LARRY BEARUP V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY BEARUP,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2008
Plaintiff,
and
DALE PARKER, JAMES WALLACE, CHESTER
NETHING, CHERYL SCHUPPLER, SANDRA
THEDFORD, Personal Representative of the Estate
of RONNIE THEDFORD, WILLIAM SPOHN,
DEANATRIS ARMSTRONG, Personal
Representative of the Estate of RETINA
HARRISTON, and BETTY ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
ROBERT A. MARSAC,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
CINCINNATI MILACRON, d/b/a CINCINNATI
MILACRON MARKETING, PRODUCTS
DIVISION, and CASTROL INDUSTRIAL, INC.,
Defendants,
and
QUAKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
LARRY BEARUP, DALE PARKER, JAMES
WALLACE, CHESTER NETHING, CHERYL
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No. 272654
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-066364-NO
SCHUPPLER, SANDRA THEDFORD, Personal
Representative of the Estate of RONNIE
THEDFORD, WILLIAM SPOHN, DEANATRIS
ARMSTRONG, Personal Representative of the
Estate of RETINA HARRISTON, and BETTY
ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
ROBERT A. MARSAC,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
CINCINNATI MILACRON, d/b/a CINCINNATI
MILACRON MARKETING, PRODUCTS
DIVISION, and CASTROL INDUSTRIAL INC.,
No. 272666
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-066364-NO
Defendants,
and
QUAKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Borrello and Gleicher, JJ.
GLEICHER, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the sophisticated user doctrine does not apply to
plaintiffs’ negligence claims other than those premised on a failure to warn theory of liability.
Furthermore, because record evidence reveals that defendant Quaker Chemical Corporation may
have possessed actual knowledge regarding its draw compounds’ defects, the circuit court should
consider whether the sophisticated user doctrine applies to plaintiffs’ failure to warn and breach
of warranty claims.
I. The Claims Contained in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs are former employees of General Motors Corporation (GM). Plaintiffs’
amended complaint alleges that Quaker manufactured and supplied GM with chemical products,
including draw compounds, and that Quaker “entered into contracts to monitor” the use of the
chemicals at GM’s metal fabrication plant. Plaintiffs also assert that Quaker provided services
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“to help [GM] in the administration” of the chemicals. Plaintiffs’ complaint pleads three distinct
causes of action against Quaker: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability.
Plaintiffs’ negligence claim avers that Quaker breached a duty to warn of the hazards of
the draw compounds, and additionally raises 10 other distinct allegations of negligence.
According to the amended complaint, Quaker failed to:
a.
… make certain that proper guards and ventilation were installed
and maintained to prevent short and long term exposure to metal working fluids
and their aerosols and mist.
b.
… protect Plaintiff’s [sic] from continuous exposures, excessive
use and over exposure to metal working fluids and their aerosols [and] mist.
c.
… monitor and . . . control effectively the presence and growth of
bacteria, mold and fungus and other biological contaminates in the metal working
fluids to which plaintiff’s [sic] were exposed.
d.
… manage and coordinate the dumping, cleaning and refilling of
the areas which supplied the fresh metal working fluids to the various machines
and areas of the plant in which they were used.
e.
… warn Plaintiff’s [sic] of the adverse health affects [sic] or
hazards associated with the chronic use and exposure to metal working fluids and
their aerosols and mists when it knew and/or should have known of such affects
[sic] and hazards presented by exposure to metal working fluids particularly used
in unsafe concentrations in poorly ventilated areas without respirators.
f.
. . . provide metal working fluids that were safe or fit for the
reasonably foreseeable uses despite its’ [sic] expressed/implied warranties and
permitting or directing or allowing dangerous and hazardous metal working fluids
to flow or to be pumped or used in Plaintiff’s [sic] work areas.
g.
… provide Plaintiffs and necessary personnel protective equipment
including, but not limited to respirators.
h.
… investigate whether the metal working fluids it manufactured,
distributed and supplied to General Motors would be used in such a way as to
have a dangerous toxic impact on Plaintiffs.
i.
… hire, train and supervise properly qualified competent persons
to carry out the responsibilities at the Defendant General Motors Metal
Fabricating Plant at all times material to this proceeding. . . .
Quaker sought summary disposition of all of plaintiffs’ negligence claims based on the
sophisticated user doctrine, and the majority applies the doctrine to conclude that the circuit
court should have granted summary disposition of all of plaintiffs’ claims, including those that
have nothing to do with Quaker’s failure to warn of the dangers of its chemicals.
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II. The Limits of the Sophisticated User Doctrine
In Michigan, the sophisticated user doctrine is a creature of statute. In MCL 600.2947(4),
the Legislature has provided,
Except to the extent a state or federal statute or regulation requires a
manufacturer to warn, a manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability
action for failure to provide an adequate warning if the product is provided for
use by a sophisticated user. [Emphasis supplied].
