IN RE EMILY JOY LAKE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of EMILY JOY LAKE, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 21, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 282036
Midland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-000410-NA
LYNNAE LAKE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, proceeding in propria persona, appeals as of right the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights to the minor child Emily under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (c)(i),
(c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I
Respondent’s children, Mary, Laura, and Emily, were adjudicated temporary court wards
in 1999, after respondent entered a plea of admission to allegations that she physically abused
her oldest child, Mary. Mary established her independence shortly before her 18th birthday,
Laura and Emily were placed in the custody of their father, Robert Lake, and the court
terminated its jurisdiction over all three children. Respondent later regained custody of Laura
and Emily.
In 2004, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) received a report that respondent
had physically abused Laura and Emily. The DHS sent a Protective Services worker, Larry
Hycki, to the children’s private religious school to interview Laura. In accordance with
respondent’s prior instructions, school officials notified respondent. Respondent arrived at the
school and attempted to forcibly enter a locked conference room where Hycki was interviewing
Laura, and yelled at Laura not to cooperate with Hycki. Respondent removed Emily from her
classroom and fled the county, and Laura was taken into protective custody and placed with
Mary. Respondent’s whereabouts were not discovered for more than a year, until summer 2005,
when respondent was located in Oregon.
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In the meantime, the trial court held an adjudicative bench trial in respondent’s absence
and found a factual basis for asserting jurisdiction over Laura and Emily. Soon afterward Laura
was dismissed from the court’s jurisdiction when she reached the age of 18. After respondent
and Emily were discovered in Oregon, they were returned to Michigan.
Respondent and the DHS repeatedly clashed over respondent’s case service plan.
Respondent accused the DHS, its employees, and its contract service providers of being
incompetent and dishonest. She resisted working with any service provider under contract with
the state, and preferred to choose her own counselors. She maintained that the DHS intended to
obstruct her efforts at reunification, no matter what she did. Respondent was not offered
visitation with Emily until July 2006, and then under conditions that the DHS believed were
necessary for Emily’s protection and welfare. In early 2007, the trial court ordered therapeutic
joint counseling with Susan Finley to work toward reunification. Respondent found Finley
objectionable and refused to actively engage in individual therapy with Finley as a prerequisite to
joint therapy with Emily. Respondent also was unwilling to execute releases to allow Finley to
share information with the DHS. Joint therapy never took place. The DHS eventually filed a
supplemental petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights. Following a six-day
hearing, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to Emily.
II
Respondent first challenges the trial court’s adjudication order, arguing that it is invalid
because she was not properly served with notice of the adjudication hearing. “Matters affecting
the court's exercise of its jurisdiction may be challenged only on direct appeal of the
jurisdictional decision, not by collateral attack in a subsequent appeal of an order terminating
parental rights.” In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679-680; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Thus, this
issue is not properly before the Court.
In any event, there was no error in service. MCL 712A.13 “permits a court to evaluate
evidence other than testimony or a motion and affidavit when determining whether notice can be
made by substituted service.” In re SZ, 262 Mich App 560, 568; 686 NW2d 520 (2004). The
trial court properly determined that personal service was not practicable because respondent had
absconded with Emily and her whereabouts could not be determined. Thus, substituted service
by publication was proper. MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b).
III
Respondent next argues that the DHS violated constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures when it entered a private, religious school to interview Laura
without her consent. She argues that MCL 722.628(8) is unconstitutional to the extent that it
requires private schools to cooperate with DHS investigations. We conclude that this issue
affords no basis for relief for several reasons.
First, this issue challenges the admissibility of evidence at the adjudicatory hearing and,
therefore, constitutes an improper collateral attack on the trial court’s jurisdictional decision. In
re Gazella, supra at 679-680.
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Second, respondent did not preserve this issue by raising it below, thus limiting review to
plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 274; 715 NW2d 290
(2006). Although the court in Doe v Heck, 327 F3d 492, 517 (CA 7, 2003), concluded that “it is
patently unconstitutional for governmental officials to search the premises of a private or
parochial school and/or seize a child attending that school without a warrant or court order,
probable cause, consent, or exigent circumstances,” the record in this case discloses that Hycki
had probable cause to interview Laura because of suspected physical abuse. Hycki was
investigating a specific report of physical abuse involving a specific individual. Thus, there was
no plain error.
Third, constitutional rights are personal, and a person generally does not have standing to
raise an objection to the violation of another person’s constitutional rights. Brinkley v Brinkley,
277 Mich App 23, 33; 742 NW2d 629 (2007); In re Investigative Subpoena re Homicide of
Lance C Morton, 258 Mich App 507, 509; 671 NW2d 570 (2003). Respondent lacks standing to
assert any alleged violation of the school’s constitutional rights, and, even assuming that
respondent could assert Laura’s constitutional rights in her capacity as Laura’s parent,
respondent is not attempting to act on Laura’s behalf to vindicate Laura’s rights. Rather, she is
seeking to exclude evidence against herself for an alleged violation of Laura’s rights.
Fourth, to the extent that respondent relies on the exclusionary rule to argue that an
alleged constitutional violation required that any evidence arising from the interview with Laura
be excluded, she has not demonstrated that the rule properly applies in this case. The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights.
People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 529; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). The exclusionary rule generally
requires that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment be excluded from a criminal
trial. People v Dagwan, 269 Mich App 338, 342; 711 NW2d 386 (2005). Respondent has not
provided any authority establishing that the exclusionary rule applies by analogy to child
protective actions. For these reasons, we reject this claim of error.
