PEOPLE OF MI V BRITTANY BIANCA WALKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 28, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 284233
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-029160-FJ
BRITTANY BIANCA WALKER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to
suppress her confession. Because we conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
defendant’s confession was voluntary, we reverse.
I
On February 7, 2007, defendant, a juvenile, was arrested by police conducting a search of
her house pursuant to a warrant. Defendant was brought to the police department headquarters
and, upon being questioned, confessed to the subsequently charged crimes.
Plaintiff commenced proceedings against defendant in the family court to waive
jurisdiction over defendant to the trial court. After a phase one probable cause hearing,
defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2); MCL 750.157a, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), two counts of
felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. After a phase two hearing, the family court waived jurisdiction of defendant to
the trial court.
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress her confession on the basis that it was
obtained in violation of MCL 764.27. Concluding that defendant’s confession was involuntary
under the totality of the circumstances and that suppression of a statement obtained in violation
of MCL 764.27 is required if the delay in bringing the juvenile before the family court is for the
purpose of extracting a confession, the trial court suppressed defendant’s confession. We
granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. People v Walker, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered April 29, 2008 (Docket No. 284233).
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II
On appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s confession
because it focused on the reason for taking defendant to police headquarters and it failed to fully
and accurately consider the totality of the circumstances. We agree.
A
We review de novo a trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress. People v
Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 563; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). However, we will not disturb a trial
court’s findings of fact following a suppression hearing unless the findings are clearly erroneous.
People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). A trial court’s factual findings
are clearly erroneous if, after a review of the record, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
B
The confession of a juvenile is admissible if, under the totality of the circumstances, the
statement was voluntary. In re SLL, 246 Mich App 204, 209; 631 NW2d 775 (2001). “The test
of voluntariness is whether, considering the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, the
confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, or whether
the accused’s will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired.” Givans, supra at 121. In applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine
the admissibility of a juvenile’s confession, a court must consider the following factors:
(1) whether the requirements of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602;
16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), have been met and the defendant clearly understands and
waives those rights, (2) the degree of police compliance with MCL 764.27; MSA
28.886 and the juvenile court rules, (3) the presence of an adult parent, custodian,
or guardian, (4) the juvenile defendant’s personal background, (5) the accused’s
age, education, and intelligence level, (6) the extent of the defendant’s prior
experience with the police, (7) the length of detention before the statement was
made, (8) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and (9) whether
the accused was injured, intoxicated, in ill health, physically abused or threatened
with abuse, or deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention. [Id.]
Below, defendant moved to suppress her confession on the basis that she was interrogated
in violation of MCL 764.27. This statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided in . . . section 600.606 . . . if a child less than
17 years of age is arrested, with or without a warrant, the child shall be taken
immediately before the family division of circuit court of the county where the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the officer making the arrest shall
immediately make and file, or cause to be made and filed, a petition against the
child . . . .
A statement obtained in violation of MCL 764.27 is not subject to automatic suppression.
People v Hall, 249 Mich App 262, 267; 643 NW2d 253 (2002), remanded in part on other
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grounds 467 Mich 888 (2002); People v Good, 186 Mich App 180, 188; 463 NW2d 213 (1990).
Rather, as indicated above, the violation is one factor to consider in applying the totality of the
circumstances test. Hall, supra at 267.1
In considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant’s statement was
voluntary. The interviewing officers informed defendant of her Miranda rights, and defendant
clearly understood and waived her rights. Defendant was 16 years and 10 months old, in the
eleventh grade, and “was doing okay in school.” She received As, Bs, and Cs, and was on track
to graduate; she had no learning problems. At the time of questioning, defendant was not
injured, intoxicated, in ill health or physically abused, nor was she threatened with abuse or
deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention. Although an adult parent was not present during
the questioning, defendant, as acknowledged by the trial court in ruling on plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, had prior experience with the police.
The arresting officer failed to comply with MCL 764.27. Rather than immediately
bringing defendant before the family court, the officer brought defendant to the police
department headquarters for the purpose of questioning her regarding her involvement in the
crimes. However, the officer believed that defendant would be treated as an adult under the
automatic waiver provision of MCL 600.606 and MCL 764.1f. Because MCL 764.27 does not
apply to juveniles charged as adults, People v Brooks, 184 Mich App 793, 797-798; 459 NW2d
1
We recognize that in People in Jordan, 149 Mich App 568, 577; 386 NW2d 594 (1986), this
Court adopted “the White exclusionary rule” to violations of MCL 764.27. This rule, set forth in
People v White, 392 Mich 404; 221 NW2d 357 (1974), provided that not every confession
obtained during an unreasonable prearraignment delay, see MCL 764.13, must be excluded, but
that where the delay was used as a tool to extract the confession, the exclusionary rule requires
suppression of the confession. Id. However, in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429
NW2d 781 (1988), the Supreme Court, after examining its prior case law, including White,
regarding the suppression of a confession obtained in MCL 764.13, which it noted had been
labeled “schizophrenic,” held that “unnecessary delay” is only one factor in determining whether
the statement was voluntary. The Supreme Court stated:
In relegating prearraignment delay to its status as one of several factors to
be considered in judging the voluntariness of a confession, we do not condone the
failure of the police to comply with the statutes. An arrested suspect should not
be subjected to prolonged, unexplained delay prior to arraignment; and such delay
should be a signal to the trial court that the voluntariness of a confession obtained
during this period may have been impaired. However, we hold that an otherwise
competent confession should not be excluded solely because of a delay in
arraignment. [Id. at 335.]
From Cipriano, we conclude that a violation of MCL 764.27 is only factor in determining the
voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession. See Good, supra at 188. We further believe that, if the
violation was used solely as a tool to extract a confession, the violation may weigh heavily
toward a conclusion that the confession was involuntary.
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313 (1990), the arresting officer did not intentionally violate the statute.2 Moreover, we disagree
with the trial court’s conclusion that the periods of detention and questioning were of a
prolonged nature. Defendant was detained approximately an hour before she was questioned,3
and within forty minutes of being questioned, defendant admitted, in some form, to her
involvement in the crimes. The interviewing officers then took a 20-minute break before
questioning defendant for approximately another 40 minutes. There is no indication that the
officers engaged in any coercive behavior.4
Considering the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s confession was the product of a
free and unconstrained choice. Givans, supra at 121. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
order suppressing defendant’s confession.
Reversed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Michael J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
2
The purpose of suppressing a confession obtained in violation of a court rule is to deter official
misconduct. See Cipriano, supra at 332; Good, supra at 187-188. Here, because there was no
official misconduct, suppressing defendant’s confession would not serve to deter any future
misconduct.
3
This delay was caused by the arresting officer’s completion of the search of defendant’s house.
4
The defendant testified that she decided to tell the interviewing officers the truth when one of
the officers told her that he knew she was lying.
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