“An anchoring rule of jurisprudence, and the foremost rule of statutory construction, is
that courts are to effect the intent of the Legislature.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466
Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). In Roberts, our Supreme Court explained that “a court may
read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature
as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Id. In ascertaining legislative intent, we “must
give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute.” Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471
Mich 540, 549; 685 NW2d 275 (2004) (internal quotation omitted). “The Court must consider
both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the
statutory scheme.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). This Court must avoid any construction of
the statute that would render a statutory provision nugatory or surplusage. People v Hill, 269
Mich App 505, 515; 715 NW2d 301 (2006).
By its plain and unambiguous terms, the statutory sophisticated user doctrine applies only
to product liability claims “for failure to provide an adequate warning.” Plaintiffs’ complaint
includes failure to warn allegations that potentially remain subject to summary dismissal
pursuant to MCL 600.2947(4), in the absence of a statutory exception. However, the other
negligence allegations pleaded in plaintiffs’ amended complaint do not qualify as failure to warn
claims, including those arising from Quaker’s obligations to “monitor” and administer the
chemicals.
Quaker’s involvement in monitoring and servicing the administration of the draw
compounds is established by deposition testimony filed in response to its motion for summary
disposition. For example, Arthur Helmstetter, a Quaker employee, described Quaker’s chemical
management services as “assist[ing] General Motors in making sure that the chemical is
functioning as it’s designed,” and “monitor[ing] concentration.” Another Quaker employee,
Katherine Coughenour, averred in an affidavit, “Quaker technicians have been assigned to GM
Metal Fab on a part-time basis, and their role was principally to test GM’s draw compounds for
concentration and integrity and to make recommendations to GM as necessary.” The record
evidence supports plaintiffs’ claims that Quaker undertook duties besides simply supplying the
chemicals.
The majority holds that the sophisticated user doctrine applies to Quaker’s monitoring
and management of the chemicals, explaining in the lead opinion,
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In Irrer,[1] the defendant also provided chemical management services,
and that court still concluded that the statutory sophisticated user doctrine applied.
More importantly, our Supreme Court has ruled that Michigan’s tort reform
legislation has displaced the common law. Greene, supra.[2] Therefore, the
statutory sophisticated user doctrine applies irrespective of whether defendant
provided chemical management services under contract. [Ante at 16.]
In Irrer, the district court granted the defendant Milacron’s motion for “partial summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to warn claims.” Id. at 678. The district court’s opinion simply
does not address whether the sophisticated user doctrine barred claims other than those involving
a failure to warn. Greene, too, is purely a failure to warn case. The first sentence of the
Supreme Court’s opinion states, “In this case we consider the scope of a manufacturer’s or
seller’s duty to warn of product risks under MCL 600.2948(2).” Greene, supra at 504. The
plaintiff in Greene alleged that the defendants had breached their duty to warn of a product’s
hazards, and that they also breached an implied warranty by failing to adequately label the
product as toxic. Id. at 506. These allegations indisputably qualify as failure to warn claims, and
do not implicate other forms of negligence.
In this case, the circuit court denied Quaker’s motion for summary disposition regarding
the sophisticated user doctrine, and did not specifically address whether the doctrine would apply
to the other theories of negligence pleaded in plaintiffs’ complaint. The lead opinion reversing
the circuit court’s sophisticated user doctrine ruling provides only cursory treatment of the
remaining negligence claims, and wholly ignores the statutory language clearly and
unambiguously limiting application of the sophisticated user doctrine to failure to warn claims.
In my view, summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claims that do not involve a failure to warn theory
are not subject to dismissal under the sophisticated user statute. Therefore, I would remand for
further proceedings regarding plaintiffs’ other negligence claims.
III. Quaker’s Actual Knowledge of a Product Defect
Plaintiffs additionally argue that the sophisticated user doctrine does not apply in light of
MCL 600.2949a, which provides,
In a product liability action, if the court determines that at the time of
manufacture or distribution the defendant had actual knowledge that the product
was defective and that there was a substantial likelihood that the defect would
cause the injury that is the basis of the action, and the defendant willfully
disregarded that knowledge in the manufacture or distribution of the product, then
sections 2946(4), 2946a, 2947(1) to (4), and 2948(2) do not apply. [Footnote
omitted.]
1
Irrer v Milacron, Inc, 484 F Supp 2d 677 (ED Mich, 2007).
2
Greene v A P Products, Ltd, 475 Mich 502; 717 NW2d 855 (2006).
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This statutory exception limits the sophisticated user doctrine, § 2947(4). According to the
unambiguous language of § 2949a, the sophisticated user doctrine does not apply to the instant
case if the court determines that (1) Quaker had “actual knowledge” that the draw compounds
were defective, (2) a “substantial likelihood” existed that the draw compounds’ defects would
cause the injuries that plaintiffs allege, and (3) Quaker “willfully disregarded” that knowledge in
distributing the product to GM.
