PEOPLE OF MI V MONTEZ DELANO BAKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 30, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278951
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-014398-01
MONTEZ DELANO BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a),
stalking, MCL 750.411h, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (second offense), MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of life for the murder conviction, two to five
years for the felon-in-possession conviction, and one year for the stalking conviction, to be
served consecutive to a five-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of murdering his estranged wife, Tamiko Singleton, during the
early morning hours of August 10, 2006. Defendant first argues that the evidence was
insufficient to identify him as the person who shot and killed Singleton. We disagree.
In determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, an
appellate court is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296; 519 NW2d
108 (1994). This Court should not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. People v Bulmer, 256 Mich App 33, 36; 662 NW2d
117 (2003). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn thereform may be
sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. Id. at 37.
The evidence showed that defendant had a history of threats and violence against
Singleton. Singleton eventually moved out of defendant’s home and moved in with her mother,
but defendant continued to follow and call her. During the day before Singleton was killed,
defendant began following her and calling her repeatedly on her cell phone. He sent one text
message that stated, “Until the day you die, you will always be Mrs. Tamiko Baker.” On the
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night Singleton was shot, defendant confronted her at a store. After Singleton rebuffed
defendant’s effort at reconciliation, defendant told her to “watch her back.” Later that night,
Singleton died as the result of a gunshot in the head. A witness testified that, after hearing a
gunshot, he observed defendant leaving the area of the shooting and placing an apparent gun in
his waist area. Defendant got into a vehicle and sped off. Although it was dark outside, the
witness testified that the area was illuminated by a street light, that defendant walked right near
him, and that he looked at defendant several times. The witness knew defendant from seeing
him with Singleton on prior occasions.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to
establish defendant’s identity as the person who shot and killed Singleton beyond a reasonable
doubt. The credibility of the identification testimony was a matter for the trier of fact to resolve
and this Court will not resolve it anew. People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381
(2000).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Singleton’s April 7, 2006,
police statement regarding defendant’s assault of Singleton on April 6, 2006. Defendant argues
that the admission of this evidence violated his constitutional right of confrontation. We agree,
but conclude that the error was harmless.
A defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him. People v Chambers, 277
Mich App 1, 10; 742 NW2d 610 (2007). Under Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct
1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court
testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. People v Jambor (On Remand), 273 Mich App 477, 487; 729
NW2d 569 (2007).
In this case, the prosecutor conceded that Singleton’s prior police statement was
testimonial, but argued that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine allowed its admission. The
trial court agreed, concluding that defendant forfeited his right to confront Singleton by killing
her. In People v Jones, 270 Mich App 208, 212; 714 NW2d 362 (2006), this Court discussed the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, explaining:
MRE 804(b)(6) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement
by a declarant made unavailable by the opponent. If the declarant is unavailable
as a witness, the rule allows admission of “[a] statement offered against a party
that has engaged in or encouraged wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” MRE 804(b)(6). MRE
804(b)(6), adopted in 2001, is nearly identical to FRE 804(b)(6), except that the
Michigan exception applies if a party “has engaged in or encouraged
wrongdoing” rather than “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing” (emphasis
added). These rules are a codification of the common-law equitable doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing, first recognized in Reynolds v United States, 98 US
145; 25 L Ed 244 (1879). Under the doctrine, a defendant forfeits his or her
constitutional right of confrontation if a witness's absence results from
wrongdoing procured by the defendant. [Citation and footnote omitted.]
As explained in Reynolds, supra at 158:
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The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should
be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to
supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own
wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses
against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his
privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is
supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional
rights have been violated.
Defendant argues that the doctrine is not applicable in this case because there was no
evidence that he killed Singleton in order to prevent her from testifying. Although plaintiff
asserts that such a showing is not required,1 the United States Supreme Court recently held
otherwise in Giles v California, ___ US ___; 128 S Ct 2678; 171 L Ed 2d 488 (2008). In Giles,
the Supreme Court concluded that the forfeiture doctrine applies only if a defendant’s actions
were undertaken for the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying. Id. at 128 S Ct 2683.
In this case, the trial court agreed with the prosecutor that the rule applied broadly in situations
involving a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing, without considering whether defendant’s actions
here were intended to prevent Singleton from testifying. Because the trial court failed to require
a showing that defendant intended to prevent Singleton from testifying, and there was no
evidence suggesting that defendant killed Singleton for that purpose, the trial court erred in
concluding that defendant forfeited his right to confront Singleton.
When a constitutional error is preserved, a new trial is required unless it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.
People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 179; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). In this case, the impact of
Singleton’s April 7, 2006, police statement was to show that defendant had previously assaulted
Singleton and threatened her. However, there was other evidence of defendant’s history of
violence and threats toward Singleton. Singleton’s mother testified that she observed bruises on
Singleton’s body and that Singleton moved in with her because she was tired of being beaten by
defendant. Further, the disputed evidence involved an assault that occurred more than four
months before Singleton was killed. The impact of this evidence paled in comparison to the
evidence of defendant’s conduct during the day and hours shortly before Singleton was killed.
