PEOPLE OF MI V GAYLEN DARRELL BOND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 30, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280616
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-027629-FH
GAYLEN DARRELL BOND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction of larceny by false pretenses
between $1,000 and $20,000, MCL 750.218(4)(a). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third
habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to a term of 24 months to 10 years in prison. We affirm, and
decide this appeal without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The evidence presented at trial established that defendant falsely represented that he had
an association with Safe Haven, a shelter, to obtain food items from Hidden Harvest, a nonprofit
organization that distributed food to shelters and other assistance programs. Defendant contends
on appeal that the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence of the fair market value of the
items he took from Hidden Harvest. “The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence in a
criminal case is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the people, would
warrant a reasonable juror in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Nowack, 462
Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). “The standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court
is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury
verdict.” Id. at 400.
The prosecution introduced several lists detailing the items defendant accepted from
Hidden Harvest in February and March 2006, which he did not deliver to Safe Haven.
Additionally, the prosecution presented testimony by Patricia Galbraith, a part-owner and
longtime employee of a Saginaw County market, whom the trial court certified as an expert
qualified to estimate the fair market value of grocery items in Saginaw County. According to
Galbraith, the listed items taken by defendant, most of which were beverages, had wholesale
values between February and March 2006 totaling in excess of $1300: the 52 cases of Pepsi
products taken by defendant for his personal use valued $803.40, and the quantities of Gatorade
he took valued $243.30.
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Defendant theorized that the items he took were past their “sell-by dates,” and thus had
fair market values less than estimated by Galbraith. But no evidence at trial specifically tended
to demonstrate that the products taken by defendant in February and March 2006 had passed
their sell-by dates, and a Hidden Harvest employee characterized the Gatorade and soda pop as
“nonperishable.” Moreover, “[i]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine
what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be
accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002); see
also People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006), aff’d 482 Mich 851
(2008) (observing that the prosecution need not negate every potential reasonable theory of
innocence). In conclusion, the prosecution introduced ample evidence regarding the value of the
items taken by defendant, and a rational juror viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution reasonably could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
absconded with items valued at more than $1,000.
Defendant also maintains that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of
Galbraith, in violation of the Confrontation Clauses of the federal and Michigan constitutions,
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Defendant complains that the trial court erred by
sustaining the prosecution’s objections to defense counsel’s questions regarding sell-by dates.
Because defendant did not object to the trial court’s rulings by asserting a violation of the
Confrontation Clause, we consider his claim only to determine whether any plain error affected
his substantial rights. People v Walker (On Remand), 273 Mich App 56, 65-66; 728 NW2d 902
(2006).
“The right of cross-examination does not include a right to cross-examine on irrelevant
issues and may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests of the trial process or of society.”
People v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). “(T)rial judges retain wide
latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant.” Id., quoting Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d
674 (1986).
That the trial court allowed defense counsel to cross-examine other witnesses regarding
the sell-by dates of the items defendant stole does not render improper the court’s limitation of
the cross-examination of Galbraith. The previous trial witnesses had testified in limited respects
about whether the items taken were in fact beyond their sell-by dates. The testimony of these
witnesses, who were employees of Safe Haven or Hidden Harvest, established that some
products Hidden Harvest received had passed their expiration dates, although Hidden Harvest
did not keep track of these past-date items in any regard. Galbraith offered testimony concerning
a different topic, the value of grocery items, and had no contact with the actual items taken by
defendant; she was called as an expert to approximate their value on the basis of the evidence
presented at trial and her familiarity with and knowledge of the local grocery market.
The trial court sustained several relevance-based prosecution objections to defense
counsel’s inquiries of Galbraith, namely questions whether (1) a retailer “[c]an . . . actually sell
the merchandise . . . as you’re coming up close on the sell-by date”; (2) “the retailer . . .
experience[s] any financial loss when things are nearing the sell-by dates”; and (3) Galbraith’s
store “donate[d] pop to Hidden Harvest.” Defendant suggests that had Galbraith admitted under
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further questioning that a significant portion of the grocery items taken by defendant had passed
their expiration dates, and that no market existed for food that had reached its expiration date,
Galbraith’s estimate regarding the value of those items may have changed, or her credibility may
have been called into question. However, defendant’s reasoning rests wholly on speculation, and
is based on an assumption itself, that a significant portion of the items taken by defendant had in
fact passed their sell-by dates; this contention has no basis in the evidence.
Furthermore, the trial court did permit defense counsel to pose to Galbraith several
questions about sell-by dates, successfully eliciting testimony concerning their significance, that
product manufacturers designated the dates, and a store’s procedure for replacing past-date
goods. Considering the broad discretion vested in the trial court to impose reasonable limitations
on a party’s right to cross-examination, we conclude that the court selected a reasonable and
principled outcome in finding that some of Galbraith’s testimony regarding sell-by dates
qualified as irrelevant and, as such, properly subject to limitation. People v Babcock, 469 Mich
247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Because the trial court did not deprive defendant of a
“reasonable opportunity to test the truth” of Galbraith’s testimony, no plain error occurred.
Adamski, supra at 138.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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