hearing. It precedes the preliminary hearing and may even precede the filing of a
petition. See MCR 3.963(C) and the staff comments. The trial court began the preliminary
hearing within 24 hours after issuance of the order as required by MCR 3.965(A)(1), and
respondent appeared at the hearing and requested counsel. The hearing was adjourned to secure
counsel and, when it resumed, respondent appeared with counsel and was served with a copy of
the petition. Thus, there was no error.
We also find no error in the manner in which the court conducted the proceedings leading
to termination. It held a bifurcated adjudicatory and dispositional hearing as required by In re
AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 539-540; 711 NW2d 426 (2006). To the extent respondent argues
that the court erred in taking jurisdiction because its findings at the adjudicatory hearing “were
not based on clear and convincing evidence,” her argument must be rejected. The clear and
convincing evidence standard is not applicable to the adjudication; rather, jurisdiction is to be
determined by a preponderance of the evidence. MCR 3.972(C)(1); MCR 3.977(E)(2). To the
-1-
extent respondent contends that the court should have held a bifurcated dispositional hearing,
whereby only legally admissible evidence regarding the statutory grounds for termination was
received at the first part, she has abandoned that argument by failing to cite any applicable
authority in support of it. Coble v Green, 271 Mich App 382, 391; 722 NW2d 898 (2006).
Further, in absence of evidence to the contrary, the judge is presumed to have followed the law
and to have ignored errors and decided the case on properly admitted evidence. People v Jones,
168 Mich App 191, 194; 423 NW2d 614 (1988). The trial court received a certified copy of the
termination order regarding respondent’s first child, which was legally admissible under MRE
803(8) and MRE 902(4). This alone established a statutory basis for termination under
§ 19b(3)(l) and, therefore, any error in relying on the additional grounds for termination would
have been harmless. In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
Finally, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was not in the child’s best interests. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407
(2000); MCL 712A.19b(5). Therefore, the court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s
parental rights to the child. In re Trejo, supra at 356-357.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.