PEOPLE OF MI V CORTLAND ANTONIO MILLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 281690
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-005498-FH
CORTLAND ANTONIO MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Borrello and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this prosecutor’s appeal, plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court’s decision to
suppress evidence and dismiss this case. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. This
appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This case began when two police officers in a semi-marked police car observed and
approached defendant’s truck, which was illegally parked at the time.1 The police officers
activated their vehicle’s lights, and one officer approached the truck on each side. Defendant
was alone and in the driver’s seat; one of the officers described him as appearing very nervous,
with shaky hands. Defendant turned on his truck’s interior light when he was asked for his
license and registration, and the officer spotted a plastic baggie with a twisted knot protruding
from defendant’s jacket pocket. The officer stated that he thus recognized what was routine
packaging for controlled substances. The officer then signaled to his partner that a search for
narcotics was in order. The officer continued that, upon assisting defendant in leaving his truck,
he was able to see what appeared to be powder cocaine inside the pocket. The officer testified
that, in his 12 years with the Detroit Police, he had seen cocaine in its various forms over 100
times.
Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that it was the product of an
illegal search. The trial court held a hearing and initially concluded that the search and seizure
were proper, and then denied a motion for reconsideration. The trial court acknowledged the
1
Defendant argued that he was not in fact illegally parked at the time in question, but the
trial court concluded from the exhibits that the police had indeed identified an illegally parked
vehicle.
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considerable experience of the officer who observed the cocaine, and regarded the observation of
apparent drug packaging, coupled with defendant’s nervousness, as grounds justifying asking
defendant to leave his car and submit to a pat-down search. Defendant then offered a guilty plea.
At sentencing, however, the trial court reversed itself. The court declared that a reasonable
person, situated as defendant was at the time in question, would not have felt at liberty to leave,
and thus that a seizure of defendant had taken place, and that for that reason the evidence would
be suppressed, and the case dismissed. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice, and
this appeal followed. Plaintiff does not contest any of the trial court’s factual findings, but rather
argues that defendant was not seized at the time in question or, alternatively, that defendant’s
parking violation justified the seizure.
Evidence obtained in the course of a violation of a suspect’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution is subject to suppression at trial. People v
Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). See also Mapp v Ohio, 367 US
643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment). In reviewing a trial court’s decision following a
suppression hearing, we review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, but review the
legal conclusions de novo. See People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 644; 599 NW2d 736
(1999). The trial court’s determination was clearly that it regarded defendant’s seizure as
unlawful, and thus the evidence obtained was the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v
United States, 371 US 471, 487-488; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).
On appeal, plaintiff expressly takes issue with none of the trial court’s factual findings.
Plaintiff first argues that the court erred in holding that defendant was seized when officers asked
for his license and registration. Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in holding that a
parking violation did not provide a valid basis for the stop and inquiry. We conclude that the
trial court correctly held that defendant was seized, but the trial court incorrectly regarded the
seizure as an illegal one.
Plaintiff first argues that defendant was not seized. We disagree. The police may
approach a person on the street for questioning without seizing that person, unless intimidating
circumstances reasonably lead the person approached to believe that he or she is not free to
leave. People v Shankle, 227 Mich App 690, 693; 557 NW2d 471 (1998). This includes a mere
request for license and registration from a person in a parked car. Id. at 697-698. In this case,
however, in light of evidence that the police pulled up behind defendant and activated their
police lights, then approached defendant from both sides of his car, we find no clear error in the
trial court’s conclusion that defendant did not reasonably feel at liberty not to cooperate with the
police and leave the scene at that moment. Therefore, defendant was seized within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment at the time.
However, plaintiff also argues that if defendant was seized, that seizure was justified and
lawful. We agree. A parking violation is a violation of law that justifies the police in requesting
that the driver produce his driver’s license. People v Ingram, 412 Mich 200, 204; 312 NW2d
652 (1981). See also United States v Copeland, 321 F3d 582, 594 (CA 6, 2003) (the police “can
effect a stop based upon a driver’s failure to comply with Michigan’s parking regulations”). The
United States Supreme Court has held that it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for
the police to stop a car and detain the driver to check the driver’s license or the vehicle’s
registration, “except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable
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suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the
vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law.” Delaware v Prouse,
440 US 648, 663; 99 S Ct 1391; 59 L Ed 2d 660 (1979).
We conclude that, by implication, the police in this case legally detained defendant for
the purpose of checking his license and registration, because at the time they had a reasonable
suspicion that defendant’s vehicle or its occupant were subject to seizure for a violation of law.
The resulting observation by one officer that defendant apparently had drug packaging on his
person, coupled with defendant’s display of nervousness, afforded probable cause to detain
defendant further and search him for the suspected contraband. Therefore, We reverse the
decision below and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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