IV
Respondent also argues that the referee exceeded her authority by signing several orders
on behalf of the trial judge. The trial court considered this issue and indicated that it had signed
all orders. The court acknowledged that the referee’s initials appeared next to many of the
signatures, but explained that this was “just a cross check on the – on the content of the order.”
Thus, there is no merit to this issue.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erroneously gave a “verbal order” permitting
Hycki to take Laura into protective custody. MCR 3.963(A) provides that an officer “may
without court order remove a child from the child’s surroundings and take the child into
protective custody if, after investigation, the officer has reasonable grounds to conclude that the
health, safety, or welfare of the child is endangered.” Thus, Hycki and the police officers who
assisted him were authorized to take Laura into protective custody after she revealed that
respondent had physically abused her and after respondent tried to forcibly intervene and
threatened to take Emily out of state. Accordingly, a verbal order from a judge or referee was
not required.
V
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Next, respondent argues that the DHS violated state and federal law by removing the
children from her care without making sufficient efforts to avoid the need for removal. This
argument is disingenuous considering that it was respondent’s own actions of abandoning Laura
and fleeing the state with Emily that gave the DHS no option but to place Laura in care and take
Emily into custody when she was found. Furthermore, respondent’s argument that the DHS was
legally obligated to provide reunification services is based on inapplicable law. She relies on 42
USC 671, a provision in the federal Adoptions and Safe Family Act, but this statute governs state
agency eligibility for federal aid for child protective and foster care services. It addresses the
DHS’s eligibility for aid, but it does not confer any rights on parents in child protection
proceedings. Respondent’s reliance on MCL 722.6 is also misplaced. This statute concerns outof-state child support obligations for emancipated minors. It does not apply here.
VI
In a lengthy critique of the DHS, respondent argues, in essence, that the DHS mishandled
her case such that the termination order should be found invalid or unfair. She argues that the
DHS failed to offer meaningful services to work toward reunification, failed to fairly evaluate
her progress, and proceeded as if termination of her parental rights was a foregone conclusion no
matter what she did.
This argument is based entirely on respondent’s one-sided, self-serving view of the case.
There is ample evidence that the DHS made reasonable efforts to provide counseling and other
services to respondent, including plans for joint therapy with Emily, but respondent’s continual
distrust of the system and failure to cooperate frustrated the reunification efforts and prevented
her from benefiting from services. We therefore reject this claim of error.
VII
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We review the trial
court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo Minors,
462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i),
(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), which allow for termination under the following circumstances:
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or
physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent's act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse
and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer
from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home.
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
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dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child's age.
(ii)
Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the
court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those
conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent
has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to
rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions
will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
***
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age.
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home
of the parent.
There was ample evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights under these
grounds.
The principal issues in these proceedings were respondent’s history of domestic violence
toward her children, her failure to benefit from past services, and her failure to address and
control her tendency for violence. There was clear and convincing evidence that respondent
physically abused her oldest daughter Mary in 1999, and abused Laura and Emily in 2004.
Investigators found bruises on Mary in 1999, and she entered a plea of admission to that incident.
Laura informed Hycki that respondent had abused her and Emily in 2004, and respondent was
convicted of domestic violence against Laura. Although respondent challenges the reliability
and credibility of this evidence, repeatedly insisted that she entered a false plea of admission
under duress, and accused Mary and the DHS of inducing Laura to lie, the trial court was in a
superior position to evaluate the weight and credibility of this evidence.
There was clear evidence that respondent would not, and did not, benefit from services.
Respondent explained that she was unwilling to cooperate with Angela Dykes’s program because
she did not want to incriminate herself with respect to her criminal action, but Dykes gave
respondent the option of addressing matters other than those that were the subject of the criminal
proceeding. Respondent also maintains that she would not admit to domestic violence because
she never committed acts of domestic violence, but the trial court was free to believe the clear
evidence to the contrary. Respondent refused to cooperate with therapists except those who she
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chose herself, who accepted her version of events, and who seemed to share her ideological
beliefs concerning the DHS and the foster care system.
Respondent argues that the DHS had no basis for believing that she abused her children,
or failed to benefit from services. She contends that the DHS was biased and retaliated against
her because she stood up for her rights, but the evidence does not support this view. Respondent
failed to make any differentiation among the different workers and programs. Although she
accuses caseworker Brenda McClellan of sabotaging visits, McClellan generally provided
favorable reports regarding visitation. It was respondent who continuously failed to honestly
review her own actions and admit wrongdoing. Respondent’s extreme attitude toward the DHS
was not objectively rational, and was more revealing of an inability or unwillingness to frankly
address the domestic violence problem than a sincere concern for reforming the system.
Respondent clearly evinced a greater interest in her own agenda than her children’s
welfare when she abandoned Laura and fled with Emily. She separated Emily from her father,
sisters, and every aspect of her normal life, and left her vulnerable to several strangers who
provided lodging and transportation. Although respondent allegedly believed that Mary was a
bad influence, she made no effort to intervene or participate in proceedings to protect Laura’s
interests.
This evidence supports termination of respondent’s parental rights under each of the
statutory grounds cited by the trial court. Respondent’s incidents of violence, and her failure to
benefit from services she received between 1999 and 2007 support a finding that she physically
abused her children and that the abuse is likely to recur if Emily is returned to her care. Emily
was made a temporary court ward because of respondent’s propensity to expose her to violence
and other dangerous, volatile situations. Respondent made no progress at remedying these
circumstances.
Lastly, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was not in Emily’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5), In re Trejo Minors, supra at 354. On the
contrary, Emily told three of her therapists that she did not want to return to respondent, and she
feared being abused if she did. The trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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