The evidence showed that during the day before Singleton was killed, defendant began following
her around and repeatedly calling her on her cell phone, causing her to become frightened and
concerned for her safety. Defendant also sent threatening text messages to Singleton, including
that, “Until the day you die, you will always be Mrs. Tamiko Baker.” Defendant was also
observed driving up and down the street of the house where Singleton was staying on the night
she was killed. Defendant later followed Singleton to a party store, confronted her, and asked
her to take him back, but she refused his request and told him that he was embarrassing her.
1
The prosecutor conceded at oral arguments that Giles “cuts a major hole in our argument on
appeal,” that the “reasoning of Giles undercuts our argument,” and that the “theory of
admissibility relied on by the lower court cannot survive on appeal.”
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Defendant’s conduct caused Singleton to call the police and report that defendant was stalking
her. Shortly before Singleton was shot, she received a phone call from defendant, who told her,
“Bitch, you better watch your back.”
Furthermore, the principal issue for the jury to resolve at trial was defendant’s
identification as the person who shot Singleton. The evidence of defendant’s April 6, 2006,
assault of Singleton was not particularly helpful in resolving that issue. Although evidence of
defendant’s volatile relationship with Singleton was probative of defendant’s motive and intent,
as explained previously, there was ample other evidence of defendant’s history of violence and
threats toward Singleton apart from the April 6 assault, including, most significantly, compelling
evidence of defendant’s threatening conduct and rebuffed attempt at reconciliation shortly before
Singleton was shot. Identification testimony was provided by a witness who was familiar with
defendant and who testified that he observed defendant fleeing the area of the shooting and
placing an apparent gun in his waist area. The disputed evidence did not aid the jury in resolving
the credibility of this identification testimony. It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found defendant guilty of the charged offenses even without the
evidence of the April 6 assault. Therefore, the erroneous admission of Singleton’s April 7, 2006,
police statement does not require reversal.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress a witness’s
photographic identification of defendant, and subsequent in-court identification, on the ground
that the police improperly conducted a photographic showup, instead of a live lineup. A trial
court’s decision to admit identification evidence will not be reversed unless it is clearly
erroneous. Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake was made. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993).
Defendant argues that the police were required to conduct a live lineup, instead of a
photographic showup, because he was in custody at the time of the identification procedure.
When an accused is in custody or can be compelled to appear, identification by photographic
showup should not be made unless a legitimate reason for doing so exists. Id. at 298; People v
Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 186-187; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), overruled in part on other grounds in
People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602; 684 NW2d 267 (2004); People v Strand, 213 Mich App 100,
104; 539 NW2d 739 (1995). Circumstances that might justify use of a photographic showup
include: (1) it is not possible to arrange a proper lineup, (2) there is an insufficient number of
persons available with the accused’s physical characteristics, (3) the case requires immediate
identification, (4) the witnesses are distant from the location of the accused, and (5) the accused
refuses to participate in a lineup and by his actions seeks to destroy the value of the
identification. Anderson, supra at 186-187 n 22; People v Davis, 146 Mich App 537, 546; 381
NW2d 759 (1985).
In this case, defendant was not in custody in Wayne County for the murder charges when
the photographic showup was conducted. Instead, he was in custody in Macomb County on an
unrelated domestic violence warrant. The trial court found that there was no valid reason to
request defendant’s presence at a lineup in Wayne County because he had not been identified as
a suspect in the murder case yet. Because there was a legitimate reason for conducting a
photographic showup instead of a live lineup, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress the witness’s pretrial and in-court identifications.
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Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give a
missing witness instruction, CJI2d 5.12, after the prosecution failed to produce two witnesses,
Christopher Calhoun and Antoine Owens, for trial. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s determination of due diligence and the appropriateness
of a missing witness instruction for an abuse of discretion. People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379,
389; 677 NW2d 76 (2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that
does not fall within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Young, 276 Mich
App 446, 448; 740 NW2d 347 (2007).
As this Court explained in Eccles, supra at 388,
a prosecutor who endorses a witness under MCL 767.40a(3) is obliged to exercise
due diligence to produce that witness at trial. A prosecutor who fails to produce
an endorsed witness may show that the witness could not be produced despite the
exercise of due diligence. If the trial court finds a lack of due diligence, the jury
should be instructed that it may infer that the missing witness's testimony would
have been unfavorable to the prosecution's case. [Citations omitted.]
The trial court conducted a due diligence hearing to determine the efforts made to locate
the two witnesses. The evidence showed that the police checked several known addresses in an
attempt to locate the witnesses, but were unsuccessful in securing their presence. There was also
evidence that both witnesses appeared to be avoiding the authorities. Christopher Calhoun had
told a relative that he did not want to get involved, and there was an outstanding probation
warrant for Antoine Owens’s arrest. Although defendant asserts that additional efforts could
have been made to locate the witnesses, due diligence is the attempt to do everything reasonable,
not everything possible, to obtain the presence of a witness. People v Cummings, 171 Mich App
577, 585; 430 NW2d 790 (1988). Because the evidence showed that reasonable efforts were
made to locate the witnesses and secure their presence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to give the missing witness instruction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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