The lead opinion observes that “the language used in MCL 600.2949a requires the
defendant to have ‘actual knowledge that the product was defective,’ not actual knowledge that a
product is so dangerous that it is defective.” Ante at 22. According to the majority, Quaker’s
actual knowledge regarding dangers and “adverse health effects” of the draw compounds does
not equate to knowledge that the products qualified as defective. Id. The lead opinion therefore
concludes that “plaintiffs did not establish an issue of fact under MCL 600.2949a regarding
whether defendant had actual knowledge that its draw compounds were defective.” Id. at 23.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the term “defective.” When
used in a product liability action, the term “defective” refers to inadequate warnings as well as to
deficiencies in design or manufacture. The Restatement 3d, Torts: Products Liability, defines
“categories of product defect” as follows:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains
a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a)
contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product;
(b)
is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c)
is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
[Id., § 2, p 14 (emphasis supplied).]
“It is commonly accepted that inadequate warnings alone can constitute a product defect,
whether the theory be implied warranty or strict liability in tort.” Smith v E R Squibb & Sons,
Inc, 405 Mich 79, 89; 273 NW2d 476 (1979). In my view, the majority interprets the term
“defective” too narrowly, and dispenses far too summarily with plaintiffs’ contention that
Quaker possessed actual knowledge that the draw compounds contained inadequate instructions
or warnings.
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The record evidence includes statements made by several of Quaker’s employees could
potentially satisfy the requirements of § 2949a. The circuit court did not address this issue
because it concluded that the term “defect” did not apply to inadequate warnings. I would
remand to the circuit court for consideration of whether Quaker had actual knowledge of
inadequate warnings, and whether plaintiffs can otherwise demonstrate the requirements of
§ 2949a.
IV. The Statute of Limitations
The lead opinion opines that plaintiffs’ discovery doctrine claims are governed by
Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378; 738 NW2d 664 (2007), but
declines to further analyze the statute of limitations issue because it holds that “summary
disposition was proper on a different basis.” Ante at 13. I agree with the lead opinion that
Trentadue precludes plaintiffs from utilizing the discovery doctrine to extend the time for filing
all claims except breach of warranty.3 However, in my view, at least some of the plaintiffs filed
timely claims notwithstanding the inapplicability of the discovery doctrine.
The period of limitation in a product liability action is three years. MCL 600.5805(13).
This three-year period “runs from the time the acclaim accrues,” which is defined as “the time
the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.”
MCL 600.5827. To determine whether the statute of limitations has expired, the circuit court
must first identify both “the wrong upon which the claim is based,” and the date the “wrong” was
done. Our Supreme Court has explained that this calculation is intended to yield “the date on
which the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s negligent act, not the date on which the
defendant acted negligently.” Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 531, 534-535; 536 NW2d 755
(1995); see also Trentadue, supra at 388 (“The wrong is done when the plaintiff is harmed rather
than when the defendant acted.”) (internal quotation omitted). After determining the date on
which the plaintiff sustained the injury underlying a claim, the circuit court must determine
whether the plaintiff filed a lawsuit within three years of that date.
Plaintiff Dale Parker allegedly suffers from disabling occupational asthma. He worked at
GM until 1998, and filed this lawsuit approximately a year later. Medical records supplied by
Parker indicate that his occupational asthma was not diagnosed until 1998. The record does not
reflect when the injury that produced the asthma occurred. The circuit court found,
In 1989 Mr. Parker indicated that he was experiencing a loss of smell. In
1992 Mr. Parker’s doctor issued a restrictive note saying that Mr. Parker should
not work around fumes. Mr. Parker reported that when he left the plant or went
on vacation he felt much better and felt that his injury was plant related.
Therefore, Mr. Parker’s SOL ran in 1995.
3
MCL 600.5833 provides, “In actions for damages based on breach of a warranty of quality or
fitness the claim accrues at the time the breach of the warranty is discovered or reasonably
should be discovered.”
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If the injury Parker claims in this case relates to his loss of smell, the circuit court correctly
analyzed the applicable statute of limitations. But if Parker’s claim derives from his
occupational asthma, the fact that he lost his sense of smell in 1989 does not define when he
sustained the harm to his lungs that caused his asthma.
Plaintiff Ronnie Thedford suffers from pulmonary fibrosis, which was diagnosed in April
1997, clearly within three years of this lawsuit’s filing date. The circuit court focused on the fact
that in 1967, Thedford “reported to his physician that he thought his respiratory conditions were
caused by workplace exposures to fumes.” This observation does not resolve the legal question
when “the wrong [was] done” that is the subject of Thedford’s claims for damages . If exposure
to Quaker’s chemicals had caused Thedford’s pulmonary fibrosis by 1967, the circuit court
correctly analyzed the date of accrual. Because the circuit court employed a discovery rule
analysis rather than applying the plain language of MCL 600.5827, however, I would remand for
reconsideration of the applicable date of accrual for each plaintiff, based on proper statutory
criteria.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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